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ABSTRACT
THE SELF, ETHICS AND POWER:

DEPTH IN AUGUSTINE, FOUCAULT AND
MERLEAU-PONTY
SEPTEMBER, 1988

ROMAND COLES, B.S., WESTERN WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY
M.A., WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by:

Professor William E. Connolly

This dissertation seeks to address the problems of
nihilism, normalization and atomistic egoism through

discussion of the self, ethics and power.

a

It aims at

the exploration and elaboration of a dialogical artistic

ethos that accents the value of diversity.

Augustine

is an important figure in this project because of his

critique of the egoism of the Roman pagan self.

Equally

important is his alternative conf essing-self which seeks
to divert the externally directed lust of the egoistic

self inward into the self's depths where it seeks God's
truth.

Augustine's alternative is problematic, and some

of these problems come to light in Foucault's critique of

the confessing quality of modern selves even though the

latter are not to be equated with Augustine's conception.

Foucault's critique of the modern episteme and modern

practices sheds light on modernity's tendencies towards

nihilism and normalization.

This essay argues that far

vii

from being nihilistic, Foucault's
notion of a dialogical
artistic ethos goes a good distance
towards addressing
the problems of nihilism and
normalization he acutely
identifies. Merleau-Ponty s philosophy
in many ways
enhances Foucault's position. Merleau-Ponty
s theory of
"depth being- elucidates the intercorporeality
of world
in a way that emphasizes the value of
our dialogical
'

'

relations with different others.

His discussions of

aesthetics and artists are important for

a further

elaboration of the dialogical artistic ethos and his
political writings allow us to develop the interrelations

between this ethos and democratic politics.

Yet there are

important differences between Merleau-Ponty and Foucault
and they stem in large part from Merleau-Ponty s effort
'

to salvage - albeit in a radically transformed manner -

certain theoretical dimensions we find in Augustine's
thought.

In the final chapter the three theorists are

brought together to access the relative merits of their
rhetorical and philosophical similarities and differences.

Much of the discussion revolves around each philosopher's

conception of depth, since the latter is

a

central concern

of each, through which each develops positions on the

central problems addressed in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Natural ecologists know that the boundaries
between
two different ecological communities

between a forest and a meadow

-

-

for example, that

often harbor a greater

variety and density of life than either of the two
distinct communities alone.

These edges are "special

meeting grounds" and "the mingling of animals from
different ecosystems charges such border zones with

evolutionary potential." 1

This fertility is often

referred to as the "edge effect" and the edge itself
wears the formal nomenclature "ecotone."

The etymology

of the latter word is of some significance, stemming from

the Greek "oikos" or habitation and "tonos" or tension.

"Ecotone" and "edge effect" call our attention to the

life-engendering character of the ambiguous tensionladen dwelling which emerges at the intersection between

differently constituted regions:

they speak of the

pregnancy of edges.
This dissertation is about edges, not those between
forests and grasslands, but those between self and other,
and those between differences within the self.

The edges

humans are most familiar with are often not pregnant with
life, but rather zones of destruction, boundaries between

1

warring countries.

Western civilization has

a

long and

dark history with respect to edges; it
tends to view them
as indicative of an evil that lies
on the other
side; it

constitutes them as regions to be forever
thrust back and
ultimately eliminated at the moment when we
conguer the
Other.
Yet it is not just specific edges which
pose
problems, but edges per se - we are a civilization
that

on the whole - at least since Plato - dreams
of a reality

without wild edges,

a

world encompassed within one Reason.

In the shadow of this dream it is little wonder that
our

approach to edges is obliterating and that when we are
involved, edges are localities desolate rather than

fructiferous.
Yes, our wretched edges are a hauntingly ubiquitous

phenomenon.

Our history is overflowing with barren

boundaries; those between master and slave, capitalist
and worker, humans and nature, male and female, white and
black,

"normal" and "abnormal."

Of course, each of these

oppositions is distinguished by specificities that are
far greater than the thin breath of ink called "comma"

which separates them might indicate.
in this sequence.

Yet there is sense

In each case, the hegemonic category

seeks to master and determine that which it is not.

The

master masters the slave by ensuring both the distinction
between the two and the former's rule over the latter.
The "normal" masters the "abnormal" sometimes through

2

.

categorization, condemnation and ostracization,
sometimes
by "helping, » "healing" and pressuring
in ways which draw
it into the circle of the Same.
in both cases
however,

what is

-

or is to be

-

and being of the Other.

eliminated is the unmastered voice
Thus, even where a difference is

constituted and perpetuated as essential

master and slave

-

-

for example,

the dynamic is fundamentally edge-

denying insofar as it seeks to obliterate the other's
Otherness.

[That is, here, constituting the other as

other (slave)

dynamic]

is at the center of the obliterative

Hence even many of our socially constituted

differences and the boundaries which emerge at the
interstice operate to

a

very large degree to extend

mastery, thrust back edges and eliminate others'

differences
In contrast to what appears to me to be the funda-

mental bent of our history, this dissertation seeks the

beginnings of an ethos that is attuned to the value of
edges and those differences whose communication makes them
fertile.

I

seek a reevaluation of edges and difference

-

not simply a new conceptualization of edges, but a new

reality as well, in light of

a

different conceptual

approach to and participation in the formation of edges.
It is my sense that the project of formulating an edge-

affirming ethos, and creating differences in light of
this ethos, must be one of the most fundamental dimensions

3

of our efforts to remedy our
contemporary social and
political problems. So long as
edges and

diversity remain

anathema, we are doomed to a
politics and life of explicit
or insidious conquest, a politics
that seeks to obliterate
the otherness of others and in so
doing devitalizes the
human and natural world. Of course,
I am not arguing that
worldly change can be accomplished by
the development

of a

new ethos alone.

Our ideas, attitudes and practices to
a

large extent germinate within and are
perpetuated by the
institutions we inhabit, and change requires
that careful
attention be given to reality in all its dimensions.
My
argument is simply that the ethical dimension is
critical
and in this dissertation it is my primary focus.
Augustine, whom

I

explore in the first section is

a

fascinating figure in light of these issues, for he has

a

heightened sense and profound analysis of one important
mode of being which transforms the edge into
it seeks to master all that is not the self:

a

war zone as
namely, that

of the egoistic self of ontological conceit which takes

itself as the ground of being.

By carefully developing

Augustine's critique of the Roman pagan self, we gain
a critical elaboration of the dynamics and consequences

of egoism which is extremely insightful and serves as
a warning beacon of that from which we must steer clear

in our efforts to formulate an ethos with a greater

appreciation of difference.

4

Augustine attempts, through his notion
of the
confessing-self, to formulate an ethos
which does not
collapse everything to the self. The

latter turns away

from the lust to dominate the world
and towards the
depths of its soul, where it seeks to
fashion even its
most fleeting desires in obedience to God's
truth and
morality.
Augustine seeks to escape the tyranny of
others' domination and conform to God in the
depths of
his soul, and this involves a profound recognition
that

others too are deep, diverse signs of God's polyphonous

voice rather than beings flattened to their "being-forthe-self."

Yet if Augustine opens the space for an

appreciation of others that appears to have been lacking
in decadent Rome, his relation to that which does not

"face God" is - in a sense developed in the concluding

section

-

monological:

that which is not obedient to

God is "nothingness" and hence we discover that the

confessing-self confronts its Other
sanctioned by God

- in a

-

that which is not

manner that is very different

but every bit as relentless and extirpating as the pagan
self.

For all of Augustine's profound insights into

depth, remembering, willing and unifying the scattered

self in confession, the edge at which he faces the non-

Christian

-

even within himself

-

is still a battlefield,

not a region of fertile intermingling.

Thus,

in this

respect, Augustine's confessing-self inadvertently

5

provides another beacon of
warning of an ethos that
still seeks to endlessly
thrust back edges, one
that
proceeds not from the self, but

from the one true God.

in section two

I

begin by elaborating Foucault's

analysis of the "normalizing"
tendencies that characterize
much of the concrete functioning
of power in modernity.
I briefly summarize his
critique of normalization as it
operates through "panoptic power"
and confessing practices
which assert that we harbor "deep
truths" within us which
we must carefully decipher and
follow.
I then explore
these themes at a meta-theoretical level
in his writing
on the modern episteme in The Order of
Thing s Whe n
Foucault's theoretical work is read in light
of his

genealogies and vice versa, his work as
a level of

a whole acquires

profundity missed by many of his interpreters.

In contrast to Augustine,

for whom depth is the dimension

of freedom, according to Foucault, depth is the dimension

of subjugation.

It is that dimension in which we rout out

the other and constitute ourselves in light of hegemonic
norms.

That we cannot "get to the bottom" of depth in

modernity does not signify that we have somehow come to
accept

a

degree of otherness, rather it merely ensures

the endlessness of subjugative interrogations.
Yet if Foucault's critique is extremely illuminating
of modern approaches to edges, equally interesting is the

alternative "ethos" which has guided most of his work.

6

in contrast to most of Foucault's
critics, who essentially

charge Foucault with nihilism,

work

I

argue that Foucault's

the content of his critique, its style
and the
positive directions towards which it gestures is
-

constituted around

a

dialogical artistic ethic which

affirms the importance of difference and the
desirability
of giving shape to our individual lives and
social milieu
in light of a "limit attitude" that affirms
edges
and

enriches human relations.

Indeed,

far from being a

nihilist, Foucault offers us important insights into

the possibility of ethics in

Merleau-Ponty, to whom

a
I

post-metaphysical age.
devote section three, is

a philosopher and political theorist for whom depth is
a central concern.

Yet depth is not a dimension which

promises total identification, but rather

dimension

a

of the concealed in which things always partially exceed

and resist our gaze.

Through an exploration of Merleau-

Ponty 's philosophy of depth (Etre profond)

articulate an ontology which harbors

a

I

begin to

profound awareness

and reverence for the edge between the self and other as

well as that which inhabits the terrain beyond this edge.

This insight acquires a particularly social significance
in light of Merleau-Ponty ' s thoughts on the "intercor-

poreality" of depth.

I

attempt to gather these insights

together, and draw on his writings on art and politics
as well,

in an effort to develop an ethics and politics

7

.

of depth and distinction which extends
the dialogical

artistic ethos initially formulated in the
section on
Foucault
In the conclusion

I

contemplate the virtues and

dangers of each theorist in light of the
insights
offered by the others. Particular focus is
given to
the significance of the ontological and rhetorical

differences between Merleau-Ponty and Foucault with
respect to their mutual gestures towards

artistic ethos.

a

dialogical

Finally, a brief and highly provisional

effort is made to formulate a few of the concrete social
and political implications of the insights which emerge
in this dissertation.

8

CHAPTER II

AUGUSTINE

Introducti on

From unfathomable depths a question emerges
whose
answer lies most profoundly in the question
itself.

Augustine queries:
nature am I?" 1

"What then am

I,

o my God?

What

This is the question through which the

Confessions are created; the restless question through

which Augustine is created; and hence the mysterious
question that transforms the self
-

-

the question's answer

as both the subject and object of the question.

It is a

question whose character and limits are defined by the God
he evokes

- a

God who guides the most sincere questioners.

With a passion rarely equaled in the history of western
thought Augustine pursues this question in search of the
deep truths within himself.

In his peculiar occupation of

this question he signifies the dawn of the hermeneutic
self.

In his most revealing moment he answers the

question thus:

"I have become a question to myself." 2

"What is Augustine?"

Augustine is a being whose

being is defined by the restlessness and depth of his
self-examination.

Augustine is a conf essing-self

;

a

self that continually faces itself in the endless task
of discovering and telling the deepest truths about

9

"

itself.

Augustine is a self that is itself
into which it continually delves;
a soil

a

"soil"

"heavy with

sweat

.

Augustine's Confessions is an exemplary
manifestation of a new way of being.
it is the gesture, the
expression, the act of a new form of self.

Long before

Michel Foucault, Augustine himself defined
the Christian
self in contrast to all previous forms of
selves,

through the act of confession.

in part

Even the Platonists, with

so many insights which Augustine respected,
inhabited a

region far on the other side of

a

gigantic chasm with

respect to the type of selves they were.
show nothing of the tears of confession.

"Their pages
1,3

The confessing-self is distinguished from previous

selves in that it is constituted through a very peculiar
movement:

the movement of the self towards deciphering

its own depths.

In a most fundamental sense, the

confessing-self is this movement.

In its ceaseless

journey to reveal and examine its interior, it becomes
a being of depth.

The confessing-self dwells in its

depth, the dimension which is simultaneously its most

profound discovery and that which makes confession both
possible and necessary.
As we inhabit the movements of Augustine's heart

and mind in his Confessions

,

we can begin to sense in

a

profound and not entirely expressible manner, how it was

10

.

to be as Augustine was.

The remarkable manner in which

Augustine attempts to confront the deepest
realms of
himself, offers us a valuable access
to Augustine's
being-as-conf essor
Yet continual confession is not a way
of being
of which Augustine is merely an innocent
and unwitting

manifestation.

As a particular expression of a new
way

of being, a way of being which one is not
unless one

chooses to become such through conversion,
Augustine

continually makes explicit the fact that he is

confessing-self

.

a

Unlike modern "western man," who

inhabits a world which Michel Foucault argues has
"become a singularly confessing society," 4 a society
in which confession is a constitutive element of so many

of our practices, institutions, discourses and ideals,

one in which all confess and all are born to be confessors
-

Augustine inhabits a world in which non-confessing modes

of being have been hegemonic.

Augustine's world is one in

which people are for the most part born non-confessors and
the techniques for producing conf essing-selves with which

the modern world is saturated are largely absent.

Augustine is quite aware that deep reflexivity is
"different" mode of being.

Hence
a

(This is not to say that

Augustine was one of the only conf essing-selves of his
day.

The early monastic self-examinations and the "self-

publication" in penitential rites were both important

11

f

.

mechanisms for producing conf essing-selves

5

Further,

as Peter Brown has noted, Augustine
associated with a
group of people concerned with "the
events of their inner
life."
Yet the techniques of confession
were not nearly
as pervasive nor as dominant as they
are today - and

Augustine in any case was extreme in his
confessing. 7

)

The Confessions offers us more than an
experience
of an early Christian's attempt to truly
become

confessing-self
self-reflection

What makes this book

.

-

so fertile,

deep self-reflection itself.
confession.

I

-

a

this act of

is that it is largely about

Augustine confesses about

know of few books that are so thoroughly

about themselves.

Hence, the Confessions provides us

with an opportunity to begin to apprehend confession as
a confessing-self apprehended it from within confession.

Through a close reading of the Confessions

,

we can start

to perceive the way in which a confessor at the dawn of

confession could affirm confession as

a

mode of being.

Yet if we are to begin to experience and understand

this early confessing-self, it is insufficient to look

merely at this self's sel -understanding
conversion and subsequent life as

a

.

Augustine's

confessor welled out

of his perception of the late antique Roman pagan world

and the type of selves which he believed constituted that
world.

If it is true that Augustine was a confessing-self

because he thought confession was synonymous with being,

12

it is equally true and equally
important, that Augustine

viewed the non-confessing Roman self
as the origin of nonbeing.
Hence it is only through a textured
understanding
of Augustine's analysis of the way
of being which he
rejected, that we can comprehend the mode
he affirmed.

In the discussions of the Roman
pagan self and the

Christian confessing self which follow,

I

have focused

particularly upon the specificity of and interrelationships between three dimensions which consistently

characterize Augustine's analysis.

One of these is the

importance Augustine places upon attempting to understand

both the implicit and explicit ontological framework

within which different selves constitute themselves.
Closely related to this dimension are Augustine's efforts
to disclose the deep psychological characteristics of

selves.

Indeed, the ontological and psychological

dimensions are generally so inextricably intertwined in

Augustine's analysis that we might best describe his
studies as "psycho-ontological

.

"

Finally, it is crucial

to realize that Augustine does not view the self as a

static entity, but rather as

a

being characterized by its

dynamic relations with itself and the world.

It is these

relations which Augustine seeks to discern; and because
they are dynamic he is primarily concerned with the

trajectory that different types of selves assume:

13

either

towards strength, unity, love, truth
and God or towards
weakness, dispersion, concupiscence
and illusion.

The salience of these three
dimensions will become
clearer in light of the following
discussion. We will
begin with Augustine 's critique of
the Roman pagan self
in an effort to situate the discussion
of Augustine's
confessing-self which will follow.

Augustine's Critique of

fche

Roman Pagan Self

Augustine recounts the history of Rome as

a

long dark

succession of conquests, civil wars, tyrannies, rapes

seemingly endless tale of subjugation.

- a

It is a history of

cruelty that was driven by the "lust for domination" 8 and
the quest for glory.

Even Rome's peace was structured

around the dominion of some people over others.

Yet

domination is never understood by Augustine to rise
out of particular social and political organizations.
Instead, Rome's social structures and the horrors so

often associated with them, are always perceived to

originate from the Roman pagan self's way of being.
Slavery, poverty, bloodshed and obscenities are simply

manifestations of selves in error:
terrena

.

selves of civitas

How does Augustine understand this Roman pagan

self - this self whose pervasive causality echoes so

violently across the face of the earth?

14

Following scripture, Augustine argues
that pride is
the start of the evil will [and]...
of every kind of sin."*
Rome's lust for dominion originates
in pride.
Yet what
is pride?
Simply a moral error? Pride certainly
has a

moral and psychological character, but
more profoundly,
the psychological "longing for a perverse
kind of
10
exaltation"
is intertwined with an ontological

error.

Viewed ontologically, "this then is the
original evil:
man regards himself as his own light " 11 (my

emphasis).

For Augustine, God is the ground and origin of
all
being.

He is the "light" which gives Being, Truth and

Goodness to all beings and He illuminates His creation
and thereby makes it perceptible to these beings.

The

ontological error committed by the proud, is to view

themselves as self-originating light:
being.

self-originating

Under the sway of this profound ontological error

people view themselves as the independent source of their
own existence and as the source of the light in which the

truth about other beings is illuminated as well.

For the

proud self, being and truth originate in the self alone.

Concerning the fall from the garden Augustine writes that

Adam and Eve "made themselves their own ground" instead
of adhering to the "real ground of their being." 12

Already we begin to see the way in which psychology
and ontology are inseparable in Augustine's analysis.
He argues that this perverse "exaltation derives from

15

a fault in

character "" (my emphasis).

character however, is

a

The fault in

very specific fault which
refers

to the ontological dimension,
namely the desire to be

self-originating being.

The essence of the conceit that

is the origin of all evil is that
it is ontological

conceit.

As the primordial conceit, ontological
conceit
is the origin and basis for all
other conceit.
In taking itself to the origin of its
own being, the

self of the purest form of ontological conceit
renunciates
its relations of reciprocity with and its
dependence upon

the world, others and God.

Freed from all necessary

relationships with anything that is "other" than itself,
the self becomes conditionless and absolute.

As absolute,

the self lives according to itself and grants itself

universal status.

In Augustine's words, the self lives

"by the rule of itself." 14

Lest we fall prey to an oversimplification of

Augustine's understanding of pagan selves and the possibility of a misleading anachronism, these lines should
be read with caution and deserve further clarification.

Augustine's description of the "origin of all evil" should
not be construed in a manner that would establish an

identity between Roman pagan selves and "modern subjects."
If pagan selves could simply be reduced to the pure form

of ontological conceit described above, such a comparison

might be inviting.

Modern subjects as we find described

16

and criticized variously in many
of Heidegger and Hegel's
texts (among others) seem to exemplify
some of the
qualities that Augustine believed were
most at the heart
of evil:
the self being its own ground,
living according
to its own rule.
Yet - with the exception of
Augustine 's
analysis of the most wicked who seek to
master the earth his writing on the Roman pagan self
reflects an awareness
of the extent to which ontological conceit
manifests

itself in a highly differentiated world of
beliefs and
events; a world originating in, sustained and
exacerbated
by ontological conceit, yet one in which the latter

frequently did not appear on the surface of beliefs and
events in the pure form described here.
a

Certainly it is

world far from that of modern selves in important ways.

Once humans take themselves to be their "own light," they
lose the truths that Augustine believed only God's light

could illuminate and fall into an extended progression of
errors.

Often these errors were purely self -centered, but

often as well, they were more complicated.

In error, the

Romans invented "false gods" and religious worship that

connected them to
were dependent.

a

metaphysical world upon which they

Augustine does not argue that in the

complicated world of pagan cosmology all selves explicitly

conceived of themselves as self-originating.
•

•

•

.

Rather he

describes their metaphysics as "pitiable folly":

i

r

pitiable not only for its falsity, but also because of

17

the extent to which this metaphysics
harbored and nurtured
the germ cells of the ontological
conceit which produced
enormous cruelty and led them beyond
all bounds - even
those posed by pagan religion. According
to Augustine,
the behavior and exploits - the violence,
cruelty, lusts of the pagan gods was emblematic of
and hence fostered the
very ontological conceit and lust for
dominion in which

they originated.

While the self was not the explicit

center of Roman paganism in the large sense,
nevertheless,
on Augustine's account this paganism generated
and

encouraged thoughts, desires and practices
mode of being

-

-

the self's

that were purely self-aggrandizing.

Hence

most essentially, the pagan selves were for Augustine
selves of ontological conceit.

His discussion of

ontological conceit is an attempt to capture the origin,

essence of and driving force underneath and implicit in
the desires, thoughts and practices of Roman pagan selves
-

not an attempt to reductively equate all of their

thoughts and practices with ontological conceit in its

purest form.

I

am interested in Augustine's analysis of

the qualities and dynamic of this essence and hence pitch

my discussion at this level.

do not wish to imply a

I

reduction of the explicit religious beliefs of this self.
It is interesting to note - as

I

develop in the next

chapter - that Augustine believes that he only escapes
ontological conceit when he becomes
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a

confessing Christian

self.

Though he endorsed Christian belief

a

good deal

before his conversion, he did not truly
become a Christian
until he overcame his ontological conceit implicit in
the willing of his everyday life - b
turning
y

towards his depths and God.
in Augustine's eyes,

inward

Christianity's superiority,

lies not only in the humble place

it accords man in the grand scheme of
things, but in the

humble mode of experiencing the everyday world
at the
basic level of desire, perception, judgment.
When the self dwells in the ontology of conceit, its

experience of the world
judgment

-

- a

combination of perception and

is fundamentally transformed.

For Augustine,

"it is the nature of things considered in itself, without

regard to our convenience or inconvenience, that gives

glory to the creator." 16

Thus,

"he lives in justice who

is an unprejudiced assessor of the intrinsic value of

things." 17

Just judgment is that which judges the

intrinsic, which for Augustine always refers to God as

the condition of all beings.

Because we are finite beings

with an incomplete perspective on the world, the intrinsic
is always to a greater or lesser extent elusive.

The

world's meaning is rarely if ever simply identical with
the meanings we discover.

Hence for Augustine, the

Christian self is always aware of the incompleteness that
always points beyond to something "other" than itself and
its own experience; an incompleteness that can only be
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filled by faith.

Everything is part of that deep
design
which no human being can completely
discover. 18
For the purely self-originating self,
beings in the
world cease to have intrinsic value as
creatures of God
and cease to be evaluated with respect
to the ordered
whole of creation.
Instead, all beings - the world
itself, all that is "other" - are reduced
to being

experienced as objects that exist for this self
which
takes itself as the origin of being. The being

of all

that is not the self, all that is "other," is
reduced
to being a "being-f or-the-sel f " of ontological
conceit,

because this self has only itself to refer to.

The

salience of this problem is indicated in the first

paragraph of the City of God where Augustine characterizes
the city of this world as a place where justice is absent

from judgment.

No one can be sure they judge justly, but

Roman pagan selves do not even attempt to judge in

manner in Augustine's view.

a

just

They judge not the intrinsic

value of things, but the things' value for the self.
The proud self lives and experiences the world

according to the "flesh." by which Augustine does not
refer primarily to our physical flesh, but rather to the
self as a whole, soul and body.

Examining St. Paul's

"Epistle to the Galatians," Augustine notes that works of
the flesh "include

x

faults of the mind' such as enmity,
I

animosity and envy as well as bodily lusts.
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To live by

.

the flesh is to "live by the rule of

f ha

selj

and it ig
thus that man "becomes like the
Devil"20 (my emphasis)
To experience the world according
to the flesh
,

is to

experience the world exclusively from
the perspective of
self -centered being, and this for
Augustine is to live in
"lust" in the worst sense of the word.
Again however,
"lust" is not meant in this sense to
refer fundamentally
to the physical dimension, but rather
to the desire
of

the self of ontological conceit for an
object

conceited objectifying desire, can take
(

libido carnalis

lust for power

(

)

a

.

Lust as

bodily form

or a more psychological form as in the

libido dominandi

)

Lust is not a possibility for the proud self
a

- it is

necessity imposed by the experience it has of the world.

The self which strove for absolute freedom by taking
itself to be the condition of its own being
light,

-

its own

its own ground - culminates in the most depraved

state of slavery.

The self experiences around itself a

world of beings which have been flattened out to their
value for-the-self

.

However, this experience of the

object flattens and drains the subject as well as the
object.

Each object, as for-the-self, demands that the

self desire and appropriate it.

The self is flattened

to the single dimension of lust as it strives to conguer
a world that invites - a world that insists - that the

self subjugate it.

But at the same time the subject is
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flattened, it is crushed and dispersed
into as many
objects as it desires.

Hence the world as experienced through
ontological
conceit leads to life lived in "lust"
according
to the

"flesh."

The great intensity of this experience
can
be gleaned from Augustine's account
of his attempt

to

overcome it prior to his conversion:
When I rose against you in my
pride. .those lower things became
greater than I and pressed me under
so that I could neither loosen their
grip nor so much as breathe. Wherever
I looked they bore in upon me, massed
thick; and when I tried to think, the
images of corporeal things barred me
from turning back towards the truth,
as though they said:
"Where are you
going base and unclean?" All these
things had grown out of my wound, for
You humble the proud like one wounded;
and I was separated from You by my own
swollenness, as though my cheeks had
swelled out and closed up my eyes. 1
.

Augustine views this pre-conversion period as one when
he was so enslaved by his experience of the world

(a

world

of objects and images of objects which grew "out of his

wound") that despite his faith in holy scripture and
Christ, he was still unable to free himself from its grip

even though he longed to do so.

In spite of his efforts

to think, the world he experienced

ontological conceit
toil.

-

- a

world revealed in

conscripted him into other forms of

In this state, he was blinded by false experiences

which he could not escape.

The desire for the self's
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absolute hegemony over objects fosters

a

relentless and

in some ways more profound hegemony
of objects over the
self.

Let us explore two of the most important
and most
"enslaving" lusts that Augustine addresses,
in order to
gain a more textured understanding of his
interpretation
of the Roman pagan self.
"The most pitiless domination," Augustine
argues,
"is that exercised by this very lust for domination." 22
It is this lust to dominate other people which
dominates

"the city of this world." 23

The selves of ontological

conceit view themselves (at least implicitly, on

Augustine's account) as absolute subjects and "live
according to their own rule."

As the self ground of

being, the proud self seeks to impose its being and its

standards upon "others."

For if others were to live

according to "other" standards, the self's absoluteness
and independence would be jeopardized.

The only way this

self, which Augustine describes as a "perverted imitation

of God," 24 can maintain the illusion of being independent

and absolute in its involvement with others is by obliter-

ating others' otherness.
•

•

Hence the self "seeks to impose
•

•

its own dominion on fellow men in place of God's rule."

"The wicked.
if they can,

master." 26

.

?S

.desire to make all men their own people,
so that all men can be subservient to one

Indeed, the only peace this "puffed up" self

23

can accept, is one where it is
absolutely hegemonic. Such
a peace would confirm the
illusions which well out of
ontological conceit - all other peace
mocks these falsehoods.
Augustine asks rhetorically, "when can
that lust
for power come to rest until after
passing from one office
to another, it arrives at sovereignty." 27
Yet in attempting to impose its dominion,
the

self confronts other similar selves with
antithetical

objectives.

"Hence human society is generally divided

against itself." 28

m

absence of fear, the libido

dominandi ran its unchecked course after the destruction of Carthage, resulting in "bloody insurrection...

disastrous quarrels ... the slaughter of civil wars...
torrents of bloodshed.

cruelty

"

29

..

greed and monstrous seething

The desire to impose the self's rule

on others is the most pitiless lust, because it is the

most impossible lust to satisfy, and because it is the
most cruel.

While Augustine sees the dynamic of libido dominandi
play itself out time and time again throughout history, it
is important to note that this dynamic is a tendency of,

but not an absolute necessity for, the self of conceited
ontology.

There are times when these selves constitute

situations where this tendency is largely contained.

Fear

for example, such as that which existed in the rivalry

between Rome and Carthage, might produce "a period of high

24

moral standards "30
.

Yet tne fear

.

r

^

^.^

standards were based, was itself
grounded in the unstable
lusts of conceited ontology, lusts
which could not rest
long in a state of relative equality
with
others.

The

libido dominandi destroyed the unlikely
preconditions of
its containment and "first established
victory in a
few

powerful individuals, and then crushed the
rest of an
exhausted country beneath the yoke of slavery." 31
Likewise, the passion for glory, which itself
stems
from and is "puffed up with empty conceit" 32
may check

the other lusts for a period of time.

The object which

glory seeks is "the judgment of men when they think
well
of others." 33

Here, the self desires subjects more than

objects for itself.

The self that seeks glory depends

upon others to recognize it as the origin of the greatness

which it continually attempts to demonstrate.

Blinded by

its conceited ontology, this self strives "to do things so

that others will be 'converted' to itself." 34

in this

sense the desire for glory is another "perverted imitation
of God."

Yet while Augustine states that glory is a vice, he

recognizes that it can be regarded as a virtue as well, in
the sense that it checks other vices.

In its best form,

glory, though it seeks "merely human praise, is anxious
for the good opinion of enlightened judges." 35

desire for glory seeks to identify itself with
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This
a

good

:

that is not merely its own good, but
a good for others
as well.
Augustine praises this glory in the
early
Romans
They took no account of their own
material interests compared with
the common good... they resisted
the temptation of avarice; they
acted for the country's well-being
with disinterested concern; they
were guilty of no offence against
the law, they succumbed to no
sensual indulgence.
By such
immaculate conduct, they labored
towards honours, power and glory,
by what they took to be the true'
way. Jb

This is an extremely interesting passage, because
it illustrates Augustine's belief that the ontology of

conceit could generate desires for social recognition
that could actually give rise to what he considered to
be altruistic "praiseworthy" behavior.

(It is note-

worthy that the desire for glory is considered good in
Augustine's view only when it takes form in the world in
a way that stands in sharp contrast to the conceit in

which it is born.)

Yet like the situation of fear, the

desire for glory, as Roman history itself attests, is an
extremely unstable basis for virtue, for it preserves

a

conceited ontology that constantly threatens to engender
more depraved lusts.

Hence, at first the passion for

glory gave rise to a love of liberty, "but when liberty
had been won, such a passion for glory took hold of them,
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that liberty alone did not satisfy

-

they had to acquire

dominion.' -37

The conceit that had taken an
altruistic
form, undermined this very
altruism when freedom and
altruism became mundane and insufficient
to feed the
thirst for glory.

Thus Augustine writes that although
there is
difference between the desire for glory
and

a

the lust for

dominion, "there is a slippery slope...
from the excessive
delight in the praise of men to the burning
passion for
domination." -38 The best desire for glory
seeks the praise
of "enlightened judges," but it harbors
within it the germ
cells of deceit and domination. Furthermore,
in its
(most

common) degraded form, it enslaves people to
the judgments
of other evil men.

In this sense it enhances an experi-

ence of the world that obliterates the space for the
self
as well as the other - the world that Augustine describes
as "massed thick."

It leads to a world that "bore in

upon" him and "pressed him under."
Let us turn now to another lust which one comes

across in Augustine's writings:
lust.

Here,

I

libido carnalis or sexual

believe, Augustine is responding to another

form of what he perceived to be flattening objectification.

Without wishing in this work to explore the history

of antique sexual practices in any detail, let me simply

note a few references that might caution us against a

trite dismissal of Augustine's concern over sexuality on
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the basis of the belief that it
was due simply to his
weird personality, his personal
obsessions, etc.
However
"weird" Augustine may have been,
there is reason to
suspect that he was not responding
to nothing.

There are good reasons to believe
that antique and
late antique "sexuality" was constituted
within a set
of practices and understandings
based on a rigid split
between those who were subjects and those
who were
objects.

In the four volumes of Histoire do

ia

Seyu.lita

Michel Foucault conducts an archeological
and genealogical
study of sexuality during different periods of
western
history.

His discussion of antique Greek sexuality is

particularly interesting in that it addresses the
subjectobject dichotomy which we have argued was central to

Augustine's critique of the Roman pagan self.
Foucault rejects the notion that the modern French
"sexualite" can be used to translate the Greek term
"aphrodisia.

11

Our idea of "sexuality" does not
just cover a wider area; it applies
to a reality of another type, and it
functions quite differently in our
morals and knowledqe. Moreover, we
do not have a concept that specifies
and subsumes a set analogous to that
of aphrodisia. 39

Hence he employs the Greek term to maintain the distance

between our notions of those of antiquity.

While there

are many important differences, the one that interests
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.

us here is the way in which antique
"aphrodisia" was

totally a subject-object dichotomized
activity.
"aphrodisiazien" (the verb corresponding

when

to aphrodisia)

was employed in its active form it
referred to the
masculine subject of the sexual relation.
The passive
form of the verb referred to the
passive object -

generally women, boys, slaves or those who
through
violence found themselves "reduced to being

the object

of the other's pleasure." 40

The sexual act was one in

which active subjects viewed their potential
"partners"
as objects for the subject's pleasure.

According to

Foucault, this mode of perception and thought was a

frequent theme in antique Greek thought.

The fundamental

assumption was that the "other" (generally non-adult male)
in the sexual relation was an object-for-the-self

With respect to Rome there are indications of

objectifying sexual practices as well (though
imply an identity here)

.

I

do not

While in Book Two of The Art

of Love, Ovid argues that "men and women should share the

same pleasures," 41 his instructions are aimed at teaching

the reader how to find an "object for your love," and

Ovid assumes and affirms that each person views others as
potential objects for the self's pleasure and dominion.

When the "other" is viewed as

perception of action)

,

a

subject (of pleasure,

it is almost always in an effort

to enhance the self's dominion over the other.
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One finds

evidence of the close association
between sexual pursuit
and domination in the metaphors
and analogies which are
employed in Ovid's poetry. The male
who pursues women
is continually equated with the
soldier and (to a lesser
extent) the hunter.
indeed, "love is a species of
war42
fare."
Ovid suggests that his poetic
instructions
on

love should be used as weapons:

Achilles, so have

I

"As Vulcan made arms for

done for you:

m

he did, to conquer." 43

then use my gift, as

both Ovid and Petronius the

male sexual organ is referred to as

a weapon.

in

Petronius' Satyr icon, Polyaenus attempts to
apologize
for his impotence and writes to Circe:

one thing, not

I

"Remember this

but my instruments were at fault.

soldier was ready, but

I

The

had no weapons." 44

In short, sexual pursuit here seems to be largely

identified with struggle for dominion.

The greater

the intensity of struggle, the greater the pleasure of
conquest.

Perhaps Fellini's Satvricon provides us with

an illuminating modern artistic rendering of the inter-

twining of sexuality, domination and conceit in Rome
-

an illumination which might help us situate Augustine.
I

have come across no passages where sexual lust

is explicitly identified with the lust for dominion in

Augustine's own writing.

Rather, the closeness of the

two seems to be an assumption that haunts his work.

arguments in the City of God shift to and fro between
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The

.

the two lusts with an ease that is
often difficult for
the modern reader (given his or her
assumptions about

sexuality) to follow.

As G.

I.

Bonner argues, one area

where sexuality and the lust for
domination are brought
into a particularly close relation to
one another is in
Augustine's discussion of Roman pagan religion.
In significant f ashion.
the twin
libidines are brought together in
the official worship of pagan Rome
The glories of conquest are thought,
to depend upon ritual obscenities. 4 ^
.

.

According to Augustine both lusts originate in
ontological conceit and both are manifestations of the

enslavement of the self that occurs as the result of our
own "disobedience."

It is this latter point (which sexual

lust illustrates more lucidly than any other lust) that

Augustine seeks to elucidate throughout much of his
discussion of libido carnalis

.

In a sense it seems to be

the sexual lust's domination over the self

(a

recurrent

theme in Ovid as well) that Augustine finds more profound

than its domination over others (this latter point was

perhaps so obvious that it was taken largely for granted)
As we have seen, the self of ontological conceit

attempts to become an absolute subject who lives according
to his own rule and denies any dependence upon God and the
world.

Yet the ultimate irony of this self's claim to

be independent, self originary and self-controlling being,
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"

is that it initiates an atomization
of subjectivity which

continues beyond the level of the self.
becoming a
self of ontological conceit the
self becomes a kind of
being that is unable to control and falls victim to the process of disintegration which
it

m

sets in motion.

The conceited self is a self which,
as it tries to
separate itself off from the true source
of being and
become absolute, initiates a process of
separation and
disintegration in which parts within the self
make similar
demands for autonomy and control which the self
cannot
resist.

Augustine writes that, "the retribution for disobedience is simply disobedience itself.

For man's

wretchedness is nothing but his disobedience to
himself. 46
...he who in his pride had pleased
himself was by God's justice handed
over to himself.
But the result of
this was not that he was in every
way under his own control, but that
he was at odds with himself, and
lived a life of harsh pitiable
slavery, instead of the freedom
he so ardently desired.... 47
It seems that Augustine has two (related)

interpretations of man's fall into disobedience to
himself.

In one sense, this disobedience was inflicted

upon man by God as

a form of

God transformed man's body

-

retribution for man's pride.
it became mortal,
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and certain

parts of his flesh ceased to submit
to his will.
another sense however, Augustine
views this disobedience
to be connected in a far more
organic manner to the mode

m

of being to which the self of
ontological conceit gives
rise to.
As we have seen, the self of

ontological

conceit is trapped in

a

mode of experiencing the world

which holds sway over it even when it
tries to resist
this mode. Within this experience, the
world demands
that the self dominate it. Hence as we
have seen, the
lust for domination is a form of compulsion
which the
self is unable to control. The self becomes
subject to
a

disobedient lust within itself.

Yet this slavery may

or may not be apparent to the self, depending
upon the

extent to which the self unguestioningly affirms its

domination over others.
It is the sexual lust which most undeniably announces

the self's disobedience to itself.

Even those who affirm

this lust are continuously and obviously subject to it:
In fact, not even the lovers of this
kind of pleasure are moved... just
when they have so willed. Sometimes
the impulse is an unwanted intruder,
sometimes it abandons the eager lover,
and desires to cool off in the body
while it is at boiling heat in the
mind.
Thus strangely does the lust
refuse to be a servant... it is quite
often divided against itself.
It
arouses the mind, but does not follow
its own lead and arouse the body. 48
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The self of ontological conceit
is linked to the
world in multiple ways through the
immediacy of

desi:.res

that are evoked by the self's erroneous
experience within
which the world appears as an object-f
or-itself
The
proud self is continually thrown outside of
f
.

in

its lust to appropriate the world.
is most inward to it,

things." 49

"it casts away what

and swells greedily for outward

Embroiled in the unmediated desire for the

world around it, the self is consequently an
unreflective
self.

Augustine describes his pre-conversion period
as
one where he was "behind (his) own back." 50
It is at precisely this point that the proud
self

becomes a victim of its demand to be
subject.

a

self-originating

For the type of self which results from this

demand is so unreflective and beyond itself that it is
unable to control the various parts of its own body and
soul.

The self's ontological conceit incites the various

parts of the self in such an immediate and powerful
manner, that they become autonomous subjects themselves.

The pagan self, as an unreflective conglomeration of these
desires, is unable to control them.

Thus according to

Augustine, the atomization which the self initiated for
its own advantage when it claimed to be a self-originating

being independent from creation and God, proceeds beyond
the level of the self and actually disintegrates the ones

who attempt to "swell."
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"

The proud self becomes the
locus of multiple
subjects, each of which attempts
to govern the whole.
Sexual lust becomes uncontrollable,
and at its height
leads to a "total extinction of
mental alertness 5 1
The undeniability of the autonomy
of the sexual lust
which originates in pride, leads to
shame.
Humans are
according to Augustine, universally
"embarrassed by the
insubordination of their flesh." 52
.

Thus, Augustine tries to show not
only that the
self of ontological conceit objectifies
and attempts to

dominate the world around

it,

but further that it is an

assemblage of self-defeating motives.
self ends in shame.
to slavery.

Born in pride, this

Its quest for absolute freedom leads

Its attempt to be the self-centered locus
of

expansion culminates in the disintegration and
dispersion
of the self.
In short, the attempt to live as self-

grounded being leads the self further and further away
from being.

"Vanity," says Augustine, "is nothingness." 53

And nothingness has a powerful inertia.

For to the

extent that the proud are absorbed in the external world,
they are "behind their own backs," non-reflective and

victims of habit.

Trapped in immediacy, the self of

ontological conceit is "pressed under" by an experience of
the world that is "massed thick" and provides exceedingly

little room for self-examination which might lead to self-

criticism and change.

Augustine laments, "I know how
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.

great is the effort needed to
convince the proud of the
power and excellence of humility." 54
The ontology of conceit and
the absence of selfrelection are inseparably linked
in a mutually reinforci
ng
dynamic according to Augustine.
Conceited ontology

develops in those who are blind
to their own dependence
upon God and the world and
unable to see their weaknesses.
For Augustine, it is impossible
to be face to face with
oneself and still affirm that one
is the origin
of

Being, Truth and Goodness.

Likewise, unref lectiveness

proliferates in those who dwell in the
confidence and
immediacy of their ontological error.
As Augustine stared into the face
of the darkness of
his age, he saw at the origin of a
multifarious
evil, a

self that willed an ontology of conceit
and was constantly
outside itself in its relentless expansive
appropriation
of the world.
His cure would consist in changing the

self's trajectory; rerouting its outward course
back

toward the inner depths of the soul in search of
the

voice of God within.

The self would become a problem

for itself, and in the process a new self would be

created:

a conf essing-self

But what would remain

.

hauntingly familiar in Augustine's portrayal of and his
existence as a conf essing-self
relentlessness
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,

is a certain quality of

Augustine's Cojifessina^self
in opposition to a world
that was "massed thick"

with selves who were "outside
themselves" and experienced
others as obj ects-f or-the-self a world largely dominated
by the lust for dominion Augustine sought to nurture
the civitas Dei.
However, the City of God would
not be

fundamentally understood in terms
of
tional structuring of life any
more

a

different institu-

than the problems of

the city of earth were understood
fundamentally to result
from any particular social arrangement.
Rather, the city
of God would represent a type of
self that stands in
diametrical opposition to the self of the
ontology of
conceit.
But what would this Christian self be
like?

worship God and follow his commandments?

Would it

Certainly, but

the difference between the Christian and the
non-Christian
selves would run far deeper than a set of beliefs
or a

moral code.

Augustine's conception of the Christian self

was most fundamentally concerned with the trajectory
of
the soul.

If the self of the ontology of conceit had

engendered a way of being whose fundamental motion was one
of "going outside itself" in its unreflective enslavement
to the immediacy of lust, the new self would have to

change this motion if it was to recover

being and a truer ontology.

a

truer way of

Instead of moving away, the

Christian self in Augustine's view would be fundamentally
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defined by its perpetual trajectory
towards the depths of
itself in order to rout out Godless
desires and conform
one's soul to the will of God.
a most profound

m

way,

the Christian self would be this
reflective trajectory.
Its existence would be transformed
by this motion, through
which it would purify and create
itself.

For Augustine, in the most fundamental
sense, to
become a Christian is to be perpetually
engaged in this
hermeneutics of the self. To be a Christian
self, that
is, to be
is to be a conf essing-self
a self that
has itself as an object for deep and endless
Christian
discernment. The conf essing-self has the
perpetual task
of finding and telling the truth about
itself,
,

:

for it is

only through this ceaseless confession that the
Christian
can be a being capable of truly embracing Christian

metaphysics and Christian moral standards.

Augustine

believes that in absence of confession the ontology of
conceit and the "slippery slope" towards the lust for

dominion would continually reemerge.

Put simply, in

absence of the deep self-reflection and self-discipline

according to God's light which occurred in confession,

vanity would assert itself and the self would be too
dispersed and multiple to be a responsible, just and
Christian human being.
To be just is not simply a matter of occasional

reflection for Augustine.

Instead, the self must strive
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to be a deeply reflective
confessing being:
always.
To
be a confessing-self is an
endless and demanding course

requiring the continuous consumption
of one's life and
one's energy.
Yet for Augustine, the life
and quality
and quantity of energy which one
gains through confession
far surpasses that which is expended.
To put it in

these

terms however, is much too modern.
a

For Augustine it was

question of being or nothinan^..

T he trajectory of

the soul - towards or away from itself
and God

-

within

one's daily life determined the larger
trajectory of one's
life:
towards justice and Being on the one hand,
or the

"slippery slope" towards domination and nothingness
on the
other.
The slippery slope was far easier to follow than
the
ascending path towards justice and God. Slaves took
the

former direction, those struggling for freedom took the
latter.

The self as it naturally occurred in the fallen

world (or one might say unnaturally

,

in the sense that

selves in this world were fallen) was, as long as it

remained in this unreflective state, insufficient for the
struggle for freedom.

The confessing-self was a creation

which might make this struggle

-

this journey

-

possible;

and this journey would eventually make confession easier.

God was essential to both.
The fallen self however, with its lusts and deeply

buried dark drives would never simply be transcended while
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humans lived on earth.

Rather it would always lurk
in the
background; a source of suspicion
which always called
for

further reflection.

Human evil was too ubiquitous,
too

deeply rooted and too recalcitrant
for the conf essing-self
to ever cease its inward gaze.

Conversion:

The Birth of the

r-onf essinn

^

*

Augustine's life prior to conversion
was not one that
was completely devoid of self-reflection.
For years he

was aware of and disturbed by his
sexual lusts.
and where reflection was not completely
absent,

But when
it was

at best intermittent and false in
Augustine's view.

Augustine the confessor, reflects upon his
pre-conversion
life as one where he was a slave to his lusts
and
his

pride.

When he saw evil within:

"I very much preferred

to excuse myself and accuse some other thing
that was
in me but was not I." 55

(Augustine's debate with the

Manichees should be situated within the overriding issue
of deep self-consciousness.)

writes:
it,

I

had known it, but

Of his iniquity Augustine
I

had pretended not to see

had deliberately looked the other way and let it go

from my mind." 56
In short, Augustine had tried to avoid self-

ref lection, and where he could not avoid it, he attempted
to view the origin of evil in such a way that he would
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not have to identify with it and
thus consider it more
seriously. Augustine was reflective
in the sense that he
was consumed with questions on
the nature of evil and God,
but he was not truly self reflective
in the deep sense
which would later seem so unavoidable
to him.
These
former philosophical questions had
a distance from
his inner soul which they would never
have after his
conversion.

Augustine's conversion occurs after
Ponticianus tells
him and Alypius about the conversion of
two officials

prompted by a written account of the life of
St. Anthony.
The experience of conversion as the birth
of deep
self-

reflection is striking in the passage that follows:
This was the story Ponticianus told.
But You, Lord, while he was speaking,
turned me ba ck towards mvself, taking
me from behind mv own back where I
had put myself all the time that I
preferred not to see myself. And
You set me there before my own face
that I might see how vile I was, how
twisted and unclean and spotted and
ulcerous.
I saw mvself and was
horrified; but there was no way to
flee from mvself
If I tried to
turn my gaze from myself, there
was Ponticianus telling what he was
telling; and again You were setting
me face to face with mvself. forcing
me upon my own sight, that I might
see mv iniguitv and loath it.
I had
known it, but I had pretended not
to see it, had deliberately looked
the other way and let it go from my
mind. 7
(My emphasis.)
.
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Conversion, for Augustine, is
not most fundamentally
a ohange in "belief."
speaking to God of his thoughts
prior to conversion Augustine
says:

I believed that You
were... and
that in Christ Your Son Our
Lord
and in the Holy Scriptures
which'
the authority of Your Catholic
Church acknowledges, You had
established the way of man's
salvation. °°

Yet the explicit faith in Christianity
was superficial
insofar as it remained outside of the
inner movements of
his soul, movements which implicated
the self at this deep
and truest level in a very conceited
metaphysics.
if in

conversion one comes to truly face God for the
first time,
the even more profound change which allows
the self to

face God, as we begin to see in the above
passage, is

that the self comes to truly face itself in God's
light:
its "iniquity" and iniquity's implications.

it is a

fundamental change in the self's being that transforms
the quality which God has for the self and the self's

relation to God.
There is probably no way for a modern human being
to feel the trauma of this conversion experience,

for

deep self-reflection is one of the defining characteristics of our age, albeit a deep self-reflection that
is not explicitly Christian and is inscribed in a very

different constellation of power
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-

part of a very

different epistemic terrain.

(This theme is explored

more thoroughly in chapters
that follow.)
For Augustine,
becoming a conf essing-self is
the most traumatic expert
ence of his life. At the age
of thirty-one Augustine's
existence undergoes a transformation
which may properly be
conceived of as one of the most
profound transformations
of the self in Western history.

This is not to say that

Augustine's conversion is a watershed
event which marks
the birth of the conf essing-self
Augustine was by no
means the first confessor. Yet his
own
.

life (as is the

case with many lives of Christians
in late antiquity)
is divided by this critical dis
juncture:

on one side

Augustine dwells as a non-confessing being

- a

type of

being he would later despise; and on the
other he is
a confessing-self - a self which
earlier was

incompre-

hensible to him.

(One of the things that makes

Augustine's thinking so interesting is that though
he
writes as a confessing-self, he writes as one who
has

dwelled within two radically different epistemes.)

That

such a transformation was understood as the beginning of
a radically new life should not surprise us.

That any

continuity remained at all is astounding.
"The day was come when

I

stood naked in my own

sight and my conscience accused me." 59

quoted

In the passage

at length above, Augustine declares repeatedly

in astonishment, the experience of becoming a deeply
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"

self-reflective beinq.
g

*

of one who confronts

-

The^
inese

.

are +-k
the redundant cries

in this case becomes the

unbelievable.

At first Augustine felt
horrified and
trapped, but finally there was
"no way to flee" from
confession. Augustine has become
a conf essing-self

Being-as-Confes sion:

"What Am t?»

Face to face with himself,
Augustine asks, "What
then am I, o my God? What nature
am I?" 6 0 Augustine
finds no simple answer to this
question and he continues
to ask it in various ways throughout
his life.
However,
at one point - a moment of remarkable
insight - Augustine
discovers an answer that refers back to
the question
itself.
At the end of a wrenching inner debate
over
whether or not the church should resonate
with beautiful
melodies or bland monotonic psalms (to prevent
ensnaring

pleasures) as well as the question of how his
own desires

might be implicated in the answers he poses,
Augustine
writes:

"I have become a question to myself.

61

Augustine will ask the question "What am I?" endlessly,
but each time he asks, the question will further

illustrate the truth of this assertion.

Augustine is,

as a question to himself.

However, this self -understanding gives rise to

another question:

Why does Augustine affirm being a
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confessing-self?

why is Augustine a question
to himself?
Given that Augustine is so thoroughly
a confessing-self,
always seeking a reason or motive
behind each thought and
action, it is not surprising that
he addresses this
question.
Nor is it surprising that this
question leads
him to explore other dimensions of
the question "What
am I?" For Augustine, the questions
"what" and "why"
endlessly refer to one another.
Hence,

in trying to understand Augustine
as a

confessor we will have to keep these questions
in close
proximity to each other. In addition, we
should preface
our encounter with a brief reminder of the
fact
that

Augustine poses the question "What am I?" (and
the
related question "Why?") in a way that is fundamentally
different from the way it was posed by non-confessingselves.

With Augustine, the question, which had

previously been predominately ontological, becomes
inextricably connected with a depth psychology of the
soul.

Unlike Plato, Augustine's attempt to answer this

question will be full of impassioned accounts of the
soul's secret desires and hidden thoughts.

Yet the

ontological dimension of self-reflection remains as strong
in the confessing-self 's questioninq.

To truly engage in

this hermeneutics of the self is to endlessly question

everythinq that one discovers about the self both in light
of God's truths and in order to further reveal His truth.
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,

To confess thoroughly is to
constantly shift back and
forth between psychological and
ontological questions
whenever they lead to one another.
Hence Augustine's
understanding of confession moves
to and fro, partaking
in both of these spheres.
To the question "What am I?

11

Augustine answers:

»A

life powerfully various and manifold
and immeasurable.
The fallen human self which he
discovers, is a multiplicity that is continually scattered
in its involvement

in

the world.

Be it food,

sex,

our desire for another's

praise or beautiful sights and sounds,
our relationships
with other human beings and things in the
world cut
through us, divide us, push us out of focus
and decenter
us.
in an unreflective state, we generally
do not engage
with other beings and things as whole human
beings.

Rather the external world speaks to and incites
various
parts of the body and soul, generally at the expense

of

the self as a whole.

Prior to becoming a confessing-self

the self is in a constant state of being "scattered abroad
in multiplicity.

1,63

Augustine examines his will and finds that even
indeed, especially

-

-

his inner dimension is discordant.

While most parts of the body obey the will on command,

Augustine discovers that the will does not obey itself

:

"the body more readily obeyed the slightest wish of the

mind... than the mind obeyed itself in carrying out its own
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great will which could be
achieved simply by willing .„64
The problem is that the will
"does not totally will-M
because it is divided within
itself.
Arguing against
Manichees that there is one
extremely divided will
within
us rather than simply two
natures, Augustine says,

^

"if

there be as many contrary natures
in man as there are
wills in conflict with one another,
then there are not
two natures in us but several. "66
(Augustine and the
Manichees reject the latter conclusion.)
For Augustine, the self as divided
is -monstrousness"
and a "sickness of the soul. "67
As we have seen, this
division wells out of the ontology of
conceit in which all
fallen human beings dwell prior to deep
self-reflection.
The divided self is bonded to the
world in an immediacy of
desire in which it enslaves, distracts
and weakens itself,

and endlessly attempts to dominate the
world around it.
But in addition to the evil which it fosters,
this self

cannot face God, the condition of its being, in
such an
uncontrolled, dispersed and impure state. The dispersed
self is scattered in every direction except that
which
faces God.

Unable to face God, the scattered self moves

toward non-being and eternal death.
The goal of confession

- a

goal that can never be

attained completely and with certainty on earth

unify and purify this multiplicity:
to face God.

-

is to

to prepare the self

According to Augustine, the very act of
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confession, above and beyond
the specific contents
it
addresses, is unifying.

The Unified Self.

Re-Memberina

tjig

rpnfessinn ao
Disinejibered

To confess is to stand face
to face with oneself - to
endlessly search the depths of the
self and proclaim the
truths that one discerns. However,
one faces oneself not
fundamentally to examine what one is
in the pure present
moment of the confession. For
Augustine, the present is
infinitely minute and has no duration.
The present is, as

merciless "ceasing to be, "68 an infinitely
rapid "becoming
past." only God is pure presence,
humans are condemned on
earth to be "divided up in time... and
the deepest
places

in [their souls] are torn by it." 69

The infinitely fast,

infinitely fleeting present moment scatters
the self in
relentless uncontrolled change. Confession as
a human act
occurs in time, and hence if the self faces the
self in

the present moment, the self that the self reflects
upon
has always ceased to be instantaneously.

However,

in

confession one does not face the self in the pure present,
because to do so would be to further sacrifice the self
to dispersion in the cutting edge of time.

Instead,

confession makes the self present by holding its past
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(up to an instant before
oonfession,

«ore stable before

itself.

The self confesses as a
temporal being that hais a
history which it presents to
itself in memory.
Indeed
the self is this history.
its action in the
lighteningfast present is dominated and
"weighed down by customs. «™
The self is_not an ephemeral
wisp which exists solely
in
the present with "no duration,"
and hence it cannot know
itself if it takes itself to be
this sort of being.
The
self must know itself as a
fundamentally temporal
£

,

being,

for although the self continually
ceases to be in the
present moment (and this is a crucial
fact, but not the
only truth about the self) because
the present moment

continually ceases to be, the self that
was present does
not cease to exist altogether.
(it
simply ceases to be

in the infinitely fleeting present.)

Rather,

it becomes

lodged in the self's past; a past which is
not only

capable of being presented frequently in memory,
but
further presents itself indirectly through its
uncanny

propensity to make the present through the inertia of
one's past being, customs and habits.

(Indeed,

for

Augustine, the extent to which the past makes the present

"behind one's back" is inversely related to the extent
to which it is presented in remembering.)

Hence to face

itself truly and stably, the conf essing-self must remember
itself.
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Confession as a remembering
of the self partially
escapes the tyrannical
scattering of the present
and thus
begins to unify the self by
transferring its attention
and the trajectory of its
being to the stabler
presence
of the self's past in memory.
remembering,

m

the self
that was tossed and torn
helplessly in the violent
waves
of the sea's surface, dives
into the stillness of its
depths where it can regain
composure and control.
By
remembering, the self - as much
as is possible in this
life - escapes the cutting edge
of time.
memory,

m

the self can abide and hence become
an object for its
own continuous considered reflection.
One way Augustine
escaped self-reflection prior to
conversion, was by
dwelling in the fleeting presence of
desire.
when he
had seen his iniquity, he "had deliberately
looked the
other way and let it go from [his] mind" he did not
remember it. When Augustine writes of being
"turned back"
upon himself, he speaks of the reflective
trajectory
of

the gaze within, but inseparable from this
is a "turning

back" upon the self as an historical being.

Turning back

in the temporal sense is remembering; holding the
past

that one is present before oneself, so that one cannot
flee from and hence avoid oneself.

That confession is to face, examine and understand

oneself as a temporally extended being is not only
indicated by Augustine's theoretical insights, but by
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the biographical content
of the Confessions
as well,
in which Augustine remembers
himself beginning withhis
infancy and continuing through
his ongoing struggles
with
pride.
Augustine holds his whole life
present before
himself as a phenomenon for
ceaseless overturning,
inquiry
and suspicion.

Augustine refers to confession
repeatedly as an act
of remembering. When asking
God's help in confession
he
says, "Grant me... to retraverse
now in memory the past
ways of my error. "'1
proclaiming to confess for the
love of God, Augustine writes
that

m

he is -passing again

in the bitterness of remembrance
over my most evil ways

that Thou mayest thereby grow ever
lovelier to me." 72
in proclaiming the integrity of
his confession Augustine
writes:
-Behold my heart, 0 my God, look deep
within it;
73
see how I remember."
As argued above, the self -remembering
that occurs
in confession begins to unify the self
by present-inn

the self in memory

- a

present that is less victimized

by the ceasing to be of the present moment.

Yet there is

an additional sense in which remembering
unifies the self

that Augustine addresses in Book X of the Confessions

.

(The discussion of memory in Book X is exemplary of
the

way in which Augustine brings himself through confession
to examine confession itself.)
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Augustine begins the first
section of Book
the plea, "Let me know Thee."™
This of course
a reiteration of the
plea of the Confessions

x

^

with

u

and more
generally, the plea of
Augustine's life. To know
God
one must confess the truths
of one's soul to Him
and win
to extirpate that which
is evil in his light.
Thus he
writes:
"He that does the truth
comes to light.
I „ ish
to do it in confession. -75
Knowledge Qf GQd
knowledge are inextricably
intertwined.
Vet in his
ceaseless questioning of both,
he runs up against the
problem of memory:
for "how shall I find You
if I am
without memory of You?''™ similarly,
with respect to
the self, Augustine writes, "in
my memory too I meet
myself."" Indeed> everything

^

^^

^

^

If Augustine is to "do truth"
thoroughly, he will have
to - to as great an extent as is
possible - examine the

part of him that contains and recalls
truths.

Hence the

examination of memory.
In Augustine's first attempt to grasp
memory in

Book

X,

he refers to it metaphorically as "the
fields

and vast palaces.

.

.where are stored... the innumerable

images of material things brought to it by the
senses...
the thoughts we think" 78

mind." 79

.

.

.and "the affections of the

Augustine is overawed by memory:
Great is this power of memory,
a thing, 0 my God, to be in awe
of,
a profound and immeasurable
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.

In the innumerable
and caverns of my
r
n
blY fUl1 of innumerab?e kin^ f thln s
g "-in and through
all%h^f
H°
all
these does
my mind range and I
move swiftly from one to
another and
ra e them
I can
out I find
bu?Tf
H no end. 80

fESPl^Z'
fields and dens
•

'

•

T^

Ho^y -

For Augustine, memory is
metaphorically conceived of
as a spreading limitless
room within 8 ! that is
impressed
by sensations, thoughts and
emotions as they pass in the
present. B2 while things are
kept distinct and those

entering by different senses are
stored apart in their
right categories, «3 for the most
part things in memory
are scattered and unarranged 84
it
seems that for

Augustine the way in which things
are contained in
memory is primarily a result of the
manner and order
in which they were experienced.
Hence their scatteredness corresponds to the scatteredness
of the
infinitely

fast,

infinitely fleeting present in which our
experiences
and we ourselves are scattered.
As brute storage alone, memory is of
little use to

Augustine, for it embodies the guality of dispersion
that
is so problematic for him.

It is only in conjunction with

its power of thoughtful remembering that memory's
value
is manifested.

When one remembers things in memory, one

"places within reach," "collects out of dispersion" and
"draws together" things which were scattered in the im-

measurable depths of memory. 85
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Augustine makes explicit

the relation between
"cogito"

together,. 86

Thus

,

when Qne

(I

^^^ ^

think) and "cogo"

^.^

(I

put

collects the self out of its
dispersed for™ in the
depths
of nem ory and places it
together within reach.
Augustine
is guick to add however,
that "if z ceased to give
thought
to [things] for quite a
short space of time they
would
sink again and fall away
into the »ore re ro ote
recesses of
memory. "87 For the drawing
together to b e
,

effective, it

must be continuous.
Let us further explore this
relationship between
memory and the self.
Is it simply that memory
is a part
of the self and the self is
something that can be
remembered? The relationship
Augustine sees is much
deeper than this, for indeed he
identifies the self with
memory:
"this thing I am." 88 The self
is the manifold
and constantly expanding field of
memory and the scattered
sensations, thoughts and feelings
therein.
One does not
simply have a past, a memory, thoughts
and desires; for

Augustine one is these things.
remember

Thus to confess

-

to

one's thoughts and desires is not simply
to
cpllect them out of dispersion, but to collect
the self
out of dispersion, to draw the self together.
-

As memory,

the self is both the locus in which its existence
is

"impressed" as scattered, and the possibility for

purposively drawing together this scatteredness
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.

It

is this latter possi
b i lity which
Augustine
realize in confession.

^

^

The task of collecting
the self is an endless
process
for Augustine.
New experiences continua
lly scatter the
"fall away" if they are
ignQred

^

g

^^

^

time," and the self is
Measurably deep and can "find
no
end" to these depths.
one is to avoid
uncontroUed
quality of being scattered,
the evil that may lurk
in
the scattered depths of the
soul, and the even
greater
evil of being behind one's
own back, one must collect
oneself and face oneself
continually:
one must remember.
Remembering
is a focusing, healing,
strengthening
and disciplining activity in
Augustine's view.

^

„

a^ch

Humble Confession
Thus far we have discussed two
ways in which
remembering as such begins to unify
the self.
First
by partially decreasing the
scatteredness that is

generated when attention is on the infinitely
fleeting
present; and second by collecting out of
dispersion a
self which is scattered. However, the
substantive
manner in which the self is remembered is also
extremely
important to Augustine, for it undermines the falsg
ontology of conceit

,

fosters a new understanding of the
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^^^^

self ana leads to a
different type q£
understanding. Through his
own
shows that deep
self-reflection leads to a
very powerful
^prehension of one's finitude,
dependence and in iqu i ty
The conceited self „ as
only ahle to uphold
an ontolo gy in
which it was the origin
of being by being „
behind
back." Facing itself
in cod
God'ss light,
lirthr«-k
the self discovers a
very different order of
things.

^_

,

in attempting to know
and speak the truth
about
himself, Augustine immediately
confronts his own finitudehe discovers that he is
a life which he
cannot entirely
know.
Rather than being the origin
of truth that the

conceited ontology believes
itself to be, Augustine
realizes that he cannot even
grasp himself totally
and with certainty. Augustine's
forgotten infancy is
accessible to him only indirectly
through the accounts
of others and through his
observations of other

infants.

These limits have

a

powerful impact upon Augustine:

am loth, indeed, to count it
[his
infancy] as part of the life I live
in this world.
For it is buried in
the darkness of the forgotten as
completely as the period earlier
Still hat 1 s P en t in my mother's
womb sS
°y
I

.

Yet Augustine cannot simply discount his
infancy any more
than he can discount the forgotten depths of
his soul

which he discovers can never be rendered completely
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intelligibXe.

For Augustine is this
hidden depth tnis
partially hidden life, which
demands to be known for
the truths it reveals and
the evils it hides.
Even his
prenatal life haunts him: .j
„ as conceived in iniguity
and in sin my mother nourished
me in the womb, then where,
my God, where, o Lord, where
or when was I, Your servant
90
innocent?"
,

The answer is nowhere and never.

One stands accused

in light of God's morality as
one reflects this light

deeper and deeper into one's soul.

Through Christian

self-reflection one discovers that
instead of being the
pure origin of the rules of morality
that oneself and
others should live by, the self is an
actuality
ridden

with imperfection and iniquity.

Augustine discovers

that even his infancy is full of conceit
and jealousy.
His present as well is laden with "impure"
desires.

Just as he is neither the origin of nor
the complete
possessor of truth and goodness, so too confession
shows

him to be a dependent being rather than self-originating.

Recalling his infancy, he is in awe of his dependence
on
the miracle of his mother's nurturing. His account of
his slow evolution towards conversion and fully embracing

God is saturated with continual acknowledgement of the way
in which the people and events around him allowed him to

develop.

Yet his understanding of dependence goes beyond

a mere dependence upon people and things.
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For Augustine,

^^^^

to thin* deeply about
the being Qf

surrounding world is to
recognize an abundance
harmony
and beauty which signifies
a greafcer being
all things depend,
of the things in
the world Augustine
says:
, they cried out
. great

^

^^
^ ^^ ^ ^

^
^
_^ ^

«V guestion was my gazing upon
theffl and
their beauty."*! The
final book Qf
£i£y
»any of the miseries of
human existence on earth,
hut
it is elso full of an
appreciation of the world as
overflowing with beauty and
miracles. Not only the
sky, the earth, the sea,
food, health and the
"soothing
coolness of breezes," but
"even the body, which

^

is

something we have in common
with brute creation. .. even
here what evidence we find
of the goodness of God,
of
the providence of the mighty
creator!""

For Augustine,
to look deep within is to
realize the overwhelming extent
to which we depend upon miracles
which originate not in
ourselves, but elsewhere. Only
having grasped "the
truth that is within them" can
people see that God is
the condition of all beings. 93

God of Self-Consciousness

This realization which emerges with
self-reflection,
feeds and shapes an intensifying dynamic
of confession.
In his state of dependence, Augustine realizes
that we
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»ust live in God's grace
to be truly satisfied
strong
hum an beings.
Indeed, to live in any
sense that is not
dying, W e must live in His
grace
However
achieve God's grace, the
self must
To turn
away from God - His Truth,
His Goodness - is to
lose

^

.

_

f^^.

light.

^

^

^

His

Augustine

,

s

insight that

^
^ ^
iQses

unless he goes fro* Thee,""
provides him
a
of
hope which can and must be
constantly returned to. Yet
the hope harbors an anxiety
which fuels relentless and
continual deep self-reflection.
For how can a self that
is a torn scattered
multiplicity face God? How can
a self
that is immeasurably deep and
cannot grasp all that it is,
know that it faces God? The
answer to both questions is
that it cannot.
'

The hope that wells out of the
insight that "no man
loses Thee, unless he goes from
Thee," would die
in the

despair of uncertainty were it not
continually reborn in
confession.
Through perpetual confession,
the self must

draw itself together, place itself within
reach, so that
it can face itself towards God and
conform
to His will

in as complete and unified a manner as
possible.

it

cannot allow dispersed parts of the self to
"fall away"
from God in pride and lust.
It must probe its depths

endlessly for evil thoughts and desires which might turn
the self unwittingly away from the Being to which it
owes
its being.
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Yet the creation of the
confessing-self - this
gigantic task of revering is not fundamentally
a
heroic feat of the self
which must he accomplished
in
order to face God. For
Augustine, Cod dwells too
deeply
within and is too thoroughly
the condition of our
being
to be merely the goal or
endpoint of the self's
action.
Rather, God is internal to
the process of remembering.
The Christian self's
relationship to God is one
where
both, the self and God make
the self more self-conscious,
for it is through confession
that the self is slowly
brought from the injustice of
conceited ontology to the
justice of God.

The act that initiates the
self-God relationship is
less the remembering, than the
will to tell the truth
about the self and do nothing to
deceive God. When
Augustine exclaims, "Woe is me! See
I do not hide my
wounds..., "96 he is not proclaiming a
complete and
"successful- confession, for there is always
a surplus
of truths and evils that far exceeds
those that can be
discovered and disclosed. Rather he is
expressing his
desire to reveal the truth about himself as it appears
in God's light - to himself and God.
it is the purity of

this desire to show God everything that is all
important.

Thus Augustine asks God to "behold his heart" and see
his
will to confess.

60

^^

When one wills to place
himself
becomes a partner in the
development of the self's
deep self-consciousness.
-j entered into
my
with you as my guide; and
I was able to
do it because
You were my helper..
Augustine s God g
self-consciousness. He makes the
weak strong, not by
bestowing upon them an abstract
power, but by facilitating
the transformation of the
non-reflective self
,

^
^^^

.

of the

ontology of conceit into

a

confessing-self

.

it is in

God's grace that "every weak
man is made strong in that
he is made conscious of his
weakness."" When Augustine
refers to God as "You in whom all
that is scattered in me
is brought into one,"" he
is not writing of an external
power that comes out of the sky and
carefully makes the
self a unity, as if God were using
his hands to reassemble
a shattered egg.
God is within, and he unifies the
self

by succoring self-consciousness, by
turning the self's
trajectory inward in deep Christian remembering.

Compulsive Confession
Thus we begin to see what is at stake and what
is

possible for Augustine's confessing-self.

For Augusti

the choice is between being a non-reflective self that

dwells in a world that is falsely revealed through
conceited ontology

- a

self that is scattered in
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a

an immediacy of desire in
which it enslaves and
is
enslaved; or a reflective way
of being which tends
towards increasing unity,
strength, justice and
God.

The choice is between being
and non-being.
Out of Augustine's understanding
of the self,
the world and God, comes a
deep and continuous selfexamination that restlessly strives
to collect,
penetrate and bring under control
all parts of the
self.
Having confessed about his life
from his infancy
to the period following his
conversion, Augustine proceeds
to relentlessly examine his
present condition according
to the truths of Christian morality.

Largely freed from

the grasp of sexual concupiscence
(though not in his
dreams) he moves towards an increasingly
meticulous study
of himself.
Nothing escapes his gaze:
As for the allurement of sweet scents,
I am not much troubled:
when they
are absent I do not seek them; when
they are present I do not refuse them;
yet at any time I do not mind being
without them. At least so I seem
to myself; perhaps I am decp.ivpd
For that darkness is lamentable in
which the possibilities in me are
hidden from myself: so that my
mind, questioning itself upon its
own powers, feels that it cannot
lightly trust its own report:
because what is already in it does
for the most part lie hidden. 15 "
(My emphasis.)
.

The "hermeneutics of suspicion" passes from one

thing to the next.

Augustine examines the "pleasures
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of the ear," and discovers
that while he is not
held as
persistently by them , he
„ find[s]

stm

what is their due place,.101

^

^^^

Augustine , s descriptiQn
Qf
the inner dile^a this
proble* leads ni m to i
s am azin
g
Wondering if he may desire
church bodies in the
„ron g
way:

At times indeed it seems
to me that T
Y
greater h °nour thafis
?he?r
lr dU
duI
when
f?!f v S" e holy f °r example I feel
words m y mind ?b
kindled more religiously and
to a flame of piety because fervently
them sung than if they were I hear
and I observe that all the not sung:
emotions of my spirit have varying
proper to them in voice and modes
song,
whereby, by some secret
affinity
they are made more alive
it
not good that the mind should is
be
enervated by this bodily pleasure.
ften ensnares m e, in that
?
!£
the t
bodily sense does not accompany
the reason as following after
it
in proper order, but having
been
admitted to aid the reason strives
to run before it and take the
lead.
In this matter I sin unawares,
and
then grow aware.
'

22i5

Yet there are times when through too
great a fear of this temptation, I
err in the direction of over severity
- even to the point sometimes
of
wishing that the melody of all the
lovely airs. .should be banished not
only from my own ears, but from the
churches as well. 102
.

After more turmoil Augustine hesitantly and

tentatively decides that church music is probably for
the better.

But the outcome is really unimportant.
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What

^

"

is lm portant,

and the reason

I

length,

quoted the p assage at
such

is the extent to which
Augustine has prohie.atized
all corners of hi nS el f
The
of

^

.

^

^

listening
music is of relati
v^i
relatively
little importance compared
to
the problematic pleasures,
desires and stives which
may
lurk beneath.
The latter are buried
deep; some times they
are invisible.
Ways they are susp
impurity threatens to scatter
the self back into the
madness of conceit, far from
itself,

^

M

^

far from God.

To view the above passages
as stemming from
"Augustine's hatred of worldly
existence" is an error.
It is impurity within the self
that is at stake here
for Augustine.
In Augustine's view, beautiful
colors,
the sound of birds singing,
delicious foods, etc., were
Messinas.103 Indeed> despite &

^

of the miseries which are a
part of human existence,

Augustine still views the world as
"that miracle of
miracles. 1Q 4 Yet the world was most
importantly

polyphonic sign of the God who created

it.

a

When enjoy-

ment of the world became an end in itself
and obliterated
the primacy of one's awareness of God,
Augustine sought
to eliminate or contain it.

Yet this is a problem of

the self, not of the world.

The world could be loved,

but it had to be loved "justly" with an eye towards
the

"intrinsic value of things." 105

Desires and pleasures

that aided one's awareness of God as the condition of all
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being were acceptable,
but they
y were aJ
alw.v.
-ways h
dangerous for
they harbored the potential
to
o Piace
place the self* unwittingly
God's place as the origin
and ground of things.

m

Confess ing-self-

^

w1

r

,

,

,

^

As the trajectory of the
self is redirected
from
the world towards the
inner depths of the self,
the self
becomes identified with the
inner stives and desires
which hide there. The self
is not fundamentally
its
actions, but the motives
buried below.
it is the latter
which must be surveyed,
interrogated and controlled
in a
manner that is every bit as
relentless as that in which
the self of conceited ontology
sought to dominate all that
was "other." Indeed, for
Augustine it is the persistent
form of the latter, that
necessitates that of the
former.

Yet the development of the conf
essing-self should not
be reduced to being understood
simply as this persistent
attempt to purify the self. To see
it wholly in these
terms is to obfuscate the more positive
aims of the
confessing-self which were at least as
important to
Augustine.
For Augustine, self-consciousness was
not
of value merely because of what it could
control or
repress.

Just as importantly, Augustine affirmed the

birth of the confessing-self because it gave
rise to
set of possibilities for being in the world that
he
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a

.

believed were never before
possible.
The confesslngself was not si m pl a new
y
way of controlling
an old self
eradicated, out deep
self-reflection gave rise
to a
as well.
Deep self-consciousness
was acco m panied by
two interrelated qualities
which Augustine thought
were
almost entirely lacking in
the late antique pagan

^

«U

self

depth and freedom.

These two elements not
only gave
rise to new possibilities
for the self, but
perhaps more
essentially, constituted
"possibility" in a new manner allowed it to be.

Since freedom wells out of
depth in Augustine's
thinking, let us explore the
latter first. There are two
senses in which depth is important
for Augustine.
one
sense depth is an attribute of
all human beings, yet in
another sense it is an achievement
only of the confessingself

m

For Augustine, all people are deep
beings in the
sense (revealed in the above passages)
that they become
identified with the motives and desires
which lurk below
their actions. Human activity becomes a
surface beneath
which there is a largely invisible interior
in which are
born and lie the real truths of the self.
These depths
are for Augustine what is most real about the
self, while

the surface is often determined and shaped by
realities
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largely outside of the self
self.
To know anybody an
impossible task to complete is to know these
interestingly however, what
accompanies Augustine's
realization that we are all
beings with a depth
is a
continuous critique of
non-conf essing-selves as
onedimensional flat beings. The
ine self of
„f „
y
conceited ontology
dwells ..outside" of itself
in its compulsive
relationship
to the world.
its gaze, its activity
and its concern is
directed outward away from the
self and toward things.
The self is to a very large
extent flat because its
life
is one of denying its depths.
its claim (either
explicit or implicit in its way
of being) to be absolute
self-originating being the self must
deny these
l.

^

m

depths,

for the invisibility and
ambiguity which depth discloses
threatens the self's claim to
omnipotence and certainty.

Further, the evils that lurk beneath
the surface threaten
the self's claim to be worthy of
being "its own rule."

For Augustine, the conceited self
denies the depth that
it is and hence lives outside of
this depth:
its way of
being is flat.

Living in the immediacy of desire, the
self of
conceited ontology is as shallow - has as
little

thickness - as the fleeting present which consumes
it.

Moreover, the world towards which it lusts is

flattened as well; reduced to the single dimension of

being an object-for-the-self

.
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The multi-dimensional

polyphonic character which
Augustine believes is
intrinsic to beings is reduced
to the characteristics
that are revealed by the self's
desire.

The flat self's

relation to the flat world is
described by Augustine as
the meeting of two surfaces,
a meeting in which
one is
"pressed under" and unable to move.
It is only the disciplined
inward turn of continual

confession that allows the self
to become a deep being
in
a way that is very different
from that
of the flat self.

Only by perpetually observing and
dwelling in one's depths
can one become deep in a sense
which is different but
related to the sense in which all
selves are deep, what
is this relationship between the
depth one becomes through
turning inward and the depth which as
human beings
we all

are

As discussed above, the turn inward
is for Augustine,
essentially a remembering of the self.
remembering,
the self recalls what is absent from the
self's attention
prior to remembering. it collects out of
dispersion what
was scattered in the depths of the self and
places

m

the

"forgotten" within reach of the attentive gaze.

it is

precisely because all selves are largely deep interiors
of thoughts, desires and feelings that are - for the
most

part - not present at any given time, that remembering
can have any meaning.

A self that was totally present

to itself would not have any need to remember itself,
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;

.

its consciousness at
anv
ny lns
inQf
a nf would
tant
be totally
identical with its being.
But nor would
it

remember itSSlf

f°r

"

is th *

b^

to

^pth which

lies below the
surface of attention which
makes memory as such
possible
For Augustine, it is the
non-present depth of selves the partial absence of
one's being to oneself that
establishes both the desirability
of and the possibility
of relating to oneself in
self -remembering.
It is the distance, the
difference within the self
between its dark non-present
depths and its luminous

present attention

-

this ever shifting interstice

-

which

provides the space for the remembering
act of confession.
It is the interval between
the thought and the unthought
which the confessing-self traverses,
and in
the process

of traversing,

it changes the boundaries
of difference

which is ineliminable.

Every depth that is exposed in

remembering becomes the surface of
another depth.
"Know
the self!
Know thyself!" yearns the confessing-self
as

it attempts to pass out of the
interstice and render its

dark depths in God's light.

Yet no matter how much it

illuminates, it remains on the edge of a
beaconing

darkness
In another work Augustine states:

Gaze at the sky, the earth, the sea,
and all the things which shine in
them or above them, or creep or fly
or swim beneath them. They have
forms because they have rhythm;
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longer"^

^

they Wil1 "°

The rhythm of the
confessing-self is the constant
unfolding of its movement
in the region between
its
light and its darkness; a
movement which can never
be
completed, but which Bust
never be discontinued
lest the
self lose its rhythm and
"fall back into nothingness."
Again, if "the deep" harbors
the evil and multifariousness which must be
controlled, so too it harbors
the space that makes reflection,
control and a new type
of self possible.
The depth of selves, the
interstice

between the present and non-present
provides the space in
which the self can turn inward and
initiate
the rhythm

which constitutes the confessing-self
's deep way of being,
in eternity, "all is present. -107
Hence> there

,

g

^

for remembering.

^

Indeed remembering, in that it
presumes
a region of absence, is impossible.
Remembering indicates
a change in the self's state of
being,
yet when being is
totally and completely present to itself,
there can be no
change.
As complete presence, there is nothing
to make
present. Of God Augustine states, "Thou art
always the

self-same." 108
creation)

God's conception of Himself (and His

is identical with His being.

though it is limitless, has no surplus.

For God, being,
It is equivalent

with and completely present in His Word, and His Word is
eternal.

Where there is identity there can be no depth,
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for depth signifies the
absence Qf
t
signifies difference.
Depth is what is left
over what
is not present in attention,
the non-identical.
God is
infinitely complex, but as
total visible presence
He is
not deep (for Himself).

^^^^

^

Augustine is constantly
confronted with the fact
that
he "cannot totally grasp
all that [ne]
_„ 109
is

^^

^

seen, this depth is of
endless concern to him due
to the
fallen state in which he finds
humanity, and it also
provides the possibility for
re raem berin g
Remembering is
for Augustine, a transformative
activity in the sense that
it creates a "collected,"
more controlled, more
Christian
self.
yet there are at least two
other senses in which
.

memory is transformative which are
equally important to
Augustine.
First, remembering transforms
the self (in a way

that is perhaps obvious, but still
needs to be stated)
in that by taking up remembering
as its primary endeavor
in light of which it guides all of
its other activity,

the confessing-self is transformed from
being the
iniquitous thoughts and desires that guided
it beforehand and increasingly becomes a yearning for
God's

truth.

Through continually shedding light upon its desires,
the
self comes to be governed by another desire.
Second, in remembering, the self makes itself present
in such a way that it is not purely identical with the
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parts of the self whir-h
;t- _
which it
remembers,
1-es in the immediacy of

when the self

d^^^

desire,

fche

self's perceptions and
actions, and render
critical
discernment of the desiree
it se1 f
ltsel
f impossible.
Desire
becomes identical with
the self in that
it has
sway over the self.
Kemembering in contrast
allows the
self to make dark elements
of itself present,
while
simultaneously establishing
a distance between
itself
and those parts of itself
which it
if hi
wnicn
discovers.
Rather
than being disguised in
their own false light,
in
confession, evil desires
are critically illuminated
in God's light.
For Augustine, the self
makes itself
present in confession in
such a way that as it
identifie.
the evil thought, desire
or emotion as a part
of itself,
it simultaneously creates
a germ cell of
non-identity
between itself and that which
is illuminated.
The light
of the will to God's truth
vitiates the evil that is
presented and diminishes the latter's
power to hold sway
over the self.
The non-identity does not
occur through
a denial of the fact that
the desire is a part of the
self, but through a particular
affirmation of this fact.
When the desire holds sway, it is
that which makes other
things present (or absent) to the
self, but when the
desire is placed before the self in
remembering, at
i

^

"

least for that moment, it is not hegemonic,

it is

presented as an object by another desire
(will to God's
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truth,.

n

is precisely this
particular objectif ication

of desire which establishes
a distance between
the desire
and the self, and allows
the self the possibility
of

Shzmim

to separate itself from
the desire.
The light
of the will to truth
places desire within reach,
but as
Placed, the desires can be
dis-placed from the self.
short, to know oneself,
one must make present
parts of
the inexhaustible depths
that one is, and it is this
presenting which allows the self
to become other than
these identified depths.

m

It is here that we begin
to see the connection

between confession and freedom
in Augustine.
It is only
through remembering - presenting
parts of itself to itself
- that there is any hope for
freedom in Augustine's view,
for it is only in remembering
the self that
the self can

become an object of conscious choice
for itself.
absence of truthful remembering we

m

are not free beings,

but beings dominated by habits and
lusts.
All people have free will in Augustine's
thought,
yet most people do not will freely.
True living freedom
is an arduous task which can only be
achieved to the

extent that the self remembers deeply,
truthfully and
perpetually. Only the conf essing-self the self
,

that

dwells in the deep, can be free, for only this
self is
sufficiently unified and self-conscious to carry out
the work of freedom.

Yet even the conf essing-self is
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in constant danger of
forgetting and slipping back
into

slavery.

Humans are born with the
capacity for freedom,
but their first choices
enslave them to habits and
lusts which henceforth tend
to overshadow and conceal
their freedom.
it is only when the self
is he i d face
to face with itself in
conversion, that it begins to
be released from the tyranny
of habit.
As the birth of
deep self-consciousness, the
conversion is the point at
which the self begins a new mode
of being, the essence
of which is precisely the
ability to free oneself from
the causality of unconscious
habit and begin. Reading
Augustine's account of his conversion,
one is struck by
the sense of sudden freedom that
seems to overwhelm

him.

"Thou hast broken my bonds." 110

conversion he asks:

of his life prior to

"But where in all that long time was

my free will, and from what deep sunken
hiding-place was
it suddenly summoned forth in the
momen t in whirh t bowed
my neck to Your easy yoke ..." 111 (my
emphasis).
Yet
if

this transformation brings a sudden freedom
from many of
the past lusts that haunted him, his exuberance
is soon

tempered (as

I

have illustrated in the account of his

"present state" above) with the realization that though
his new life in communion with God delivers him from
the

worst cares that gnawed' 112 it by no means delivers him
to a life of pure and easy truth and freedom.
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Far from

it.

As Augustine looks
inward, the
une initial
u of
*
initial fn
flash
God'*
light (in a region Augustine
claims to have previously
been fleeing) helps him
truly see and transcend
the most
prominent lusts of his past.
Yet at the edge of this
radiance is a deep, dark,
hidden region which demands
further interrogation and
illumination.
God's freeing
light is infinite, but only
for those who will join
Him
in diligently extending
his truths into the depths
of

their souls.

God offers freedom, but
it is a freedom
marked by a strong awareness
of its own present finitude
and a responsibility for
expanding its boundaries through
ceaseless confession. The sudden
freedom of conversion
calls forth an inner struaal.
for f^eedoi that
is

laborious, uncertain, never finished.

The confessing-

self is free precisely because
it can partially release
itself from its identity with
unconscious habits and
desires - from the past that it is through reflection
and begin to be otherwise.
Released from this causality,
the will is its own beginning. 113
As a confessing-self, the self
actualizes the freedom
it is born with.
All selves are free from being totally
passive objects of the world's chain of
causes, but few
are free of the causal dynamics within
themselves, and

they have done so only through relentless
remembering.

Freedom for Augustine does not well lightly, easily,
or
perhaps even wildly, out of the beings we are. It is

not
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the effortless ability to
put down our pencil and
rise out
of our chair at an
unpredictable moment. True
freedom, is

the most arduous task
humans can accomplish.
Moreover,
the gay thoughts of one
who comfortably dwells
in the
knowledge that one is "freeare the most deceptive
thoughts of an, for habit
and desire enslave the
self
under the guise of freedom.
Freedom demands a new self,
a deeply reflective self.
>,
The
ine ahilitv
acuity <-„
to begin
demands
the ability to remember.
Freedom demands responsibility
not only because through it
we become the initiators of
events with important consequences,
more primordially for
Augustine, freedom demands
responsibility because it is
only through responsibility (as
continual will to truth
about the self) that freedom is
released into being.
it
is the depth of human being
that provides the possibility
of the confessing-self, and it is
the conf essing-self that
frees freedom.
'

There are other important relationships
between
depth and freedom for Augustine as well.
The

self of

the ontology of conceit is locked into

a

dependence

upon the opinions of others to affirm its
being.

its

action in the world is bound in the incessant
attempt
through force and persuasion to sway others to
affirm
the self's absoluteness.

In contrast, the turn inward

of the confessing-self is a turn away from this
external

dependence on the "mob" and towards
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a

dependence upon

the Truth that dwells
within when the self
faces God
Conscience with respect to
Truth, Goodness and Being
free the self from the
tyranny of "public opinion":
[W]e detect weakness
in
that cannot bear... the a mind
opinion of the mob; we stupid
ascribe greatness to a rightly
that has the strength tospirit
despise the judgment of men and in particular the
judgment
of the mob, which is so
often
clouded in the darkness of
error
- in comparison with the
pure
light of a good conscience I* 4
.

As the self turns inward
it dissolves the compulsive
flat relationships it had
with the world when it dwelled
in the immediacy of desire.
The world can no longer press
the deep-self under in the
way that it did the flat self.
The depth of the self is
infinite; the more the world
presses, the deeper the self
dwells.

However, the quality of the world
changes for the
confessing-self as well, for as the self
dwells deeply,
it releases the world from the
one-dimensional form in
which it was imprisoned by the self
of ontological
conceit.

Freed from being an object-f or-the-self

,

the

world becomes a multi-dimensional reality
with a depth.
The world is always a surface wh ich
signifies
the

"transcendental signified" God.

Far from being flat

and transparent, things in the world are
ambiguous and

offer multiple truths to those who encounter them.
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The

»

invisible depth which is
designated below the surface
of
the sign calls forth an
endless henneneutics.
indeed,
the "obscurities" and
"ambiguities" which well out
of'th.
depth of some things "are
provided by God to conguer
pride
115
by work.
.

.

.

Confes sio Erq n

fin^

Gareth Matthews has made some
interesting observations on the important differences
between Augustine's Si
Fall ° r S,m (If 1 am mistaken,
I am) and Descartes'
Cogito
1
Ergo Sum
And certainly Augustine's conf
essing-self
'

.

^

does not occupy the position of
the subjects in the sen se
that Heidegger understands Descartes'
notion of man. 117
Nevertheless, perhaps there is a profound
way in which
Augustine is distinctly modern. Perhaps
it is not the

cogito, but Confessio Ergo Sum which
Augustine shares
with modernity. We will have to wait
until the following
chapter to decide with respect to modernity,
but for
Augustine, confession is clearly the condition
for human
being.
God of course is the ultimate Being of beings
for

Augustine, but we cannot face God and hence partake
in his
Being unless we confess continually. As we have
seen, the

vanity which leads one away from confession, at the same
time leads toward "nothingness."
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As the above discussion
reveais, oonfession not
only
allows us
in terms of our direct
relation to Cod
but is the condition for
our living lives which
avoid
the compulsive domination
over the world around
us which
results from ontological
ax conceit.
conceit
rv>„*«
^
Confession is the
possibility for realizing all
that is good in humanity
and purifying the self
of the dangerous "pride"
that we
are always prone to.
It carries and proliferates
God's
truth deep within us - a truth
which for

t^

•

Augustine is

identical with being.
However, strangely located
in a work that affirms
confession as a way of being, one
discovers the following:
...God, hear me and look upon
me
and see me and pity me and heal
thou in whose eyes I have become me
a'
question to myself: and that is my
1
infirmity

Be it a moment of brilliance,
or a simple recognition of
the obvious, in this concise
statement Augustine appears
- if only for an instant - to peer
into the heart of the

confessing-self and see

a

problem.

in the depths of his

soul, Augustine comes face to face
with the "infirmity"

that results when the will to truth confronts
the

ambiguous nature of a self that is largely
and in-

eliminably invisible to itself (on earth)
must know himself, but he cannot.

question to himself."

.

Augustine

He can only be "a

Not a question which he can affirm
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as a mystery, but a
question that is an infirmity a
question he must try to
eliminate. This deep question
he
is, this question that
is the source of his
strength and
hope, is at the same time
a problem for Augustine.
Vet
neither the questions nor the
problem can be put to rest
since each question only
leads to more questions.
The
Christian conception of the
"disease of curiosity limits
in important ways the nature
of the self's interrogation
of the world around it.
But with respect to itself,
the

questioning-self is driven beyond all
limits.
For an
instant Augustine seems to
understand the confessing-self
to be essentially problematic.
What was to lead to health
appears to be the cause of infirmity.
However the infirmity does not pose
a fundamental
challenge to the confessing self for
Augustine.
Indeed
it appears that further confession
is the only solution
to the infirmity. A little later in
the text Augustine
repeats:
"Again, let me examine my self more
closely." 119
The confessing-self moves towards the God
who will
"heal."

"I beseech you,

confess.... »!20

0 my God, show me to myself that

I

may

As long as Augustine , s God existS( the

confessing self remains impervious to any fundamental
and
sustained problematization.
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Prelude:

Augustine and Modernity.

Over fifteen hundred years
separate us fro, Augustine
and the world to which his
writing belongs and refers.
Moreover, an equally awesome
chasm lies between modernity
and Augustine:
for many, Augustine <s God
is dead or at
least missing in action.
The strong steady Light that
illuminated Augustine's perception
and thought - the sun's
Sun - has faded and become at
most, the dim struggling
light of a distant star.

Augustine's affirmation of the
conf essing-self is
inextricable from his faith in a God
that is the supreme
creator of all things and dwells
within.
God is

the telos
of confession; not only because
through confession we may

eventually "cleave" to God in Heaven,
but equally because
God as perfect Being is the qualities
that the confessingself strives toward (recognizing that
God and not
the self

is the source of being).

God's transparence to Himself,

His pure presence, His unity and His
truth and goodness
are all qualities which the confession
intrinsically

leads toward.

Though they are unattainable during

one's existence on earth, they are Being and to
the

extent that the self simply accepts opacity, absence,
discord, "evil" and "error" within itself, it tends

toward non-being.

The values of confession and the

qualities that are intertwined with it

-

that is, the

values which constitute the self's relation to itself
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»

are aiyen in Augustine's
faith in God and his under .
standing of humans as God's
creation.
Of course, it is not
simply faith which lea<Js
Augustine to embrace the
confessing-seif
His writing
offers us many interesting
insights and arguments
concerning the problems that
result from ontological
conceit and non-reflective
being as well as the virtues
that are associated with
confession.
y et many of these
understandings and all of the
prescriptions Augustine
.

draws are grounded in his
understanding of God and the way
He intended humans to be.
The arguments that Augustine
constructs, through which confession
comes to be seen as
the only possibility for being
are, to borrow Jasperswords, "guided by a faith that
has become one with
reason. 121
But what is left of Augustine's
arguments for the

confessing-self in an age where Augustine's
faith is
rapidly becoming less tenable? What
is confession

in

the modern age?

What can confession be in the modern

age?

What possibilities for being open up
if the notions
of transparency, control, unity and
presence - God's
qualities - cease to be absolute ideals which
hold
complete sway over our being? Are we really
"deep"

selves or is this merely an attribute that is
posited
and then colonized by Christianity?

Does the death

of God allow us to transform "depth" and reveal new
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understandings of being, or
does it entail a complete
renunciation of depth? What
possibilities for a greater
affirmation of "difference"
open up in Christianity's
twilight? These are some
of the questions which
must
haunt the following chapters.

And these questions are
important.
Confession
did not die with Augustine,
but has become one of the
defining features of our age.
Self-examination and the
examination of selves are, Foucault
maintains, continually
constituted by a constellation
of discourses, disciplines
and institutions which probe
deeper and deeper into
the

self in order to control it.

indeed, modern self-

examination is central to a form
of power which controls
and normalizes populations on
a micro-level never before
imaginable. God is dead, but the
Christian will to truth
is not.

Far from confession being a mode
of being which
challenges the hegemonic forms of power
as Augustine
believed it was in late antiquity,
Foucault argues that
confession is at the core of the modern
configuration of

power-knowledge
Modern conf essing-selves confess in

a

world where God

is dead (or at least very different
and much weaker)

and

the form of power is drastically different
from that which
existed at the birth of confession.
if in many important
ways confession remains confession, it is also
true that

there are important differences between confession today
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and Augustine's conception
of it.
A careful study of
Foucault's work Urinates
both the similarities and
some of the differences.

Exactly what dimensions of
Augustine's analysis
are salvageable and what
might be worth saving are
guestions we must hold open
until we have carefully
confronted Foucault's critique
of the confessing-self
and its place within the
operations of modern normalizing
power.
Perhaps what is needed most in
pursuing Foucault's
call for the creation and
promotion of new forms of
subjectivity which free us from modern
power structures,
is Augustine's "pious seeker."
"For to be
Pious," in Peter Brown's words, "meant
refusing to
solve the problem simply by removing
one of the poles
of tension." 123
It is a bit ironic that with the
death of Augustine's

God, we must become more pious (in
the above sense) than

Augustine.

For all the tensions which God held open
for

Augustine are small when compared to those which
emerge
when our idols prove hollow. We discover that
Augustine's
confessing-self is a dream and a nightmare. Augustine
had

but the briefest glimpse of the latter.
we have illuminated the dream.

In this chapter

In the following chapter

we will explore Foucault's critique of the will to truth
of and about selves in modernity, and his opposition to
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the ontological assumption
about human beings and the
world which he believes are
tightly intertwined with

affirmation of the conf essing-self

.

all

His critique is very

powerful, but tensions remain
which we must inhabit in
following chapters.
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CHAPTER III
FOUCAULT

Introdunt-i

The man described for
us, whom we
are invited to free,
is already in
himself the effect of a
much more profound than subjection
himself
A "soul" inhabits him and
brings
him to existence which
is itself
a factor in the
mastery that P
power
V
thS bod *The
is th^^,°
the effect and instrument souI
political anatomy; the soul of a
is the
prison of the body. 1

r

Foucault rejects the soul

-

this "prison"

-

as well
as the belief that it
should be the ground and target
for
our explorations of truth
and freedom.
To the extent that
it is possible he asks "what
is man?" at the boundaries
of
man's being; at the battered and
embattled surfaces where
man confronts his others.
For Foucault argues that it is

the interrogation of man's
interiors, the questioning of
depths below surfaces of carefully
bound and circumscribed

realities which so characterizes the
operation of power in
modernity that he seeks to thwart.
Depth, the dimension
in which Augustine sought truth,
freedom and increasingly
unified subjectivity, is for Foucault
the dimension in
which human beings are identified,
interrogated,
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constituted and rarified.

„

Depth
pt " ls
is th=
the dimension of
subjugation. The constellaH™ „o
nstellation of g 1V en,
fixed, absolute
truths, and a freedom
that ninges
hinae^ on <->,
the progressive
discovery of these truths
rucns, is
<=
fh = promise
the
that lurks in
the depths and draws
people deeper and deeper
into
subjugating examinations
of themselves and
others - deeper
-to the prison and its reign
of continuous pure
light
The crystalline motionless
transparency of Augustinian
heaven where even our
internal organs would be
visible is
for Foucault a nightmare
towards which modernity
presses.
in this chapter I explore
Foucault 's critique of
Modernity on two levels.
First , , briefly develQp
context in which the objectif
ication and subjectification of selves occurs in
modernity, and highlight
some of the disciplines,
discourses and institutions
which help make it possible.
„y purpose here is nQt
summarize Foucault's project
as a whole, but rather to
i

^

^

very selectively illuminate
dimensions of this project
which serve as indispensable
groundwork for understanding
and situating my reading of
Foucault in the remainder of
this chapter and the chapters
which
follow.

(it is not my

project to make it wholly sufficient
for those who have no
familiarity with his work.)
particular, I have focused
on the way in which the interplay
of depth (production of
the deep self), objectifying and
subjectifying illumination and the will to truth have been
central to the

m
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constitution and control
ntrQl ° f rou Ps and
^
individuals in
modernity.
Second,

have attempted to
elucidate Foucault <s
meta-theoretical understanding
of this phenomena
as it

^"atea

in

I

Tn^o rdS£_2f_iDjjlas

^

^^

i

Hhile
we lose much of the
texture found in the
ge nealogical
Foucault, we gain a level
of generality „ hich
offers us
-sights into the central
understandings of modernity
which govern his worx;
insights which are guite
valuable
and less visible in his
micro-analyses.

Since at this point

I

.

am interested in
elucidating

my understanding of Foucault
<s arguments, saving
criticism for later, I sometimes
simply write from Foucault's
perspective in order to prevent
overburdening the text
with -Foucault argues,"
-Jn Foucault's view," etc.
This
is not necessarily to
suggest my affirmation of his
arguments.

My position is made most
explicit in the
concluding chapter where I discuss
the three theorists
in light of each other.

The ContPvr
In order to situate the discussion
which follows, let

us briefly place Foucault's
discussion of the production
of deep subjectivity in the broader
historical context
as Foucault sees it.

Foucault rejects all theories of
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economic determinism on
both historical and
theoretical
grounds.
while he denies fchat
instance(
economic system are the
ultimate subjects of history
he readily affirms and his works illustrate
this
affirmation - that the
production of subjects "cannot
be studied outside their
relation to the mechanisms
of
exploitation and domination. »2
Rather, subjectif ication
and economic exploitation
coexist in "complex and
circula
relations.- .3 since these
relations play an important
rol
in some of Foucanlt-'c
*-^-4-„
u
*oucault s texts, it is
worthwhile to summariz
his understanding of them.

m

^

•

j.

•

Foucault maintains that the
proliferation of
techniques of subjectif ication
was largely linked to
the problems and demands that
were associated with
the rise of capitalism. As
wealth was accumulated

in

increasing quantities in workshops,
warehouses and ports,
a more systematic and
continuous form of policing and
punishment of theft was necessary to
replace the old
system with its dangerous spectacles
and tolerated
illegalities.
it became necessary to make the
power
to punish "more regular, more
effective, more constant
and more detailed in its effects; in
short [to] increase
its effects while diminishing its ...
costs 4 simulta.

neously, the increasing emphasis on
productivity and

growth required that the bodies of the workers
be rendered
disciplined and docile to maximize their utility and
to
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integrate them into relatively
rigid mechanized proces.es
It became necessary to
"increase the forces of the
body
(in economic terms of
utility, and diminish the
same
forces (in political terms
of obedience, .» 5
Furthermore,
the increasing concentration
and utili za tion of larger
populations required a means
of constituting and
controlling large groups of
people in a manner that as „e shall see - bears
interesting resemblances to
the
constitution of selves.
Populations too had to be ordered
in a way that optimized
their utility and mastered
the
potentially resistant powers of
the newly assembled mass.
"Bio-power" refers to the sum of
these disciplines,
institutions, techniques, and
discourses that develop to
track, survey, constitute,
regulate and most importantly
make more productive both individual
bodies and populations,
Foucault's view, these mechanisms do
not all
come into being simply to meet the
demands of a developing
global economic system. Rather they
are heterogeneous
in origin, developed to meet the
requirements of local
situations, and are henceforth "invested
and annexed by
more global phenomena." 6 The relative
causality of
various historical factors varies widely
and is for

m

Foucault, a question which must be investiqated

historically case by case.

What is certain is that

the body can only be utilized if it is at
once pro-

ductive and subjected.

Hence the micro-powers that
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constitute subjects
<~*i
lects aro
are indispensable
to political
economies endlessly engaged
in enhancing
productivity
Whxle the original context
of the development
of
disciplinary power is the
capitalist system, this
form of power has been
widely deployed in other
societies as well (e.g.,
socialist and fascist).

Objectification anH

gjabjastificatj

on

in this discussion of
subjectifying practices

I

win

focus first upon the ways
in which persons afe
objectif
as soul bearing subjects,
and then discuss Foucault's
understanding of the manner in
which individuals
constitute themselves as deep
subjects in the modern
context.

The growing emphasis placed
on achieving maximum
utilization and control of life
was accompanied by the
development of what Foucault has
characterized
as "the

art of light and the visible.

During the classical

age, military camps, workshops,
schools, hospitals,

asylums, housing projects, etc.,
began to be constructed
and organized with greater
attention to the principle
of increasing the visibility of
those contained within.
Gaps, aisles, openings, walls, the
position of tables and
beds - were designed to optimize
surveyability
Groups
were divided, organized and hierarchized
to facilitate
.
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Purpose.

In addition to the
perfusiQn

^

igenerai
gaze- thr o Ugho ut a
myriad of institutions>
that the -threshold of
visibility"
within
wirnin th«
y
the gaze was
markedly lowered.

For a long time ordinary
individuality - the everyday
individuality of everybody remained below the threshold
of
r Pt n
The di ^iplinary
^th H t° wered the threshold
of
HocS
k a i°
le individuality and
made
of this description a
means of
control and a method of
domination.
*

^

8

in schools,

factories and armies careful
attention was
given to gestures, punctuality,
attitudes and subtle
variations in behavior that
had previously gone unnoticed.
Regions of the visible were
divided and divided again
with
an ever intensified focus
on detail.
One of the mechanisms that
rendered people
increasingly visible was the
examination, which
became widespread in schools,
psychiatric practices
and hiring processes.
The examination allowed for
a minutely specified
objectif ication and tracking of
individual characteristics, and
simultaneously facilitated the measuring and grading of
individual differences.
Through the proliferation of the
examination persons
became objects of a meticulous and
relentless will to
truth.
"Micro-penalties" were introduced at various

92

^

m

Points to influence beh av
ior according to
judgments that were intrinsic
to the exam's operation.
The function of the
normalizing gaze and the
penalties that accompany
it is to constitute
certain
actions, attitudes and
abilities and to exclude
others.
Vet it is a serious
oversimplification to understand
the
exercise of this power
solely in terms of an
enhancement
°f homogeneity.
„ ithout a doubt

^^

narrow the range or
of acceDi-ahio
acceptable heterogeneity in
y
fashion.
Behaviors, thoughts and
emotions that

^

a

radical

fall

outside a narrow range are
identified as perverse
abnormalities and excluded.
Yet within an accepted
range, the gaze also
identifies, orders and indeed
helps constitute differences.
Foucault summarizes:
In a sense the power of
normalization imposes homogeneity, but
it
individualizes by making it possible
to measure gaps, to determine
levels
to fix specialities and to
render
the differences useful by fitting
them one to another. 9

Somewhat paradoxically, at the same
time that people
are abstracted as commodified
labor, made exchangeable
in highly routinized labor
processes and become formally
equal members of political systems,
"the individual is
carefully fabricated." 10 within the
limits of the
"tolerated," disciplinary power establishes
careful
hierarchies, and "separations" between those at
the
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same ran*.

^.^

Th e gaze penetrates

^^^

exclude differences that
do not meet
institutiQnai
requirements, but in addition
tQ

system of differences:

7

amid

lfc

att

— ^»

^

^

,, he continuQus
individuaiizi

^

individuals by sei2ing
t
thexr
pecul iarities as
deviations fro, detailed
norms
The gaze m anifests a
relentless
-

win

to "truth"

(from

which the exercise o £
power is inextricable,
which seeks
to transfer™ the atoms
of hodies into objects
of Knowledge
to be ordered, altered,
fixed or excluded.

It is obvious that
light and vision are
neither

neutral

events

nor innocuous realities
in Foucault's
work.
Rather they are among the
most central characters
- both literally and metaphorically in his understanding
of the functioning of power
in modernity.
One of the
cardinal features of disciplinary
power is the frequency
and extent to which it is
based on a "mechanism that
coerces by means of observation.-"
Illumination and
observation (accompanied by
penalties and rewards) ensure
the production of those
behaviors which are desired and
excludes those that are not. It
is no wonder then that
Foucault compares these modes of
observation with "the
telescope, the lens and the light
beam." 13 Jus t as the
latter were central in the development
of knowledges that
facilitated ordering and utilizing the
physical world,
so

too the "observatories" of human
beings made it possible
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to constitute humans
as obiect^
objects of v
knowledge - things to
be used.

^
^^

The architectural
scheme which most
embodied
principles o f light and
vision „ as
the -Panopticon."
Bentham's structure was
a rin g of
completely illuminated
cells in the center of
which was
a watchtower that
was designed to allow
the guard to
observe the prisoners,
without them being able
to see
him.
This not only allowed for
continuous observation
but more importantly, the
structure gave the prisoner
tfca
SSD^of being under continuous observation
even though
he could not verify this
suspicion.
This situation - the
ever-present possibility of the
invisible gaze - compelled
the individual continually
to watch over his own
behavior.
The Panopticon manifests
"a gaze which each
individual
under its weight will end by
interiorizing to the point
that he is his own overseer,
each individual thus exercising this surveillance over,
and against, himself..."
And here we arrive at the heart
of disciplinary
power:
the constitution of subjects
that relentlessly
subject themselves to self-observation.
The aim of the
panoptic gaze is not simply to trap
and control subjects
that would otherwise resist, but
ultimately to constitute
subjects that will generate their own
gazes - gazes that
will envelop them with a continuity
and thoroughness that
the gaze of another could never sustain.
The reign of
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«^

Pure light , the proliferating
and productivity demands

—

wiu

tQ observatiQni
confcroi

finaUv that the objects

•

of light

shxne, there must be
no shadows.

autocatylitic:

.

^

Everything

The Panopticon was
to he

"the P
perfection
Ctlon of thls Power
should tend
to render its actuai
exercise unnecessary:
...in short
the rnmates should be
caught up in a power
situation of
which they are themselves
the bearers. "15 „ ence
the
creation of an ideal economic
situation:

maximized

control and benefits at a
minimal cost.
Vet what is the nature
of this disciplinary
panoptic
gaze and its internalized
counterpart? Do they merely
judge surfaces, actions,
immediately visible behaviors?
Certainly these are observed
and judged, but conjointly
cne witnesses a much more
profound observation taking
Place.
Foucault argues that with the
emergence
of

disciplinary power it is no longer
simply the crime,
visible deviation or error that
is judged, but the

passions, potentials, drives,
instincts, desires beneath
the visible as well:
"these

sh*^

case itself -16 (my emphasis)

.

lurlrin „ hoh;

perhaps

^

^^^

obvious in our courts, prisons and
mental institutions,
yet it is equally at work in
"tracking" children

through

schools, and hiring and promotion
processes where people
are often subjected to interviews
and exams aimed not
simply at discerning relevant capabilities,
but the
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inner nature character
.-aptitude" of the
self as „e
The disciplinary gaze
judg es with a re m
ar kable de re e
g
of aepth:
it examines,
deciphers, g rades.
draws suhtie

U

»
»

-re

'

ways

to discover and
constitute truths about
the,
an effort to raaximize
utility and
*». that we interna liz e and perpetuate.
This gaze is
to he S3m tS a with the
confessing gaze discussed
heXow
but it is important to
note fche exfcent
,

^ ^

^

^

^ ^.^ ^

^

even this discipiinary
gaze has a reaarKably
subterranean
quality to it.
Of course, as we iooK
out our windows or
walk through
the streets we discover
very rew
verv
few mn«H
round transparent buildings with cornerstones
dedicated to Bentham - even
if
there are many prisons modeled
to varying degrees on
this
architectural form. Yet Foucault's
discussions of the
Panopticon are not primarily an
attempt to persuade us
of the pervasiveness of its
literal reality.
Rather
Foucault's writing traces the
lines of light, the walls,
the angles, shapes, patterns
and the intended effects
of this structure as he finds
it in Bentham's
4-

text.

it

captures his attention as an "ideal
form"*? of a mechanism
of power which has been extremely
important during the
last two centuries. The themes
articulated in this form
have been embodied in a variety of ways,
not
all of which

have been architectural (e.g., the exam),
and we can all
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thxn k of numerous
panoptic devices i„ our
everyday Ufe
from one way Errors,
vi sibl e and invis ibl
e cameras in
ban k s and stores,
intercom system in
schools that allow
the principal to listen
into classroom, to
urine
analysis.
'

One should not read
Foucault to he contending
that
people located within
panoptic institutions are
slml^
pacified, constituted and
rendered transparent to
the gaze
of power.
These latter are the
objectives of a certain
strategy of power, and
indeed they do inscribe
their
effects into the very being
of people; yet those
objectified by power are not
simEly products of fcheir
objectification, and strategies
of power are met with
counter-strategies.
(Mo re is said on this
in chapter
four.,
with this caveat however,
it remains the case
that
the deployment of vision and
light - the principles of
the
Panopticon - have been central
in Foucault <s analyses
of
power and his understanding of
the types of selves we have
become today.
The correlate of these principles
and the penalties
that accompany their operation
is the soul, as both the
effect of this power and that which
reproduces
it at

the level of the self.

Just as the body of the king was

duplicated and became the unchanging
atemporal body that
maintained the kingdom in the Middle Ages,
Foucault argues
that the bodies of those housed in the
institutions of

98

discipline society
wen, in the form of

give rise tQ fcheir
dupucates
the modern soul

^

_

^
mg

a

semi -se=ularizea vesti
ge of Christianity
or simpJy
ideological fiction, the
soul is a real
product of
-dernity. It is that which
is constituted by
disciplinary power in schools,
the wor k p la ce, prisons
and
psychiatric practices. The
sou! is the "reality
reference" of this power:
that which is educated,
trained, punished, normalized,
identified; that which
is codified and inhabits
the body in which it
is produced
But perhaps even .ore
importantly the soul is
that which
surveys and governs man from
within, in the name

J

-

of

freedom.

The soul is the profound
subjection of humans,
for it buries the effects
of power deep under
the flesh

of their being.

The soul is the panopticon
which each
self harbors within
xtnin itseit
it<?Pi f 4» a space
- in
which itself is
a product of the power
that constitutes
it.

It is within this context
of the production of

the modern soul that we can best
situate Foucault's
discussion of the deep self-examining
self in Volume
° ne ° f The History of Sexual ity
for the latter is an
additional strategy of subjugation which,
though different
in important ways, is nevertheless
quite consonant with
- and often overlaps and is intertwined
with - the
,

deployment of the disciplinary gaze.

To avoid confusion

before pursuing a more extensive analysis of the
modern
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confessing-self
diSC

X

^---

„ is h briefly tQ

^

**«..„ this deep-self and
the above

discussion of the disciplinary
self.
With respect to si ra
ilarities, perhaps most
i.portant
the fact that both work
to generate a self
that is
related to itself through
a colonized, codified
and
continuous self-reflection;
a self -reflection
which
tends to nonnalize as it
observes, both by i mp
regnating
the self with self-definitions
constituted by heg em onic
discourses and practices and
by engendering certain
"desirable" characteristics
while reducing those that
are "undesirable" or "other
or.ner. »
pw+-k«v-~
Furthermore,
the conception
of the self as deep-harboring
hidden truths and

-

secret

circuitous causalities

-

which is tightly bound up
with
the confessional practices
also conveniently serves
to multiply the disciplinary
holds over the self.
it
is these similarities which
are so conducive to the

overlapping deployment of conceptions
and practices of
the deep-self and disciplinary
technologies.

We see this

overlap in modern treatments of
madness as evidenced by
the nineteenth century "moral
methods" which operated
through "that psychological inwardness
where modern man
seeks both his depth and his truth." 18
with the birth
of the asylum guilt was organized
to produce deeper more

detailed self-consciousness, responsibility
and unity.
Similarly, as we noted above, Foucault argues

that our
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juridical practioes have
moved tQwards
examination
of the desires, drives
and deep personai
beneath the relevant
acts." This
J-nis is not
immediately
deep self-reflection,
but it is reflection
on the dep th s
of selves, a reflection
which, when continuous
enough
^ins to he generated within selves.
If sexuality
p
a central role i n
the constitution Qf

^

^^^^^
.

^^

^

^

deep self-reflection,
it also plays a role
in proliferating disciplinary
arrangements:
the segregation of
nineteenth century working
class bedrooms by

age and
sex, the surveillance
of parents over children.

Both disciplinary power
and the confession of
the
deep self are characterized
by an obsession with
minutiae
But here however we arrive
at a central difference
between
the two as well.
Por „ hat drives the confessing .
self
endless circles of self-reflection
is the attempt

^

to

discern the meaning and deep
truths buried within and
beneath the details of existence.
"For the disciplined
man.
[however] no detail is
unimportant, but not so much
for the meaning that it
conceals within it as for the
hold
it provides for the power
that wishes to seize it." 20
.

.

in contrast to the disciplinary
gaze, whose direct and

primary objective is utilization
and control, the gaze
of the confessing-self is driven
by a "hermeneutics of
suspicion- that delivers it to infinite
depths, meaning
behind meaning,
if the panopticon ends in pure
light
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,

the

.

confessing-self on the other
hand is after gn
object
15

ana

^

to such an absolute

an

tne deep truths humans
see, to discover
a bout
themselves in the modern
episteme
fj-oueme is s
t y,
at
best a "dark
shimmer,-- . truth that
continually recedes with
each
approaching gaze a truth
demanding a confession
that can
never end.
the panoptic gaze is
driven by an endiess
imperative to maximize
utility Foucamf
*°ucault argues that the
confessing gaze - with its
partly overlapping
deployments - is driven by
an imperative stemming
from the
very being of ..man" as he
exists in modernity.
The most
immediate effect of this
imperative is the constitution
'

<-

,

„

'

^

of

a

he^eneutic subject.

Yet as we turn to discuss
this
subject, let us not forget
that it disciplines
as it

confesses
As noted above, the manner
in which "western manis constituted as a deep
self-examining self is elucidated
in Foucault's discussion of
sexuality as a locus of modern
confession.
Volume One of The History of
Sexuality

m

Foucault argues that:

confessing society. "22

» We

have become a singularly

Confession has become increasingly

important in our institutions, our
relations to others
indeed confession has come to constitute

-

the self's

relationship with itself.

Inextricable from confession,

as both its precondition and its
effect is the under-

standing of the self as

a

deep subject.
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It is this

interplay between depth
and confession
and the role
Foucault argues they
perform in the
constitution Qf
subjectivity that I shall
explore in what follows
Depth is not, according
to Poucault, an
essential
quality of selves. Rather
it 13
1= a dimension
that comes
into being as an effect
of power,
power- a space created
as a
correlate of a variety
varietv nf
<-._v.
,
of technologies that
operate upon
selves.
conjunction with the
production of the "soul "
depth is created through
the discursive
deployment of
sex as -the secret" that
is subtly and
surreptitiously
signified by all the actions,
thoughts, emotions and
desires of the self. As
indicative of "a universal
signified"" to which all things
refer, the visible
manifestations of selves point
beneath themselves to
their -true.- meaning. Always
to be un-covered, sex
constitutes the whole of the
visible as the surface of
a
depth.
sex is not secret simply
because it is "elsewhere"
than the direction in which
we look:
it does not lie in
the field of the visible,
requiring only that we shift the
trajectory of our gaze. Rather,
the visible lies between
ourselves and the true meaning we
seek.
The visible is
laden with the weight of a thickness
that lies beneath it
- a depth it simultaneously signifies
and conceals. As
sex is discursively attached to
the visible, the surface
of the visible swells open like a
balloon to harbor the
secret in its interior.

M"

m
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Yet we become deep
nn f only
P selves not
because we are
constitute, as beings
.

^^^ ^ ^

^

we become beings
directed

_

dwell in ana grope through
depth.
For depth harfcors
the secret truth that
to surface sq
«y obtain our health, freedom and intelli
gibility 24
Because the promise of
liberation Ueg buried

^^
^

^

what one does, what one
recollects and what one
has
forgotten, what one is
thinking and what one
thinks he
is not thinking.-*.
Failure to
e)£plore

^

our dark interiors will
perpetuate our --repression,
••^authenticity" and blindness

--

to our --essential nature.--

However, Foucault axyues
arques

thaimat

fh 0 o 0 claims
these
that depth

is the dimension of truth anH
trurn and freedom are merely
the ruse

which lures people into
trap,

m

a for™ of

subjectivity that is a

fact, the space is colonized
at its inception

and remains a locality that
is continually penetrated
and
invested by a variety of power
strategies.
Truth is not
"the child of protracted solitude, -26
the essences that
rise in the soul's silence.
It does not emerge in purity
from deep within. Rather '-[tjruth
is a thing of this
world, it is produced only by
multiple forms of constraint.-' 27

we discover within, the being we have
been

fabricated to be; and we perpetuate and
intensify this
form of being when we exalt it as truth.
The
soul is
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^

an effect of a form
of power that
proliferates in
discovery.
„owever/ the content
Qf
a
are not estahlished
once and fQr
ates in the discovery
of the self rne
the t
* „•
tas >
* of
discovery
itself proliferates in
denth
Q
ae 4-v,
epth as
the dimension of
the
hidden which one never
depletes
Pieces.
HP
nn 0 power
Hence
perpetually
strives to define our
r depths,
deaths to uhelp us
define them, ever
anew.

^

^

^
M

^

,

Foucault illustrates this
dynamic in his discussion
of the "latency., that
oo.es to be attributed
to sexuality
- a latency which conceals
the truth
of sex from the self

sex "truly" resides in
regions even deeper than
those into
which we are able to submerge
ourselves.
„ e must delve
deep, but we are unable
to delve deep enough.
The last
part of the search requires
the help of "the other
who
.28
knows.As beings of such

^^^^

^

^

require an other (psychiatrist,
psychologist, therapist,
counselor, priest, teacher, etc.)
to identify
the real

truths of our soul:

a "master of truth" who
will decipher

what we really are.

Through the interpretive voices of
these others, a plethora of discourses
endlessly develops
around the task of deciphering,
identifying and codifying
the gems extracted from the deep.
In the scientific

discourses, subjects come to be defined
and located on
a scale stretching from the normal
to the pathological.
In these discourses selves are tracked,
fixed attached
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o operatives ana
ultimately constituted
is the relation
between discourse and

^termines the truth discovered

in

^

^
^
^^ ^
individuais

&

The -economy" of
discourses - their
teChnol °gy. the necessities
ot S2?i° e
tactics th **
«pS?"tSS e?^2:S of e power
wh ich
under 1 »
S
and
Which the * transmit
"
is what d
• ..is
determines the essent-i.i
features of what they
have ?o sav
f SeXUality -™st be
written ?rL°t h
1 °f 3
history

^

l

-

'

1

^courses^"

Depth is the place we are
identified and held fast
as objects upon which
power is exercised. Even
more
deesly. and fundamental
than we can know, we are
what
the psychiatrist tells
us we are.
The truth of our
bSing is depth as s~n in th»
eyeg of 1n -thM
And this truth is unity.
Beneath the ambiguous and
shifting surfaces of our flesh
and word, signified
in

multifarious ways, one discovers
the "one true sex." This
discovery of unity in depth can
be grasped metaphorically
in Foucault's presentation
of the hermaphrodite
Herculine
Barbin.
The examinations of Barbin
are important
for

Foucault because they exemplify
the disciplinary seizure
of the body.
Read metaphorically, however
(substituting
"deep self" for bodily depth) they
draw attention to
the violent and reductive aspects
of the search for deep
truths,
on the surface, Barbin appears to
be a most
"extreme mixture" of the two "true" sexes.
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Yet deep

below, discovered firstrSt h«
by

Pirating touch and later
by means of the surgeon's
b l ade one finds
the real truth
Barbin is extricated from
-the happy Umbo of
her
identity^

^

and hurled intQ

non-

"indeterminate anatomy where
the doctors and
lawyers
and judge determine the
single
truth of her being-

•male," before which the
truth of Barbin's
apparent
ambiguous difference as a
"hermaphrodite" is evaporated
in the prefix -pseudo."
Depth is ultimately
not a

dimension into which ambiguity
and difference are
extended and proliferate d. Depth
is a dimension of
reduction.
The illusion of richness

that depth might

conjure

each surface refers to something
else - shatters
in the "reality" that ultimately
they all refer to the
same thing,
it is not only that Barbin's
ambiguous flesh
is finally fixed as male, but
moreover that "his" whole
being is fixed as " male sex ." Barbin's
protean being is
crushed, ground homogenized by the
immense weight of a
depth which in the end Barbin cannot bear,
an engulfing
depth in which "he" drowns.
-

Vet,

if we are simultaneously produced and
reduced

in depth, we do not all experience depth and
sex as did

Barbin.

Indeed, the task of recovering the truth of our

sex has been constituted as something desirable.

Hence we

seek this truth of truths in the name of liberation.

freedom is to free sex.

Our

In fact however, Foucault argues
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that in trying to free
Power, but

..

„

sex „

^

^^

»

^
^ ^^^^^

which „ e think we see
Qurselves renected
shiver of sex .„31 we strive

^

truiy
t erms of this darlc
shiranering unifcy witMn

Foucault refer to the
^e

"

shiver be dark?

"flaw,
d ark

side

^^^^ ^ ^

are fastened to

_

^

^^

_

shmmer " of sex?
>.

Perhaps it is because

How can

^

a

^

^

darkens ail the living
surfaces which are referred
to it
endlessly as it swallows
their radiant plenitude.
Perhaps
it is because the shiver
is surrounded by the
darkness
it produces as we enter
the Paustian bargain
in the na me

of liberation and "exchan ge
life in it, .„,.,,

itself -32 (my emphasis)

_

perhaps

,

t ig

for sex
,

,

.

nel m nabie

darkness of monochromatic light.
The paradox that governs the
deployment of sexuality
cannot be overstated. On the one
hand a unity is posited
within as the "truth" and key to our
being.
But while
the creation of this "unity" has great
effects on our
self-understanding and our being, it is elusive
enough
to require continually renewed
self-surveillance
and

examination by others in order to approach closer
to
its "origin."

Thus the will to truth about sex spreads

to new areas and "penetrat [es] bodies in an increasingly

detailed way." 33

m

the nineteenth century sexuality

begins to circulate throughout the family; great attention
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xs paid to infantile
sexuality, masturbation,

separating
boys ana girls and parental
surveillance.
Sexual forms
and deviations are specified,
multiplied, and so too
the "surfaces of intervention"
through „ hich individuals
can he identified. We are
in the midst of an
extremely
multiplicitous search for unity.
in addition to the effects
of depth discussed above,
'

Foucault maintains that the
conception of the self as a
subject of deep truths functions
to disguise the operation
of power in which it plays
such an important
part,

since

truth originates in the purity
of the inner dimension
(the
reasons for error are "deen"
+-o^
aeep too...),
we avoid examining
the social, economic and political
practices in which
truth and the subject are produced.
Instead, to
\

,

the

extent that we examine the effects of
the social world
upon the self at all, it is in the

form of the "repressive

hypothesis" in which power plays
over against the deep-self.

a

purely negative role

Hence the constitutive

effects of power are disguised, and ironically,
people
exalt the very effects of power in rather poor
attempts
to be free.

As the deep-self - one of the most profound

effects of power

-

becomes the a priori assumption of

the analysis of power, power itself becomes increasingly
invisible.

One should not read Foucault to be arguing that

self-examining unified deep-subjects are produced solely
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^

through modern discursive
and non-discursive
practic
.ces
of sexuality.
Fouoault has
he
^

^

understands it to be very
important in
production
modern subjectivity, out
egually because it
Actions so
well to illuminate the
ontological understandings
that
underlie hegemonic modern
ideals of

^

the self „ hich are
by no means limited to
sexuality.
Poucault sees similar
themes embodied in modern
"self-absorption, "34 therapeutic
practices and Sartre's notion
of "authenticity "35
And
though the self-observing self
constituted under the
.

eye

of disciplinary power is not
identical to the hermeneutic
subject, we have already noted
the way in which a notion
of deep truth has made its way
into juridical and educational discourses.
In short, Foucault believes
that
the constellation of depth, unity
and self-examination
constitutes the epistemic terrain upon
which most
contemporary discussion occurs: it is
a central

feature of what he calls the
"epistemologico-juridical"
formation. 36

m

order to gain a clearer understanding

of Foucault's analysis of the self as it
is constituted

within the modern episteme, we now turn to his metatheoretical insights in The Order of Things
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.

Meta-Theoretir^n ^paly^s

Th^d^f_rhin^,

Foucault conducts a meta-

theoretical analysis of the
modern sciences of ma
n.«
in this investigation,
he does not attempt
to define
the various ideas that
the human sciences have
in common,
nor the framework of thought
within which they operate.
Rather he is striving to
comprehend what he calls the
"historical a priori" of modern
theories about man.
..

This a priori is what in a
given
period, delimits in the totality
of experience a field of
knowledge,
defines the mode of being of
the
objects that appear in that field
provides man's everyday perception
with theoretical powers and
defines
the conditions in which he can
sustain a discourse about things
that is recognized to be true. 57

Hence Foucault is interested in the
"conditions of
possibility" of the modern discourses on
man.
Because
(as we shall see)

he contends that man is situated at
the

heart of the modern "episteme" as the subject
and object
of knowledge in a way that is very different
from previous
epistemes, an exploration of the being of man in
modern

theory is central to his project.

unfolding what we might call

a

in a sense Foucault is

relative ontology of man;

an ontology that addresses not the being of man's being in

any essential or ahistorical sense, but rather an ontology

that addresses "man" as that being which burst upon the
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scene at the turn of the
nineteenth century, and
makes
possible and governs the
human sciences.

Foucault confines himself
to archaeological
method° l0gY

^

^^^hin^,

and hence the connections

between knowledge and power
which one finds in some
of
his earlier and later works
are absent.

indeed, the

appearance of man as that which
made the human sciences
possible is seen in this work
not as a consequence of
technologies of power, but instead
as "an event in the
order of knowledge "38 Tne
methodological snortcomings
of this stage of Foucault 's
thinking have been cogently
discussed by Dreyfus and Rabinow 39
and retrospectively
.

by Foucault himself. 40

However, one of the things that

remains of great value in this work is
the sustained
analysis of the mode of being of "man"
as he appears in
a wide variety of modern discourses.
We find here a level
of generality which sheds light on some
of his later works
which tenaciously remain at the level of the
particular.
I believe that if we read Foucault's
archaeologies
and

his genealogies in light of each other, we can
reveal

important insights into modernity which are far more
illusive when these texts are read separately.

effort to do this,

I

In an

will first briefly situate the

sciences of "man" in the contest of power, and then show
some of the ways in which his archaeological discussion
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of "man" sheds light
liaht nr.
on the general
characteristics of
man as the subject and
object of power.
Zt is in

^iniine_^n^uni^

that Foucault most
clearly situates man and
the sciences of man in
the
context of technologies of
power.
Rather than simply
being "an event in the
order of knowledge," man
is
understood to be an "object-effect"
of the modern
techniques of "domination-observation, "41
and the

sciences of man are understood
to develop largely in
the midst of relations of
power:
the observation and
definition of incarcerated persons,
the relationship
between psychiatrists and patients,
the widespread
subjection of person and populations
to examinations,
ever more continuous observation,
detailed attempts to
constitute desired behaviors. In short,
the sciences
of man develop in a panoptic society
in which humans
are increasingly under observation,
and the "man" they
study is the man that is constituted within
these

power relations.

Knowledge and power "presuppose

and constitute" one another:

"The subject who knows,

the objects to be known and the modalities of
knowledge

must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental
implications of power-knowledge." 42
If knowledge is born in and proliferates operations

of power, then we should not only be able to situate

and gain a deeper understanding of modern knowledge by
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power by studying the
characteristics of Knowledge.
If
the man who is both an
effect of power and a
being that
extends it, is also the man
that is the subject

and object
of the human sciences,
then a study of the being
of this
man that has governed these
sciences is likely to give
us
greater insight into man's
relation to power.
For this
man - his relationship to
his life, his language,
his
labor and his consciousness,
the things he must think
d ° " iS ^Mng^oX_ms_world
of "war by other means."
The human sciences attempt
to describe a being that
exists, and their effort itself,
in part, both manifests
and constitutes this extant being.
And if there are

^

fundamental characteristics which
define his being for
all of these diverse sciences we
should examine them

carefully in an effort to discern some
of the fundamental
aspects of the functioning of power in
modernity.

The

man of finitude and the things he "must"
do, provide us
most profoundly with a general description
of man-inmodern-power
.

In order to bring Foucault's discussion of
the Age

of Man into relief,

it is helpful to briefly outline his

conception of the Classical Episteme which preceded
The Classical Age conceived of the world as
of being created by God.

a

it.

great chain

Each of the beings lodged within

this continuous chain varied only in the slightest manner
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from its neighbors in the
chain.
Each being was represented, but its representation
was not the creation
of
another being. Kather,
significations and that which
they
signified were transparently
and internaliy connected.
I„
the "Classicali Age,
Aae the =sign is the
representativity of
the representation in so
far as it is representable.
"Each [representation] posits
itself in its transparency
as a sign of what it
represents."" The place of human
beings in this scheme of things
was to compare the
representations of a world that had
been scrambled by
time to examine the minute
identities and differences
between beings, in an effort to
construct an order that
would resemble as closely as
possible the Order that God
created.
As is readily apparent, the Classical
episteme
lacked the space in which humans could
be originary
beings.
Representations did not emerge out of the

density of man's being, they existed in

a

completely

transparent "strictly binary" 45 relation with the
things
they represented; the order which man sought to
construct
was not the product of a creative effort to make some
sense out of a chaotic Godless world, but simply an effort
to reconstruct the God-given.

The representations given

to humans and the things themselves were unproblematically

linked in the language people spoke.

Hence "man, as a

primary reality with his own density, as the difficult
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object and sovereign
subject
cr of a11
an ^
J
Possible knowledge,
has no place in [the
Classical episteme] "46
The
discourse that joined
representation and being
"provided the link between
the *i think'
.

and the

*I am'

of the being undertaking
it. "47

And

.

f

^

being of the "I am" remained
unexamined, it was because
it could not constitute
a "problem" in an
episteme where
thoughts and beings pressed up
against each other so
tightly that there was no space
to ask a question which
would soon become imperative.
Man as the object for
complex interrogation and analysis
did not
exist.

Foucault argues that a new epistemic
space with new
possibilities and new requirements began
to emerge at the
end of the eighteenth century with
the recession of the
Classical Episteme.
(This is a change Foucault is content
to describe as an "archaeological
mutation," and makes no
attempt to explain until later works.)
in the Classical
Age the truth of a thing was defined by its
position in
the table of representations which was constructed
to

mirror God's Order

-

itself and order of the visible.

The thing's visible representative qualities manifested
its identity which could be comprehended in its relation

to other representations.

Hence, representation

visible surface of the world
and their truths.

-

-

the

was the locus of beings

However representation began to be

displaced, as labor escaped from the table of needs with
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"

Smith and became an
"irreducible absolute"
standard of
measurement for anal yzing

^

exchange; as

natural history began to
be based on organic
structure
"an internal principle
not reducible to the
reciprocal
interactions of representations" ,48
as the

principle of inflection usurped
the primacy of representation in analyses of language.
Foucault argues that
these initial changes were
further transformed and that
they established a complete
break with the Classical
Episteme in Ricardo's originary
labor, Cuvier's primacy
of functions and Bopp's emphasis
on grammatical
wholes.

Things withdrew beneath their
visible surfaces; truth
came to reside in their hidden
regions.
As beings
"withdraw into the depths of things,
"man" emerges

in the space left behind - a being
at the center of a

murky world who provides himsPlf with
representations.
As thought falls outside of its previously

transparent

relationship to the world, Kant awakens.

Restless and

uneasy, he begins to ask about the "conditions
of its

possibility.

Foucault contends that the man that emerges in

modernity discovers that he is indicated by the positive
forms of life, labor and language which he finds himself
in the midst and mist of.

required

-

"Man is designated

-

more,

since it is he who speaks, since he is seen

to reside among the animals

(
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on extremity of a long

series)

and since... he is
necessarily 4-v,
the principle and
means of all production." 50 v
e r as »
Yet
man is indicated at
the center of life, labor
and language, he
simultaneously
finds that his existence is
only accessible in these
very
forms, and that they are
older than he is and
determine
him.
Man can only be known as
he works, speaks and
lives.
Yet only through an ancient
language can man speak, only
by means of processes older
than himself can he work,
and he lives only as part of
a primordial life that
precedes him. Everything indicates
man, and everything
man can reveal about himself
indicates an "irreducible

anteriority"

-

gestures towards his ineliminable
finitude.

However, if everything bespeaks
man's finitude,
nothing enables him to "contemplate"
it; for everything

which is given in his thought
itself based on finitude.

-

even his finitude

-

is

As man attempts to elucidate

the system of words, production and life
that outdates
him, that which he is attempting to clarify
"always

already partially and surreptitiously constitutes
his
elucidation.
elusive.

Man

-

what he is and what he is not

-

is

But that which man is unable to completely

contemplate because of its irreducible anteriority" is
at the same time only possible and given to experience

on the basis o f man's finitude.

The mode of being of

space, life, production and language are only given to

man on the basis of his body, his desire, his work and
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his speech.

TnU s the finite ex
stence wh ch iim ts h
access to things is also
that which Makes all
access
possible.
.

.

.

^

It is precisely the
evasiveness of finitude the

endless reciprocal referral
of man and things which
harbors finitude's promise.
if man is unable to
comprehend with clarity the
precise nature and
boundaries of his finitude there
is always the
possibility that there may be a way
out:

a form

of life, labor and language soon to be discovered that would be completely transparent,
rational and
unalien.
Oddly, man's finitude is accompanied
by

hope more than by submission or
resignation.
Heralded in positivity, man's finitude
is outlined in the paradoxical
form
of the endless; rather than the
rigour
of a limitation, it indicates the
monotony of a journey which, though
it probably has no end, is nevertheless perhaps not without hope. 5*
Indeed, this hope and the struggle to realize
it are not

possible options for man to pursue; they are imperative

.

For this finitude which originates in man's strange being

threatens to completely cut man off from the truth of
himself.

The ambiguity of finitude which harbors the

possibility of escape from an ambiguous existence into
a

realm of pure truth threatens to snuff man out under

the tragic weight of error, alienation
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-

the Other within.

The possibility of the
tne 1ai-^>.
latter generates the
y
imperative
quality of the former.
The strategy employed
by man in his effort
to
achieve transparency and
rise beyond his finitude
takes
the general form of the
"repetition of the positive
within
the fundamental,- .52 in
which man attempts
those things which determine
him and indicate that he
is finite, in the positivity
of his own being.
Foucault
argues that there are three
ways in which this "analytic
of finitude" is "deployed":
the repetitions of the
transcendental and the empirical,
and return and retreat
of the origin and the cogito
and the unthought.
Each
of these doubles deserves
discussion, for each is central
to the trajectory which he believes
modern man

^

^

follows:

a trajectory in which man makes
his Other,

the Same.

Foucault states that man in the analytic
of finitude
is an empirico-transcendental doublet:

"a being such

that knowledge will be attained in him of
what renders all
knowledge possible." 53 As the analysis of
representation
recedes, man becomes the

"

site of anaiy ^^' which must

be continually interrogated and defined in the effort
to

provide a stable foundation for knowledge.

One form this

takes is that of mechanistic, physiological and biological

attempts to discover the conditions of knowledge in the
nature of the human body.

The most recent manifestation

of this effort is witnessed in the sociobiology movement
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.

that has become quite
popular in the past decade.
Here
truth is bound to a fixed
understanding of the human
nature that makes it possible.
Another form of the
exnpirico-transcendental double is
the effort to ground
knowledge in a history which
can be known with certainty
and simultaneously prescribe
the forms of this knowledge
(here he has in mind Comte
and Marx)
Thus man as he appears in
modernity is constantly
traversed by knowledges which
reduce him to the status of
an object which is uncritically
given, and/or define him
in terms of what he is becoming
and will be.
In both
cases "truth" is constituted and
man is defined as "the
same" meaning that man is to be
identified within a
constellation of truth which does not ^Vnnw.^
tnat
in humans which is other than,
non-identical with
or in

opposition to this constellation.
little consequence.

And this is of no

As we see in other works, a plethora

of discursive and non-discursive practices
is launched
to make man be what he "truly is."

These practices are

tightly intertwined with the way in which man appears
in
the modern episteme.

What is unavoidable is that man

-

as the finite subject and strange object in which dwells

and from which emerges an elusive truth

-

must continually

be traversed, interrogated and illuminated in the effort
to discover and make him conform to a truth which is

nevertheless impossible to secure in modernity.
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The second awkward double
in which man in the
analytic of finitude discovers
himself is the constant
referral of the ^itp. to
the unthougnt
within
modern episteme, man is
unable to infer a total,
immediate
and transparent "I am" from
"I think."
The "I think" is
only able to think what it
thinks on the basis of what
it
does not think. As we have
seen, man's thought is
carried
along by a language, a life
and a labor that are older
than he is and not completely
intelligible to him. Man's
thought constantly refers to what
he is not and does not
think.
As such a being, man is the
"locus of misunderstanding ... that constantly exposes
his thought to the risk
of being swamped by his own being,
and also enables him to
recover his integrity on the basis of
what eludes him." 54
Being neither a dead object nor an
absolute subject, man
is "always open, never finally
delimited, yet constantly
(but always only partially) traversed" 55
by a
.

^

gaze, a

thought driven by fear and hope.
The unthought that haunts man does not have
the

character of an external limitation.
man does not think

-

Rather, that which

his Other - is born with man:

is the "shadow" he casts with each thought.

it

Thus the "I

think" which led Descartes to truth and certainty, must
be for modernity a project that is never completed and

ceaselessly renewed.

And if Kant stepped to the threshold

of modernity when he began to question the conditions of
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^

possibility of truth, fully
modern man ig
the possibility and actuality
of "what eludes him."
Hence man "must traverse,
duplicate and reactivate in
an explicit for, the
articulation of thought on
everything
within it, around it, and
beneath it which is not
thought
•*- a

^^^

y renewed

Everything which
surrounds him

-

-

i

ntor rogation.. 56 (my emphasis)

^

in the depths of man and
that which

evades man's thought, now
threatens man's

entire existence (no longer
transparent and stable: now
increasingly opaque) with error,
alienation and madness.
The shadows that man casts with each
thought have been
cast by all men during all of time,
and the darkness of
this collective shadow carries him
forth as a grain of
sand on the crest of a turbulent wave.
Better
yet, as

an inept god thrashing uneasily in a
dark murky ocean of
his own creation. The ocean roars to man's
horror "I am
Other, » yet without it he would be desiccated
and succumb

to an unlivable gravity, for the other is the
necessary

condition of man's being

- a life,

labor and language

which he is not identical to nourishes and sustains him.
In his effort to recover his promised position as

the pure origin and certain sovereign of thought, man

penetrates into the region of the Other.

However this

constant obsession with and interrogation of the unthought
does not culminate in the dissolution of opacity.

than an end, man establishes himself in the endless
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Rather

"Agnation

of the eleaent^darlsness
that cuts

off from himself"" (my
emphasis)

_

^ .^.^

raan

the depths which prevent
him fro* being self-identical
self-presence. This is the
essence of man and thought
in modernity.

Hence Foucault argues that
"for modern thought no
morality is possible, "58 for it
is always in movement
towards, but never arrives with
certainty of a secure
self-identical thought unplagued by an
unthought residue
which might enable us to grasp the
laws of the world's
order which have grounded western
(non-religious) morality
in prior times.
(Another certainty ground religious
morality and this becomes problematic in
modernity
as

well.)

Indeed, the only imperative which this
thought-

which-never-arrives can generate

- an

imperative of

no small importance - is that of its own
movement:

continuously expanded reflection-illumination of its
atramentous depths.
Yet if thought must ceaselessly shed reflective
light, this is not to say that thought is simply bound

up with itself and, due to its uncertainty, unable to act.
On the contrary, Foucault maintains that "modern thought,

from its inception and in its very density, is a certain

mode of action." 59

In modernity, thought has always

"left itself," it has never stayed within the domain of

the theoretical.

Modern thought has always been compelled
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to move beyond itself
to what is not thought to what is
•'-thought." And where contact
has been made there has
been disturbance. For
thought does not simply
"reveal,"

but rather is

«

J

modification of what it knows.. .60
thought ide^tifie^ it "offends
or reconciles, attracts
or repels, breaks, dissociates,
unites
or reunites:
it cannot help but liberate
and enslave. "61 Thought

exercises power not merely because
of its content and
its bases in societal struggles.
Moreover thought is
linked to power because of its
fundaments

t^^..

.

because it is always "advancing
towards that region where
man's Other must become the Same
as himself."" Modern
thought moves to make all that is
Other identical
to

its concept, and in so doing enslaves
and obliterates
the Other's difference (it may
establish the Same's

differences)
Same.

.

it constitutes a new thing that is
the

Before prescribing action (based on morality),

thought in modernity is action.

Hegel might serve as

an appropriate illustration of this point,
his dialectic

moving restlessly from one thing to the next,
identifying,
reducing, exhausting the meaning of things to the truths

they contain within his phenomenological "museum."

Even

Hegel, the master of that final synthesis, senses the

ineliminable proximity of an unthought about to caste

tremendous shadow upon our current truths.

a

If "the owl

of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the
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dusk,"" what

is this but a subtle
acknowledgement that

thought never quite keeps
pace with the cutting
edge of
the historical wave which
bears it along? what is

this
if not a delicate confession
about that twilight region
in which thought is
condemned to fly its unthought
always

just below the horizon

-

never to spread its wings
in the

pure transparent light of a
new day? More concretely,
we
can think of the ceaseless
efforts to ensnare the untame
protean world within truths that
reduce it to the terms
of hegemonic discourses - terms
of "the Same." The
reduction of dreams to Oedipus, of
homosexuals to medical
categories, dissidents to psychological
classifications,
nature and people to the discourses
of utility, the self
to deep truths - lest the True,
Normal,
Healthy, Useful,

Deep man be forever cut off from himself.

There are few places in The Order of Things
where
Foucault comes as close to leaping out of the
archaeological dimension as he does in the above passage.

More

than simply a discussion of thought and unthought
as

archaeological contemporaries, Foucault offers us the

broad contours of his understanding of the manner in

which modern thought in its very being manifests
of power.

a

type

In this analysis of the episteme he recognizes

characteristics of modernity

-

the restless unending

illumination, identification and transformation of

Otherness in an effort to constitute the Same in its
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purity

which he studies on a
micro-level in his more
genealogical works. while
there are many very imp
ortant
differences between Foucault's
archaeological and
genealogical periods, the broad
insights in the former
and the particular analytics
in the latter both belong
to a "structure of perception"
which remained remarkably
constant in important ways.
-

The final double Foucault
discusses is the "retreat
and return of the origin."
the Classical Age, humans
returned to the origin of things
by discovering the order
of representation that perfectly
and transparently represented the world. With the attainment
of this order man
could unproblematically witness the
primordial origin of
all things including knowledge itself.
However as things
withdraw into their depths and transparency
clouds over,
the origin that existed in theory in
the Classical Age
becomes impossible. In modernity, when man
looks for the
pure origin of his being, he discovers that he
is always

m

"bound to a previously existing historicity." 64

As we

have seen, the dawn of his own being is always attached
to a life, labor and language which began long before
him.
In fact, the nature of modern man's origin can no longer

be conceived of as an immediate and pure beginning, but

rather as the way he "articulates himself upon the already
begun." 65

Instead of "the immediacy of a birth" which

would reveal him as and allow him to be
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a

self-present

subject, he finds himself
always already infused with
and
borne along by what is not
identical with his own being.
Far from leading back, or
merely pointing, towards a even
peak...
of identity, far from
indicating
the moment of the Same at
which
dispersion of the other has not the
vet
come into play, the original
in man
is that which articulates
him from the
Up ° n somet hing other than
?2 it
t is
himself;
that which introduces
into his experience contents
and forms
older than himself, which he
cannot
master. .scatters him throughout
00
.

time.

Unable to bear this, modernity has made
multiple
attempts to recover man's origin from
the naive positivist
attempts to "insert man's chronology within
that of

things" 67 to the very diverse strategies
of Hegel, Marx,
Spengler, Nietzsche and Heidegger.

Whether it is in the

form of man-as-realized-being, or as the retreat
of the

origin which alone makes experience possible,
Foucault

maintains that "modern thought makes it its task to
return
to man in his identity."
We might summarize the discussion of the analytic of

finitude, by contrasting the trajectory of the thought it

generates with that of the Classical Age.

The Classical

Episteme as we have seen, was based on an ontology of
continuity.

The world was perceived as

a

great chain

of beings which varied only in the slightest manner from

their neighbors in the chain.
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It is easy to see how

thought which identified
reality with the well
ordered
table would be likely to
violently distort and subjugate
reality under the guise of
transparent and innocent
representations. This order of
things could
be

and
as Foucault shows in other
works was - indicated in a
set of practices which
constituted certain forms of

behavior and excluded others.

The exclusion of madness

in the Classical Age illustrates
the extent to which this
form of reason could be involved
in the obliteration of

Otherness.

Foucault never indicates that the
Classical
Age was a "good time" or a period we
should return to.
Yet upon the perceived ontological
continuity
of being,

classical theory was concerned with
distinguishing

difference

:

the like." 68

among "the secretly varied monotony of
The trajectory of Classical thought was

towards "the never-completed formation of
Difference." 69

Modern thought in contrast, moves in the opposite
direction.

In the attempt to secure man from the erosive

forces which threaten his precarious being as it is given
in the analytic of finitude, man must ceaselessly show

that he is the complete foundation of what can be

a stable

truth; that the unthought can always be thought; that he

can seize his origin.

Man must attempt to squeeze shut

the gaps where the Other might arise.

In a state of

complete self -presence man would be the absolute sovereign
entirely rid of the temporal and spatial lacuna that might
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spawn the other.

As self identical/

^

^

^

so thoroughly that the
unthought would be unthinkable.
Yet the Same is for modernity
only a promise, a direction
to be pursued, never entirely
attainable.

Foucault summarizes:

in modernity "we have
moved

from a reflection upon the
order of Differences [Classical
Episteme]...to a thought of the
Same, still to be conquered in its contradiction.-.™ "
It is always concerned
with showing how the Other, the
Distant, is also the Near
and the Same." 71 The ultimate
consequence of this
is

that modernity harbors within itself
a most compulsive
imperative to obliterate difference.
All that is other
threatens "man's" inherently unstable
position and must
succumb to the Same.
if the Classical Age closed

out the

Other at the level of its ontology, modernity
is founded
on an ontology in which the Other is
continually
reborn

in the depth of being - not simply exterior
to but within

the very flesh of man
formed,

-

and must be ceaselessly trans-

identified, made the Same.

The Same is no longer

the ground for activity, it is now the essence of the

trajectory of activity itself.

And it seems that Foucault

perceives the activity of revealing the Same to be even
more dangerous than the ground of the Same.

If in the

latter, the Other might avoid recognition and exist simply
as a non-being,

in the former there is absolutely no place

for the Other to hide.

The Other is ceaselessly present
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as an absence recognized
as the danger of Death
and
Madness, and must be the
target of continuous,
detailed,

deep illumination and
intervention.
But precisely at the
point where thought has
become
a restless activity that
must ceaselessly reflect
upon
the question of man, Foucault
maintains that thought
is "falling asleep.
The point at which modernity
perceives the awakening of philosophy the point at
which man kills God and dissolves
the visible surface
of His Classical Order into
depth - is for Foucault only
an instant of consciousness that
is engulfed once again
by Morpheus. This time however,
Morpheus does not rule
as a God from without, but from
within - as man in the
analytic of finitude.

^

Rather than overcoming pre-modern dogmatism,
the
analytic of man merely "consists in doubling
over
dogmatism." 73

The positive and the fundamental are

made to refer to one another endlessly in an
effort
to render the foggy depths a place fit for
sovereignty.
In this Fold, the transcendental
function is doubled over so that it
covers with its dominating network
the inert grey space of empiricity;
inversely, empirical contents are
given life, gradually pull themselves
upright, and are immediately subsumed
in a discourse which carries their
transcendental presumption into the
distance.
...All empirical knowledge,
provided it concerns man, can serve
as a possible philosophical field in
which the foundation of knowledge, the
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definition of its limits,
and in

fch*

Yet the ideals which govern
man's being - transparency,
identity, sameness - are
precisely those which were
shattered when man killed God.
They can be for man
only an impossible promise.
As man steps to the vacated
throne he finds that God's world
has deserted him.
The
dim godless world resists the
principles which rendered
God's sovereignty so unquestionable.
The order crumbles;
being sinks beneath the reach of
his gaze.
man's
attempt
to be the ground of the Same, he
merely situates
"his language, his thought, his
laughter in the space
of that already dead God;" 75 and
hence man's death is
simultaneous with his murderous birth.

m

Man is born in the effort to see man

-

not God -

as the self-present self-knowing origin
of his own being.

With the death of God however, there is no ontology
which
will enable man to attain the presence God had before
man

dethroned Him.

Man cannot be the God he killed, he is

somnambular in his efforts (to use
enjoyed)

.

a

word Nietzsche

Morpheus is the only god man can be.

Foucault ends The Order of Things with the ambiguous

prophesy that man may soon be "erased, like
in sand at the edge of the sea." 76

What

-

a face

drawn

if anything -

Foucault hopes will emerge, we will hold until the next
chapter.

What is clear so far however, is that for
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Foucault, man, and the attempt
to discover the "truth
of all truth" in himself
which defines him, leads
power
and knowledge in a direction
that makes freedom and
thought increasingly impossible.
"The man whom we are
invited to free, is already in
himself the effect
of

a

subjection much more profound than
himself. "77
We have seen the sense of this
statement

in light of
the practices of power which
define the truths of human
beings and fasten them to these truths.
So too this sense
emerges in the practices in which selves
fasten themselves
to both the truths that are deployed
and the deployment
of truth.
The studies of man in the analytic of
finitude
are deeply entwined with this project,
for they perpetuate
an ontology and a specific understanding
of "liberation"

which is central to the operation of power in
modernity.
Correlatively, they necessitate

a

will to truth and a

will to light which is also fundamental to these
forms
of power.

The archaeology of these sciences reveals

dimensions of our modernity which illuminate our situation
in ways that may help us transform it.

But if Foucault rejects deep man and the search for

the "truth of all truth," does he then simply revel in the

pit of irrationality?

Does this abandon leave him in the

existentially crippled condition of absolute relativism?
Is he unable to affirm one set of practices over another?

Does he thoroughly reject enlightenment and its counter-
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discourse?

is he ln
in +->,-:
thls~ sens e a
"neo-conservative" as
Habermas claims? 78
No.

The arguments to support
such lucid bluntness lie
in the next chapter, but
the "no" whispers in the
final
pages of the "Man and His Doubles"
chapter we have been
discussing. Here Poucault does
not celebrate the death
of man as the end of thought,
but rather as thought's
dawn
:

The end of man... is the return to
the beginning of philosophy.
it is
no longer possible to think in
our
day other than in the void left by
man's disappearance.
For this void
does not create a deficiency; it
does not constitute a lacuna that
must be filled.
It is nothing more,
and nothing less, than the unfolding
of a space in which it is once more
possible to think. 79

And lest one think that by "thinking" Foucault
has
in mind something that originates only in
Foucault 's
skeptical laughter

-

and it does find a home there

-

we

might note that he speaks of awakening modern thought "in
order to recall it to the possibilities of its earliest

dawning."
•

ft

n

These passages should caution us against

quickly leaping to the conclusions which may have seized
to dismiss Foucault.

A space.
possibility.

Nothing more, nothing less.
In the following chapter,
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I

A space of
will argue that

the space that emerges in
which it is once again
possible
to think arises from the
counter-ontological claims of
the human body which appear
most forcefully when the
deep soul of man has deserted
it.
More precisely
it is

Foucault's counter-ontology of
the body which constitutes
the possibility of thinking
and the "work of freedom."
indeed, thinking, freedom and
self are reconceived on
the ground of this ontology.
what emerges is nothing

short of a radical transformation
of enlightenment;
but a transformation which Foucault
nevertheless places
squarely within the tradition it
transforms.
it
is a

transformation explicitly attuned to the
possibilities
of enlightenment's earliest dawnings.

Conclusion
Thus we have explored Foucault's understanding
of

the way in which depth, truth, light, liberation,
and
the confessing-self function together in modernity to

constitute the Same and exclude the Other.
is ubiquitous,

If confessi

it is not simply because as moderns we

are attached to the imperative of discovering our "one

true sex."

The hermeneutics of the sexual subject is

only one part of the confessing-self understood in a

more fundamental sense.

At the epistemic level, the

confessing-self is synonymous with man in the analytic
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of finitude who must
ceaselessly attempt to bring
forth
the entire empiricity of his
being; who must endlessly
seek to think the unthought
that lurks in all thought;
and who incessantly strives
to recover his lost identity
- his absolute presence in which
he would be completely
the Same, entirely rid of the
Other.
Man must attempt
to proliferate the will to
truth throughout every
corpuscle of his being and the beings
which surround
him.
Everything must be brought to light.
modernity,

m

the being of man (as individual and
as society) consists
of ever-tightening circles of
reflexivity which increasingly bind him to the Same.
In the next chapter, as we develop
the positive

dimensions of the Foucaultian project, we will
see some
of the understandings which govern modernity
undergo
radical transformation, while others drop out
altogether.

We will consider the tenability of this project
in the
final chapter where we will discuss Augustine, Foucault

and Merleau-Ponty in light of each other.
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The Affirmative

T>- a iectory

Of Fouc ault's Thnng ht-

Introduction
Foucault's critical insights
have spawned debate
that vary widely in their
acuity and
value.

:

Yet thii.s

is not the terrain upon
which he faces his most serious

challenges.

Even among those who acknowledge
that

Foucault's studies illuminate dimensions
of our modernity,
we hear the incessant charge that
Foucault is essentially
nihilistic and unable to tell us why he
criticizes
some

things and not others, let alone provide
us with a
positive vision or affirmative ethic. Thus
Habermas
has claimed that Foucault rejects the
enlightenment,
is a "young conservative" 81 and lacks
"normative
yardsticks"; 82 Charles Taylor refers to Foucault's

"monolithic relativism" and his inability to affirm
one
set of practices over another; 83 Michael Walzer charges

him with "infantile leftism" and "anarchism/nihilism"; 84

Richard Wolin accuses him of an "aesthetic decisionism"
within which he is forced to take "irrationalist leaps"
to affirm anything. 85

The list of these dismissive labels

is a long one.

However,

in spite of Foucault's frequently conspicu-

ous silence regarding the affirmative dimensions of his
thought,

I

believe that

a

strong argument can be made
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that his criticism wells
out of an ontological
position
which not only plays a central
role in determining the
domains, focus, character and
style of his work, but
is entwined with a positive
"ethos" which provides the
general outlines of an alternative
vision of selves and
social relations as well.
Moreover, I maintain that the
ontological and ethical dimensions
of Foucault's thought
- missed all too often by many of
his interpreters -

are

among the most important aspects
of his work.
Foucault's
ethics provides a general framework
for post-metaphysical
criticism and supplies us with a loosely
defined vision
of the human world which affirms
diversity, dialogical

artistic existence and
with different others.

transfigured sense of "belonging"

a
I

will begin with a discussion

of his ontology and follow with an
interpretation of his

ethics.

Ontology of Difference
Guarding the entrance
entry

-

-

and seeming to prohibit

to an understanding of Foucault that seeks to

place an ontology of the body at the center of his
thought,

is the following:

his body

-

"Nothing in man

-

not even

is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis

for self-recognition or for understanding other men." 86

This passage might be interpreted to mean that we are
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.

hopelessly cut off from "the
truth" of ourselves bee,:ause
there is nothing in our being
"sufficiently
stable" for

us to seize and interrogate
in an effort to understand
who we are.
indeed, the "who" at any
moment is merely
the "current episode in a series
of subjugations, "87 and
the effort to essentialize the
"who" is an important
strategy in this episode. Certainly
if the body is

infinitely malleable and there is no
basis for selfrecognition, talk of an ontology of
the body seems
absurd?!
it is the domain of Merleau-Ponty
,

removed from Foucault's thought.

but far

One wonders if in

absence of such a ground there is any basis
for or
direction to Foucault's critique.
It seems to me that this interpretation
of the

passage, while it starts on the right track,
largely

misses Foucault's point; and that rather than being

a

barrier to an ontology of the body, this passage leads
directly towards such an ontology

- even

though it is

one which radically opposes the unitary, essentialist and

teleological theories which are so common in the western

metaphysical tradition (understood in the broadest sense)
In fact it is the latter which are the most formidable

barriers to the ontology that Foucault seeks to develop.
Hence the first movement towards

a

new ontology of the

body involves shattering these barriers; and this is

precisely one of the functions of the passage in question.
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The cited passage must be
read as part of Foucault's
deployment of a "knowledge made
for cutting"" apart
these metaphysical constructions.
The "self-recognition"
which the body cannot provide indeed defies - is that
of a "rediscovery of ourselves""
which would demonstrate
the metaphysical truth of our
being in an origin. Yet
in "shattering the unity of
man's being" 9 0 Foucault's

genealogies do not leave non-ontology,
but rather provide
us with a different ontology:
one which "introduces

discontinuity into our very being." 91

instead of

perceiving discontinuity as the surface
beneath which
one can discover the truly unified
character

of being,

genealogy perceives the continuities and
unities which
metaphysical thinking takes to be truth, as
constructions
which insidiously attempt to obfuscate, master and

enslave

beings which are often multiple, heterogeneous and
recalcitrant.

Foucault discovers plurality beneath our carefully

fabricated identities.

Our body, is the target of various

power strategies which aim to fashion it into
lable and utilizable entity.

a

control-

It is conceived of as stably

governed by laws, instincts or morality.

Within this

identity however, Foucault perceives "a complex system
of distinct and multiple elements, unable to be mastered

by the powers of synthesis." 92

The genealogist hears

a cacophony where modernity imagines perfectly pitched
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harmony.

The genealogist hears
each note straining,
unstable, reverberating uneasily,
as the churoh bells
chiMe (unwittingly)
.„ God is dead< then metaphysical
man is too."
:

But the genealogist does not
simply discover that
man is not the original unity
he claims to be.
As
essentially engaged knowledge
genealogy instigates and
enhances the dissonance it discovers
and is "capable of

liberating divergence and marginal
elements." 93
think here of "ars erotica" or
cacophonous

we might

erotica,

in

an age of heterosexual ity, true
sexuality; insubordinate

dimensions of the self which resist
surveillance, order
and utilization in an age of hierarchies
and disciplines
aimed at increasing productivity; friendship

in an age of

insidiously possessive love; non-codified
distinction and
abnormality in an age governed by the norm. Genealogy
seeks to arouse that which is ostensibly excluded
or

lodged uncomfortably; not to integrate and obliterate,

but to bring to light and life the "face of the Other"
that always lurks within the Same.
Perhaps Foucault would have been better understood
if he had said "Nothing in man - especially not his body"

can ground metaphysical self -recognition; for the body
is a rather unstable target for such unities.

"volume in perpetual disintegration.

1,94

It is a

Indeed,

it is

that to which Foucault frequently appeals in his attempt
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to unseat the perpetual
rediscovery of the self-as-origin.
It is to "bodies and pleasures" «

in^tMi^jmlU^lic^^

that Foucault gestures in

Thejis^v_p^^

Volmne
as a possible locus of
opposition to the unifying deployment of sex. 95 Wnile the „
demagogue dGn es
bQdy
to secure the sovereignty of
a timeless idea," 96 and
others can affirm the body only as
a timeless idea,
I

^

.

Foucault evokes the body in order to
radically question
timeless ideas. The body is ontologically
different
from these ideas - a locus of differences
which exceeds
and resists them, a being both fabricated
and torn in
the midst of other bodies to which it is
inextricably
and often discordantly related.

The different-body is

not the end of critique but the beginning of

a

critique

that wells out of a sense of ontological difference.

Foucault aims not at the end of all self-recognition,
but at a recognition distinct and often multiplicitous

dimensions of the self which do not fit comfortably

within and are not reducible to the hegemonic categories,
a recognition that these dimensions one discovers within

the self are not things of Truth, but rather contingency,

voices in the cacophony of our being.

The beginning of

a more profound self -recognition lies in the discovery

that one is different from the metaphysical conceptions
and prefabricated identities one is offered.
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"

Foucault's understanding of
the resistant aspect
of bodies makes little sense
when one tries to understand
it apart from this ontology
of difference.

m

fact, the

notion of "plebs" can almost
appear to be mystical In
this reading. The "plebs" is
that which "in the social
body,

in classes, groups and
individuals themselves...

in some sense escapes relations
of power....

There is

plebs in bodies... in a diversity of
forms and extensions,
of energies and irreducibilities 97
if
.

one reads this

passage in light of the unified continuous
ontology that
governs so much of modern thought, then
one is at
best

brought to

a

state of confusion.

What escapes?

individual bodies generate resistance?

ontology is dislodged

-

How do

However, if this

and this is the aim of so much

of Foucault's work - a new insight into the
phenomena

of resistance is revealed.

If human beings are not

essentially unified "individuals," but rather, in the

world as multiple, discontinuous, divergent, discordant,
irreducible and flux

- in short,

as ontologically

different, then there is no reason to believe we could
be completely subjugated.

The heterogeneity, contingency

and non-prefabricated distinction of our beings makes
us impossible to target in toto

.

There is always

continually renewed surplus that is unidentified

Other than that which is targeted.

a
-

Our being is such

that while it is open to the imposition of rather extreme
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forms of subjuqation
ydtlon

itlt:
'

ic
1-a

/t.
not (by
any means)

complicity with these forms.

in complete

It is this discrepancy
which

fosters resistance and perpetual
"war by other means"
rather than hermetically sealed
hegemony.
Nothing is so
simple as to be susceptible to
complete identification.
The notion of difference with
which Foucault works
needs clarification, for it is
remarkably divergent from
those which are most often expressed
in western thought.
It is in "Theatrum Philosophicum,
" a very favorable
review
of Gilles Deleuze's

DifJ^n^^^

and

Lg^^

de_Sens, that Foucault most explicitly
discusses difference as it appears in these texts.
Foucault 's admiration
for Deleuzian philosophy echoes throughout
this essay
in which he says that with Deleuze
"thought is again

possible- and "perhaps one day this century will
be known
as Deleuzian." 98

Given this expressed concordance and

the concordance between this essay and other of
Foucault 's
works,

I

will discuss the notion of difference in this

review as one which Foucault affirms.

Characteristic of western thinking, and its
"first form of subjection," is that

"

[d

]

if f erence is

transformed into that which must be specified within
concept, without overstepping its bounds." 99

a

As specified

and without excess, difference is made equivalent to the

concept

(s)

which identifies it

which thinks it.

-

the Same as the thought

The unmastered singularity of events is
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obliterated as thought makes
the, identical with it:s
own
categories.
Yet this obliteration
of Otherness which
occurs the instant that thought
specifies in order to
totally seize, is merely the
first stroke of
a long

grinding process.

As specified, difference
is speciefied; made to appear on the
basis of differentiations

within commonalities that are
considered to be more
fundamental.
"For the concept to master
difference,
perception must apprehend global
resemblances ... at the
root of what we call diversity "100
Herculine Barbin is
identified and seized as "male hermaphrodite":
.

a

of sexuality.

species

The genus defines the species and both

define Barbin.

What is this peculiar body-event called

Herculine Barbin?

It is a type of male hermaphrodite.

What is a hermaphrodite?

A type of sexuality.

Herculine

Barbin 's difference assumes significance for
hegemonic

nineteenth century French society only when it is

essentialized and made to appear within the categories
of the Same.

Barbin 's raw difference is eclipsed as

Barbin only appears in hegemonic society as essentially

male sexed.

The individual differences of Barbin's body

are examined, measured, compared with those of other

members of this species and located within an organized
spectrum of variation.

It is the assumed underlying

identities that call forth examinations, make possible

comparisons and provide the framework within which the
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,

pseudo-recognition of differences
occurs.
the establishment of a codified
range

Of course,

of differences is
'

for Foucault, not simply a
characteristic of Western
"thought," but is an imperative
that is embodied in
techniques, institutions and other
practices as well.
The Deleuzian/Foucaultian
alternative to the
tradition of western metaphysics is
difference conceived
"differentially": difference as "a
pure event,
not

^

completely reducible to conceptual
generalities.
"freeing of difference" demands "thought

The

that accepts

divergence; affirmative thought whose
instrument is
disjunction; thought of the multiple - of
nomadic and

dispersed multiplicity that is not limited
or confined by
the constraints of similarity." 1
instead of perceiving
reality as a teleological unity (and all a priori

^

unities

are teleological for Foucault)

,

Foucault points towards

the Nietzschean thought of being as "the recurrence
of

difference." 103

The first task of such thought would

be to seek the unique singularity of events and the

multiplicity within them.
Central to Foucault 's project is the attempt to free
the difference of events

these differences

-

self and the world.

-

that is, to make us aware of

and to lodge difference between the
In "The Order of Discourse," written

at about the same time as the review of Deleuze, Foucault

cautions us against imagining that we have
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a

"primordial

^^

complicity with the world"104
tnat
perfectly know and identify
it with our thoughts.

^^

The world is not the
accomplice
of our knowledge; there
is no
prediscursive providence which
predisposes the world in our
favour.
We must conceive discourse as a violence which we
do to things, or in any case
as
3
06 Which we im P° se upon
them

^

In light of Foucaultian ontology,
difference appears
everywhere, unstable, elusive emblematic of the in-

eliminable excess through which beings
escape from the
clutches of identifying thought. The
world around us is
always partially Other. However, far
from leading

towards

some form of relativism or nihilism, this
ontology

- in

which the self and world are always together
in their
inextinguishable difference in which discord and

division

are inherent in all constructed unities

-

constitutes the

space in which it is "once again possible to think."

Or

better still, as we shall see, this ontology opens the
opening

-

shut by western metaphysics - in which it is

possible to reformulate the practice of freedom

.

For

difference conceived differentially is ultimately not
simply a new way of thinking, but more profoundly

a

new

mode of being.
Difference is a broad prescription for action as well
as a thought about the being of the world.
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Difference

signifies a new engagement
with the otherness of being.
It calls us to act with
an eye towards difference
rather
than in the light of
preconceived identities. This
does
not mean that existence is
to become a blind
deconstrucrampage that smashes and
shatters everything within
reach in order to maximize
"difference" and worship atoms.
Rather, it means that the
differences within our own being
and between ourselves and that
which is other should

ts

be

acknowledged and moreover reckoned
with in our efforts
to create our existences, rather
than insidiously denied,
obliterated, ignored or dealt with
through
moral cate-

gories of metaphysical origin.

Foucaultian ontology

calls us to throw the metaphysical veils
off of ourselves
and others, and dwell with more "maturity"
in the midst
of the living multiplicitous particularity
of
ourselves,

others, our social practices and our history.

There is

clearly a delight in difference that radiates
from many
of Foucault's texts.

Yet this should not be understood

as an overall plea to simply "let difference be,"
for such
a plea is itself laden with metaphysical residues
which

are no longer tenable in light of Foucault's ontology.

The injunction to simply "let difference be" assumes that

there is some sort of preordained harmony in the world
that makes life livable and worth living without human

praxis and intervention.

It assumes that the good life is

ready-made and endows each human being with
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a

presumptuous

position of cosmological
importance as a being for who,
things and others exist to
be both life-sustaining
and
satisfying.
Equally important, it assumes
that the
self would cohere as something
interesting without
any imposition of form,
content, commitment, etc.
Yet the human world revealed
by the genealogist is
far too discordant for any of
these fantasies to remain
standing.
Even at the level of the body:
what sense
does "let difference be" make
as an overall prescription
when the body is a "volume in
perpetual disintegration"?
Not much sense at all; and hence
it appears
that at the

same time that Foucault undermines
metaphysical unities
which obfuscate difference, he also
undermines what is
perhaps the last gasp of metaphysics:
"let it be."
But then what prescription for action
wells out of

this ontology of difference?

What does dwelling with

maturity in the midst of bodies, pleasures and
others
who are different from the given hegemonic

identities

and harbor no deep truths mean?

Foucault writes:

the idea that the self is not given to us,
is only one practical consequence:

ourselves as

a

work of art." 106

I

"From

think there

we have to create

This artistic existence

in which we seek to give ourselves form takes place at

the limits of our being in dialogue with that which is

different from us or that within us which finds no place
within the reigning identities.
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For Foucault,

"freeing

difference" is a step towards
confronting the particularity and untaxed nature of
existence, towards confronting
an existence that is not
that of our categories.
it is
a step towards the artistic
ethos; a necessary part of,
but not the end of this ethos
or existence.
Giving for,
to one's life involves
accentuating and developing
certain
dimensions, placing others in the
background, foregoing
certain possibilities. Yet these
decisions are made in
the midst of and with an ear
to the multiple and differing
voices within and around us. But
is not this injunction
that we create ourselves still
rather empty and unable to
inform our creativity in any way?
Does Foucault leave us
with anything more than an absolutely
relativistic sense
of creativity which is not much help
at all?
it seems
to me that his notion of artistic
existence both avoids

relativism and is able to inform our creative
activity in
an important manner which avoids nihilism
and indifference
at the same time it avoids the metaphysical
solutions
to

these very problems.

This results from the fact that

Foucault 's notion of the artistic ethos provides us with
a loosely articulated conception of the social context

conducive to artistic existence, which, in a very broad
sense, might guide our activity.

In its creativity,

artistic existence seeks in part to work towards and
enhance conditions in which an artistic ethos might

become a more general and vital possibility.
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If human

life should be a thina
ung of
or art
art, then the artistic
practice
of caring for life should
be linke<J

^

^o^

^

^

situations and

of existence where life
can flourish
as art.
It is towards this end
that Foucault's corpus
- as in many ways exemplary of
the artistic activity
he describes - strives. The
artist in part seeks to
contribute to a world in which
one could answer the
question, -Couldn't everyone's
life become a work of
art?" 10 ? with a resounding "Yes."
Let us explore what
this seems to entail.

The DialoaicaT

A rtistic

R.hnc

Shocking as it may be to some of his
readers, in
his later essays on Kant and the
enlightenment, Foucault
places himself in a certain fundamental
respect squarely
within the enlightenment form of reflection.
Foucault
argues that the reflective questioning which is
central
to the task of freedom originates in a line of
thinking

pursued by Immanuel Kant.

Yet is not Kant one who

initiates the analytic of man and the analytic of truth

which Foucault has so vehemently opposed?

How can one

who stands in direct opposition to this central late

enlightenment theme simultaneously claim to belong to
the tradition of enlightenment?

Foucault understands

his discrepant positions on enlightenment to well out of
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»

discrepancies within enlightenment
itself and particularly
within Kant. On the one hand,
Kant of the Critigues
begins a tradition of
philosophical reflection which
is aimed at discovering
the truth of truth
in man.

Foucault has consistently opposed
this tradition and
shown it to be closely aligned
with modern forms of
power and subjugation. On the
other hand however,
Foucault sees in Kant's essays on
enlightenment and the
French revolution the beginning of
a radically different
sort of reflection, one which
characterizes the dimension
of enlightenment within which he
situates
himself.

"Here

it is not a question of an analytic
of truth, but what

one might call an ontology of the
present, an ontology
of ourselves." 108 Most succinctly, this
philosophical

tradition consists in "problematising its own
discursive
present-ness. 109
It is this latter "attitude,

»

rather than any

specific doctrine or legacy, within which Foucault
places himself.

Central to this modern relationship

with the present is what he identifies as
and a "task." 110

a

"

belonging "

with respect to the first, the

philosopher questions the knowledge and practices of
the present as those to which he or she belongs, and
as those which are necessary to comprehend in order to

understand the produced-ness and context of his or her own
being.

Indeed,

it is in problematizing and understanding
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this present

and the fact that one
belongs to it - that
one "is to elicit at once
[one's] own ^raison d'etre'
and
the foundation of what one is
to say." 111 It is through
understanding the present of which
one is, that one
determines what one is to do, say
and become.
Thus in
Kant's case, it is
'.s understanding
of the present, the
fact that his answer to the
question "Was ist Aufklarung?"
is "man's release from his
self-incurred tutelage" 112 and
the free use of his reason, that
calls for and guides the
work of his critical efforts to determine
the conditions
of possibility of truth and the
legitimate uses of reason.
It is because philosophers belong to
"a certain *we,
a
-

1

'

we corresponding to a cultural ensemble
characteristic
of [their] own contemporaneity," 113 that
their self-

understanding, self-direction and self-creation are

inextricable from an inquiry into their social present.
The question regarding what one should say and do
concerns
the "we"; the ontology of the present is an "ontology of

ourselves"

-

not one self in isolation.

Here we arrive at a more profound understanding of
the "belonging" of modernity.

For insofar as we recognize

that self-creation demands an interrogation of the "we,"
as moderns, we belong to this ceaseless inquiry.

What

characterizes the modernity which Foucault describes
in "What is Enlightenment?" is the belonging to the

questioning of that to which we belong
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.

As moderns we

create ourselves by ceaselessly
taking up the question
of our present.
This is the "task" to
which we belong,
a task which as moderns
we share.
short, part of
modernity's unity lies in this
question,
our belonging
to the present as socially
constituted beings

m

is

de.

facto;

our belonging to the questioning
of our belonging is the
practical appeal modernity makes
to each of us.
We make
it real by assuming the task.
Let us examine this question

-

this task

-

more

carefully.

Foucault understands it as »a critique
and
permanent creation of ourselves in our
autonomy:
that
is, a principle that is at the
heart of the enlightenment
114
itself.Consistent with his genealogical efforts
and his emphasis on local inquiry,
Foucault's notion of
critique and creation - the artistic ethos does not
imply that we completely jettison who we are
at present
in favor of some totally new being.

repeatedly led to disaster.

Such efforts have

Rather his conception of

critique-creation revolves around what he calls

a "limit-

attitude," which would continually direct us to the limits
of our being - to that edge at which we face the Other.

Again, Foucault is not advocating a blind rejection of
all limits, but instead, a careful analysis of the

boundaries of our being.

Such an analysis would focus

on particular regions of our self and social world which

have become reified as unquestionable givens, in an effort
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.

to understand their
historicitv
uuriciry, ftmrMH
functions, effects and
the possibilities and
desirability of going beyond
the,.
This analysis of li mits
would attempt to illuminate
"in
what is given to us as
universal, necessary, obligatory,
what place is occupied by
whatever is singular, contingent
and the product of arbitrary
constraints. -1 15 In contrast
to the Kantian project of
determining the boundaries of
the legitimate use of reason,
Foucault advocates
a

critique of established boundaries
to determine areas
of "possible transgression."
Rather than determining

why we must remain the Same given
the "truth" of who we
"are," the task is to determine in
what
ways it might

be

"

P^sible and desirable "

to become different and "to

determine the precise form this change
should take" 116
(my emphasis)
Foucault is careful to stress that this
critical
ontology of ourselves is not a doctrine which would

insidiously reestablish a Truth

- but

rather an "ethos."

Here what is involved is a general manner of living.
This ethos is elaborated in the notion of the "self as
a work of art," which is most developed in Foucault
's

later essays and interviews, and is rooted in Baudelaire,

Nietzsche and the ancient Greeks.

As a work of art,

"one

take[s] oneself as [an] object of a complex and difficult

elaboration" ±J

-

in an effort to create one's existence.

As we have seen, this effort takes place at the limits
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of our being and involves
a questioning attitude
within
which one seeks to define
the shape of one's being
and
contribute to the creation of
the social world.
One is
hardly a work of art if one
unconsciously accepts the
shape of the boundaries that
have been defined for selves

by history.

Even considered most narrowly,
this task, though
it aims at creating an
existence which is not intended
to be established as a
universalized norm, but rather
a shape only for a particular
self, is not an isolated
self-enclosed project.
indeed this self-enclosed

selfhood-ness is characteristic of those
projects which
seek to "liberate" and realize "the
truth" of oneself to become what one "really is." The
encounter
in this

case is an inner one with one's "identity"

-

the Same.

But this is diametrically opposed to
Foucault's notion
of the self as a work of art.

in the latter, the task

is to create the shape of one's life through
a careful

experimentation with limits.

And dwelling at the

boundaries of one's being essentially entails a continual
dialogical encounter with otherness and others

.

Hence

the self as a work of art entails the exploration and

transformation of more than just the self.
In an effort to gain a clearer understanding of

this relationship between the notion of the self as a

work of art and the encounter with otherness, let us
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^

take Poucault hi.self as

exemplary Qf

^

self-understanding and self-creation;
understanding and
creation that as „e have shown
is inextricably connected
to understanding and showing
possibilities for creating
the "we" to wnicn
which the
tho self
CQ ^ belongs.
i

(Already we have gone

beyond the boundaries of the
self, but the self does not
dissolve into the we, for each
person, as "different" will
have a particular understanding,
particular practices
he or she embraces and a uniquely
shaped life on these
bases.)
Indeed, Foucault patiently and
in a self-

disciplined manner fashioned his life
around this task
as he understood it.
His life was, to reflect back
upon himself words he uttered in another
context,

"a

philosophical life in which the critique of
what we are
is at one and the same time the
historical analysis of
the limits that are imposed on us and an
experiment with
the possibilities of going beyond them." 118
it
seems

to me that there were some ways in which his work

persistently engaged with otherness that were central
to his life as artistic self-creation.
To begin with, Foucault continually sought to elicit

the "insurrection of subjugated knowledge" 119 - knowledges

disqualified and silenced by hegemonic discourses and
practices.

The purpose of this attempt to make these

Other knowledges audible was twofold.
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First, Foucault

sought to amplify these
knowledges in an effort to
establish an historical memory
of the struggles through
which hegemonic forms of power
and discourse established
themselves.
By doing this he illuminated
some
of "the

contingency that has made us what
we are.-^O He
attempted to show that the
practices and understandings
that we perceive to be necessary,
universal and currently
hegemonic because of their unquestionable
virtuosity,

are - at least in part

-

products of conflicts for power

in which the hegemonic powers
have sought not only to

produce certain utilizable forms of
being and eliminate
Others, but to reduce all expression
of conflict with
the Others to silence as well. Thus
for example, he

elucidated the way in which modern methods
of discipline
and punishing are to a large extent tightly
implicated

in the exigencies of capitalist accumulation
rather than

simply the emergence of

a

benevolent good-willed humanism,

by showing the resistances and struggles in which they

were born

- a

struggle with those who were not "always

already" docile and useful.

Likewise in Madness and

Civilization, Foucault records a history of "that other
form of madness, by which men, in an act of sovereign
reason, confine their neighbors, and communicate and

recognize each other through the merciless language of
non-madness,

1,121

rather than a history which assumes the

unchallenged superiority of "reason."
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He shows reason

to be in part the outcome
of its
xcs atmiwn*
r,-i4-u
struggle with
an Other
- "madness" - rather
r than a teleological
development of
its own pure essence.
short, to guote Madness_and
emulation (and I think this indicates the
continuity
of Foucault 's project}
ject), "what
i M
~,
wnat isc in
p
question
is the limits
rather than the identity of a
culture." 122
n

=>

m

i

By bringing the contingency
of our thoughts and
practices to light, Foucault seeks
to loosen our identity
with them - an identity which is
most complete when the
terms of the present appear too
ubiquitous and necessary
as to allow neither the possibility
nor the desirability
of criticism and change.
it is only when our identity
with the Same is slackened that we can
consider possi-

bilities of creating existences other than
those that
are "given."
The second reason for amplifying the
"insurrection
of subjugated knowledges" is to provide a
different

perspective on the truths, norms, unquestioned identities,
imperatives and practices of

a period.

The objective here

is to question the hegemony of certain discourses from

the perspective of the Others which they exclude:

"to

entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous,

disqualified illegitimate knowledges against the claims of
a unitary body of theory which would filter,

hierarchise

and order them in the name of some true science." 123

Hence Foucault seeks to rediscover the knowledges of
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:

mental patients, prisoners,
students, "hermaphrodites,"
etc.
in an effort to make
audible the voice of the other
in a world where it is
rarely heard. Through these
other
claims, Foucault seeks to shed
critical light on features
of the present which aspire
to the status of universals;
,

and he seeks to help enter
different voices into the
discussion about what the Order of
things is and how it
should be.

Another way in which encountering
otherness was
central to Foucault's life-as-art has
less to do with the
way in which otherness explicitly and
directly confronts

dominant knowledges and practices, within

a

given period,

but rather concerns the value of the
experiences and
practices of other periods of history in
illuminating

possibilities of living differently.

His analyses of the

relationship of the early Renaissance to madness and
of
ancient techniques of the self are precisely such efforts
to think about how we might formulate different social

practices.

But not merely "social practices."

Equally

at issue is the shaping and transformation of Foucault's

own thought and existence.
The connection between philosophical-historical

understanding of otherness and the creation of self is
perhaps most explicit in The Use of Pleasure

.

Reflecting

in the introduction upon what motivated his work Foucault

says
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ri ° slt y-'-not the
curiosity
t0 assimi ^te what it
is
IrltJ- *
° ne t0 know but that
kn
which enables
one to get free of
e ^*-'*
There are times
life
Shfn the question
when
of knowing if one
can

ILl

'

^

think differently than one
and perceive differently than thinks
sees, is absolutely necessary one
if one
is to go on looking and
reflecting
Pe °P le wil1 s ay, perhaps,
«LI games with
that
oneself would better
be left backstage.
But, then, what
is. .philosophical activity
... if it
is not the critical work
that thought
brings to bear on itself? in what
does it consist if not in the
endeavor
to know how and to what extent
it
might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what
is already known? 1 ^ 4
.

The understanding of otherness is part
of the
"critical work" that enables "one to get free
of oneself."
(Of course, Foucault is perfectly aware
of the limits of

getting free of oneself, which is exactly why the
labor of
freedom always takes place at the limits of our being.
We

cannot simply leap over our limits.)

Since we are beings

essentially embodied in the social world, artistic selfcreation implies critically understanding and creating
this world.

The dichotomy between creation of the self

and the creation of the social world breaks down in their

internal relation.

But the dissolution of this dichotomy

does not lead to the obliteration of difference and the

ushering in of a simple "harmony of interests" (nor

a

complex harmony of interests with rigid predetermined
pseudo-differences) between the self and this world.
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As

it is the discovery of
otherness and of the contingent
limits of the present that
is an essential aspect
of

creating the self, so too it
is to a large extent
in
becoming different that the
self partakes in the creation
of the social world. The
form the self takes as a different, often transgressive
being is aimed in part at
transforming the social world towards
enabling greater
possibilities of different expressions
of artistic
existence.
It should be emphasized that
the engagement with

otherness in the creation of the self
as

a

work of art

thought of "differentially"; not in terms
of

a

is

reversed

identification where the self seeks to become
the same as
the other.
If Foucault rejects the ceaseless
trajectory
towards the Other in order to make it the Same,
he
also

rejects the will to discover the Other in order
to become
the same as it.
Such naive appropriations tend to

ignore

problems inherent in past alternatives and they tend to
ignore historical changes which would make such trans-

formations untenable.

More importantly, they close

freedom's opening (in the perception of the possibility
of difference and the adoption of an "experimental"

attitude) at precisely the point at which it could burst
forth.

In contrast,

for Foucault, though encounters

with otherness may gesture in helpful ways in certain
directions and away from others, what is most important
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in the encounters is that
they reveal the possibility
of

being different.

m

the light of difference,
thoughts
and practices previously
considered necessary begin to
be
seen as contingent; and in
recognizing the contingency of
being we return to the possibility
of creating alternative
practices which might enhance the
artistic ethos - we
return to the possibility of
freedom.
it is partly
because his work is governed by
this end, that Foucault
is so evasive when Dreyfus
and Rabinow repeatedly question
him about whether or not the Greeks
offer an "attractive
and plausible alternative. «•« 5
Indeed/ it s Qnly the
notions of "art of life" and "self as a
work of art" that
-

Foucault offers as specific helpful insights
we can gain
from the Greeks. And these are in the
realm of
"ethos"

- an ethos of creative activity - rather
than specific

concrete practices.
Yet

I

think this conception that Foucault repeatedly

engaged himself with different modes of being in order to
reveal the possibility of creating himself/ ourselves, or

even in order to gain insights for his/our creative task,

obfuscates a dimension of this engagement at the same
time that it clarifies certain others.

For there is an

important sense in which the ends-means separation that
lingers in this formulation fails to do sufficient justice
to the "ethos" towards which Foucault gestures.

Inherent

in this artistic ethos is a vision of exemplary meta-
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And this meta-style is
precisely that of dulling
analog ically with that which is and
those who are different at the limits of our being.
(i call it "meta-style"
in order to emphasize the
diversity of dialogical styles
within this more encompassing
notion.
This dialogical
engagement with that which is other
is for Foucault
the stylistic essence of the
artistic existence; it is
through this engagement that we
create ourselves. This
conversation within which one gives
shape to one's life
as a specific voice is creative
activity.
Hence while
the content aim of the artistic ethos
can be defined
very broadly as the enhancement of
conditions that make
possible the "permanent creation of ourselves
in our
autonomy" - and central to this are more
dialogical
itoOl.

non-disciplinary social discourses and practices,
the
exemplary meta-style is achieved to the extent
to which
we fashion ourselves into dialogical beings - beings
who
dwell in the difference of being and shape our lives

there

rather than beings who blindly accept hegemonic identities
and dwell in complacent indifference in the home of the
Same, the Norm, the Truth.

In this sense,

Foucault 's

dialogical engagement with difference, while in part a
means to another end, is also in part an end in itself

-

the embodiment of the meta-stylistic ideal of the artistic
ethos.

This is further exemplified in the manner in which

Foucault 's work develops and is portrayed.
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Is there any

other philosopher in modern
times who has so persistently
utilized the conversation/interview
format to expr e!
iSS
and develop his ideas - and
also, to gesture toward,Is
a
particular way of being?
The importance of the
dialogical essence of both
the style and content of the
artistic life must not be
underestimated, for it is at the
heart of Foucault's
understanding (sometimes it is
explicit - more often it
is the "unthought thoughtHeidegger refers to) and is
what links the affirmation of the
self's distinction
inextricably to the distinction and
difference

of others.

In a late interview with Rabinow,
Foucault stresses that

the "dialogue situation" was not
only essential to his
"way of doing things," but moreover
that "a whole morality
was at stake" in the difference between
dialogical versus
polemical styles of existence - a morality
which concerns
"the relation to the other." 126
By sketching a vision in which the notion
of self

as art is intrinsically related to encountering
otherness,

Foucault is able to suggest a way in which the affirmation
and enhancement of the self's creative activity and dif-

ference would occur not in atomistic oblivion to others,
nor through obliteration of others as is the case when

difference is conceived of on the basis of equivalence,
but instead through the dialogical engagement with others

who are different.

A primary virtue of this philosophy
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of the self is its increased
appreciation of othern e!;ss

Foucault points towards

a

Plays a central role in

deterging

philosophy in which dialogue
what one will say;

in which dialogue is essential
to sel f -creation

.

it is

^^^^"-^-^^

'^^^^
And it is within this dialogical

situation with others that our freedom
acquires the form
and content of a carefully shaped
existence.
It seems to me that Foucault 's
understanding of

the relationship between the encounter
with otherness
and freedom offers us a fundamental reworking
of the
latter concept as it has often been formulated.
For

Foucault,

freedom does not arise out of some sort of

access to "the truth"; it is not to act according
to

self-generated transcendental laws of reason; it is not
most profoundly opened as we face the possibility of our

death and return from the anonymity of the "they" (das
man)

to the particular "there" of our Being; nor does it

arise out of an "authentic" relationship to our "true
self."

Rather, we are returned to the contingency of

the world and our relationship with it, as well as to

our being as the possibility of self-creation, through

dialogical encounters with otherness.

(This is not simply

the absence of our own being, or that which opposes us in

contradiction

.

)

We are exposed to the radical contingency
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of our practices

and more generally that
of the world
we experience and partake
in - through our encounters
with others with different
u± Lie rent nr^H^o
practices and experiences and
the Other experiences within
our own being.
-

(E.g., it
is Foucault's encounter with
Other social perceptions

of madness (Renaissance) that
allow him to grasp the
contingency of modern perceptions of
madness. Madness
and CiviTization is an archaeology
and genealogy which
reveals the producedness and contingency
of our own

perceptions
madness." 127

- of

the "constitutive.

..

action that divides

Foucault's effort to expose us to this

contingency is the central aspect of his
attempt to
return us to the possibility of our freedom.)
Hence
our own freedom is inextricable from - and thus

in part

should be guided towards creating

- a

social world that,

to a greater extent, provides space for others who
are

different and difference within the self,

when we close

this space we simultaneously drain our world of the

possibility of self-creation through dialogue (often
agonistic dialogue)

.

An increasingly disciplined

normalized world increasingly closes off freedom not
only at the level of the constitution and exclusion of
selves, but equally important, because it increasingly

withdraws the experience of otherness which both opens
the possibility of our freedom to begin with and provides
us with multiple points for creative engagement.
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The

more we approach otherness
within the terms of the Same,
the less we encounter otherness.
of course, we never
completely encounter otherness.
Rather, our experience of
otherness begins when we sense the
surplus of the other that which is different. The
encounter with otherness is
in this sense always in a state
of beginning.
Normalizing
practices attempt to disguise the surplus
and thwart this
beginning.
No doubt, an important guestion which
comes to

mind concerns the possibility of social and
political
coherence within this philosophy of distinction.

m

addressing this issue

I

think it is helpful to return to

and consider anew the rather interesting paradox
we noted
earlier.

Foucault's work over the years has persistently

attempted to reveal the many ways in which insidious
forms, discourses and mechanisms of power function in

modernity to conceal, control and obliterate otherness.
We have been told that rather than enhancing

a

creative

ethos that grows out of dialogue with others, modernity

constitutes subjects around "norms" and "Truths" which
serve a productivity that has little to do with enhancing
our freedom.

We have been told that power in modernity

is not dialogical, but hierarchical and coercive.

Rather

than an ethos which calls us to the limits of our being,

modernity has us digging deeper into our centers for
a truth - freedom which lies in our core - if only we
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can secure it and bring it to
light.
equally under the normalizing

Even among beings

gaze, we are told that

modernity thwarts dialogue.

Let us not forget that

"lateral invisibility" and
"partitioning" are as integral
a part of panoptic power
as visibility and transparency.
Uncontrolled "multiple exchanges" the unexpected dialogue - must be eliminated if
this power is to function
optimally.
Yet Foucault claims in his
enlightenment
essays that the "ethos" of modernity
is precisely the
critique of its limits and the exploration
of "possible
transgressions" - possible sites of artistic
creation.
As already argued, this is partly
explainable by the fact
that Foucault does not perceive modernity as
a unified
beast, but rather as laden with multiple
characteristics,

some of which develop in radically different
directions.

Nevertheless, these essays appear to make assertions
about
the "ethos" of modernity that make one wonder why so
much
of modernity has been the object of such intense criticism

from Foucault.
I

think this essay should be read as what Foucault,

following Beaudelaire calls an "ironic heroization"
of

the present.

In doing so, we are better able to

understand it in the context of Foucault 's other works.
Moreover, we can gain a better understanding of the place
of "belonging"

(in the Enlightenment essays Foucault

"belongs" to modernity) in a philosophy which not only
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emphasizes the value of differences
but also confers on
normalized identities a very
central role
in the evil:-S

of modernity.

since the thought of a society
without
some sort of belonging is
little more than an infantile
illusion, the tenability of
Foucault's "artistic ethoshinges in part on how well he
can address this question.
Before discussing "ironic heroization, "
let us very
briefly - and somewhat simply summarize three notions
of belonging which one can
draw out of Foucault's thought
as we have discussed it thus
far.
First, we are essentially beings whose existence is
inextricably intertwined
with the social milieu of which we are
a part.
Hence our
self -understanding and self-creation
must refer in part to
the society to which we belong. Second,
as moderns, we
belong to the questioning of that to which we
belong.

m

spite of radical differences in style and content,
this

questioning is something we do

-

or should - share; it

should bind us to some extent, and lend us a degree of

solidarity

-

even if very loosely.

Thirdly, since our

freedom wells out of and develops within our dialogical

encounter with others who are different, each of us should
belong to the task of creating

a

society and politics

which enhances the possibilities of expressing difference (differences which are not constituted around the

obliteration of different others)

.

At least in this very

broad sense, the freedom of others is entwined with our
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own:

our creative freedoms

tensions

-

with all their agonistic

belong together if they are
to be at all.
But one gets to the end of
this list wondering if
there is any relation we can take
to the present - to
who we are at p rPs^nt - that is
anything other than
genealogical criticism and "possible
transgression."
-

Can we belong in any way to our
present?

is our freedom

in any way entwined with the
present or does it simply
lie beyond it? To the extent that
societies have ever

"held together" in a non-authoritarian
manner, they have
done so in part out of some sense of
shared belonging
to a set of values and practices which
guide life in
the present and help generate the dreams
for the future.

Albeit that these traditions have always involved
the
exercise of power and subjugation, they have for
better
or worse been the foundations of the order of their

day.

While we want to move in a direction away from these
subjugative practices, we cannot move away from some
sense of shared practices and values.

It is a very

textured identity which makes social life possible.

As

fundamental and illuminating as Foucault's vision based
on the artistic ethos may be, it is difficult to believe

that what we have discussed thus far would be sufficient
for the existence of a social order.

There has to be a

way to belong to the present which is not merely that of

getting free of it.

171

It seems to me that the
notion of ironic "heroization" which is developed in
the context of his discussion
of Baudelaire points in this

direction.

For Baudelaire,
in Foucault's words, one of
the central characteristics'
of modernity is "the will to
Zeroize' the present. "128

Heroizing the present involves an
attitude of recapturing
"something eternal" that lies within
the fleeting present
- a present which is extremely fleeting
and impermanent
in the modern world.
it is the attempt to
"extract- the

"poetry" from within modernity.

Yet this heroization is

ironic in that while seeking the eternal
in the present,
it does not seek to eternalize the
present.
Instead,

the eternal which is made manifest is
itself a "transfiguration [which] does not entail the annulling
of

reality, but a difficult interplay between
the truth
of what is real and the exercise of freedom." 129

m

this transfiguring, "beautiful" things become "more

than beautiful." 130

The one who heroizes illuminates

the worthy aspect of things in such a way as to make
it dominate them whereas before it may have been barely
a perceptible trace.

One stretches reality towards what

one dreams it could be, by grasping and developing that

within reality which most closely embodies this dream.
Foucault writes:

"For the attitude of modernity, the

high value of the present is indissociable from

a

desperate eagerness to imagine it otherwise than it
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is,

and to transform it not by
destroying it but by
grasping it in what it is." 131

Perhaps as illuminating as
Foucault's attempts
to explicitly describe "ironic
heroization, »

is the

essay "What is Enlightenment?"
itself, considered as
an exemplary manifestation of
this endeavor, what is
his characterization of modernity
as the
"ethos" of

critiquing our boundaries and exploring
the possibilities
of going beyond them if not ironic?
Has not the great
bulk of his work aimed at showing us
the ways in which
modernity insidiously disguises itself and
drives
towards an organization of being which posits
the Same

as fundamental and the Other as that
which must be

made the Same?

in the essay "Kant on Enlightenment

and Revolution," Foucault includes Hegel as an
early

representative of "a form of reflection within which
have tried to work." 132

I

But there are few essays where

Foucault has not in some way argued against Hegelian

dialectics or at least hurled

a

sarcastic remark in that

direction simply in order to distinguish his own project.
Can a Foucaultian heroization of Hegel be anything but

ironic?
But it is still a heroization.

And in this notion

of ironic heroization of the present lie the germ cells
of a theory of "belonging" which is quite different

from theories of identity which have dominated western
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metaphysics.

m

the latter tradition, identity
has been
thought primarily in terms of
equivalence. 13 3 The goal
with respect to the self has
been to discover the truth
of what one is and govern
one's thoughts and actions in
accordance with this identity, to
the extent that it is
humanly possible to do so. To
identify with a community worldly or spiritual - has been to
thoroughly embrace its
fundamental faith, truths, and the
practices which follow.
However, identity, as a grasping of
the "essential truth"
of ourselves as individuals and as
a society becomes
impossible to conceive on the basis of an
ontology that

emphasizes contingency, multiplicity and
difference.
For Foucault, the "who" to which we belong

is not

a truth to be apprehended in its
essence.

Rather, the

determination of the "who" to which we acknowledge
our
belonging is always a partially transformative
activity
in which we selectively illuminate our being in the lig ht

of who we long to be.

We do not choose our identities out

of nothing, but neither are they objectively given for
us

to simply acknowledge as true.

The belonging of ironic

heroization is "an exercise in which extreme attention to
what is real is confronted with the practice of

a

liberty

that simultaneously respects this reality and violates
it ,,134
.

But why would Foucault seek to acknowledge a

"belonging" and affirm a "respect" for the present?
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Why would he ironically
heroize Hegel? I think that
his affirmation of "belonging"
is rooted in his ontology
just as deeply as is his notion
of freedom as artistic
transfiguration.
Foucault reads the world to be
a

contingent often discordant interplay
of differences.
His statement:
"My point is not that everything
is bad,
but that everything is dangerous, "13 5
is bas ed on this
reading, and most of his work attempted
to illuminate
dangers, violence and subjugation which
modernity
has

disguised in the name of truth, virtue
and humanism.
In accordance with his ontology and
understanding

of

subjugation, his vision of the future has been
guided
towards a world which would affirm far more
space for

difference.

Yet this ontology which demands critique
and

transformation also issues forth

a

warning of caution

.

For if everything is dangerous, transformation
is

dangerous

-

requiring "patient labor."

And in the

ubiquity of danger, we must not simply dismiss all of
the present world, but rather carefully search for the

possibilities it presents which may be worthy of our
affirmation.

Since the possibilities for freedom are

as tenuous as they are, those thoughts and practices

which make it possible in the present should not be cast
aside in a reckless fashion.

Those thoughts and practices

which encourage dialogical encounters with otherness and
artistic existences (or those within which this ethos
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can be encouraged) are too
rare to be taken lightly.
By
belonging to them, we place
ourselves in the opening they
provide, in order to refuse
closure with our own being or, in more positive terms,
to affirm * sjJaiaj^ that
enhances artistic existence.
In a world that continually
attempts to suture shut the openings,
belonging is crucial
to our freedom.
The possibilities of the present
should
be carefully held in an artist's
hands - transformed
"not

by destroying [these dimensions] but
by grasping [them] in
what they are." The artist carefully
works on the being
of the present in part through the
openings it provides,
to increase their scope and create others
in a way which
will avoid collapsing that which is beneficial
in the
present.

These favorable dimensions of the present which

call us to make explicit our belonging serve as
focal

points around which we might coalesce and develop

a

greater sense of the ways in which we belong together
as diverse beings affirming certain shared practices.
In this manner, Foucault heroizes Hegel and enlight-

enment.

Having criticized Hegel in a variety of ways,

he nevertheless sees in Hegel a project

-

an ontology of

the present - worthy of affirming and belonging to, albeit
in a different form.

If it is true that we can thwart

certain trajectories of our present through critique, it
is equally true and equally necessary that we accentuate

other trajectories of this present through our belonging
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as ironic heroization.

The Foucaultian task is
"work

carried out by ourselves
UEon^urselves
situations for freedom exist in

.

«136

when

who_we_Jk re, they must

be maintained and enhanced.

There is little possibility

of creating openings and
situations for freedom ex nihilo
in a world that is as radically
contingent, dangerous,

discordant and always very incompletely
understood.
is thus that we belong to
aspects of

it

mowiL^dsteQce

which offer us possibilities for
existing artistically
- shaping our lives in face of the
plenitude of

things.

This is not to say that there is not

a

lot in our

present which Foucault would seek to
drastically alter
or do away with.
Clearly there is.
Yet there

are also

aspects which have made his own work possible.

it is

in acknowledgement of and for the enhancement
of the

situation within which one exercises freedom, that one
"belongs" to certain dimensions of the present through
ironic heroization.

But we do not "identify" with certain

thoughts and practices in order to use them as

a

ruler

to measure our progress towards or away from truth and
freedom.

Rather we "belong" to aspects of our past to

the extent that they offer us possibilities for embracing
a dialogical artistic ethos - carefully - in ways which

respect and in part are guided by, but also violate, the

present itself.

We heroize that which offers us the

possibility of freedom.

But our heroization is rarely

rid of irony.

our be-longing is always
constituted in
tension with who we long to be.

Conclusi on
It seems to me that this
is where Foucault jumps
off the boat of theory and onto
the shifting sands of
the shores of the modern world.
Here, continually at
the edge of our existence, he
has taken up the task of

meticulously combing through who we
are.
of) the above themes, what
Foucault

Beyond (or out

offers us,

I

believe,

is an acute awareness of the
limits of these themes -

of the way in which questions of
ontology, ethics,

belonging and freedom and the concrete
individual and
social practices which embody the dialogical
artistic
ethos demand profoundly historical inquiry.
it is when
the philosophical task of creating ourselves
becomes
historical that it begins the activity of freedom.
Having developed the thought of Augustine and

Foucault in relation to their understanding of their

respective worlds, the task remains in the final chapter
to bring them together.

There is more to be said about

Foucault 's thought on depth, truth reflection and freedom,
but we have reached a point where further illumination

will be far more fruitful if we explore the thoughts of
each theorist at their limits where each confronts the
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Other.

Prior to this however we shall
explore the thought
of Merleau-Ponty in an effort
to oast yet another light
on depth, difference, ethics
and the self.
True to form,
Merleau-Ponty successfully challenges
the opposition we
have been developing in a manner
that illuminates things
thus far concealed.
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CHAPTER IV

MERLEAU-PONTY

Merleau-Pontv's Phil osophy of
Depth

Introduction

Augustine sought depth as

a

dimension of refuge and

Truth.

Foucault's studies reveal depth as
a "dimension
of reduction," and "truth" as
the dazzling lure with
which we are led into depth in order
to cleanse ourselves
of "the other." For Augustine, depth
is the dimension
of salvation.
For Foucault, depth is the dimension of
subjugation.

If one of Augustine's most central
yearnings

is to return humans to depth, one of
Foucault's most

important tasks is to expose depth as
free us from it:

a

myth and thereby

depth is a dimension constructed in

disciplinary society through which to wage "war by other
means" upon selves.

It seems to follow that a key

strategy for resisting current modalities of power is
to sabotage depth and deep truth.
It appears perhaps that these alternatives cleave our

conceptual universe regarding depth right down the middle:
these positions seem exhaustive.

We must struggle for our

freedom within either one or the other.

At best we can

allow the thesis we ultimately reject to inform us of the
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"

underside of our most basic
convictions, and possibly we
can utilize it to tame partially
the imperatives that our
own position generates.
Perhaps.
A dialogue between these two
positions is indeed
worthwhile and it is part of the
project at hand.
But
before the discussion takes place
it will be helpful
to consider the work of Merleau-Ponty
for though his
position is sympathetic to certain
dimensions of both
,

Augustine and Foucault, there is

a

way in which his

writing contests the very terrain upon
which they
oppose each other.
Merleau-Ponty explicitly rejects the notion
that philosophy and life should assume the
Augustinian

project of turning inward to seek deep truths.

He does

not believe that "truth dwells in the inner man."

Yet

he is equally opposed to any position which would
deny

that depth is "the most

»

existential ' of all dimensions.

If he can simultaneously oppose both the Augustinian

and Foucaultian positions on depth

-

while offering us

a position capable of appreciating important aspects of

each effort - it is primarily because he has reformulated

depth in

a

manner that partially escapes the excessively

constricting universe which the two have unwittingly

appropriated and perpetuated together.

It is the

implicit thesis of this chapter (though his relation
to the other two theorists will only be developed in
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1

the conclusion) that
Merleau-Ponty s understanding
of
depth is an important
contribution to our discussion
<

because it alerts us to dangers
inherent in each of
the other two positions that
otherwise go unrecognized
and simultaneously, allows us
to fortify some of their
most valuable contributions.
Merleau-Ponty sketches
an understanding of being in
the world which gestures
towards an ethics and politics
with which to move away
from nihilism, resist disciplinary
power and affirm human
identity and difference.

The Trajectory Away from

Although

I

Hn^ e rlian

"Angustini sw »

wish to forgo a careful analysis of the

relationship between Augustine, Foucault and
MerleauPonty until the final chapter, it is helpful

to introduce

Merleau-Ponty 's philosophy of depth by situating it
within
the context of some of the themes that have arisen
in

earlier chapters.

Perhaps the best place to begin is

with a brief discussion of Merleau-Ponty
of his relation to Husserl.

the early Husserl

- as

'

s

understanding

This is helpful because

Merleau-Ponty interprets him

-

elaborated a philosophy which illustrated some of the

worst developments one might try to trace to Augustine's
thought and exemplified some of what Foucault considered
to be the most dangerous and insidious characteristics
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of philosophy in the modern
episteme.

(As I will argue
later, the connection between
Husserl and Augustine is
tenuous at best. Yet Husserl
is illustrative of the
consequences of reading Augustine
under the influence
of the modern philosophy of
the subject, and these

consequences deserve clarification
and response.)
Merleau-Ponty's relationship to Husserl

is a curi ous

one,

for although Husserl is the
philosopher to whom h e
believed he had the greatest debt, at
the same time

Merleau-Ponty appropriated key Husserlian
terms such as
"phenomenological reduction," "cogito," "intentionality"
in a way that radically transformed the
meaning they

had for the early transcendental Husserl and,
even in
Merleau-Ponty's words, "pushed" the later Husserl
of

the Lebenswelt "further than he wished to go
himself." 2
(Some maintain more bluntly that Merleau-Ponty
attributed

his own ideas to Husserl.

3
)

There can be no doubt that

Husserl 's later formulations in The Crisis of the European

Sciences

,

Ideas II and III

,

and Cartesian Meditations were

vitally important for Merleau-Ponty, no matter how much
one wants to argue that he "coherently deformed" much
of what he found there.

However, one misses what most

fascinated Merleau-Ponty about Husserl if one reduces it
to the theses that can be selectively appropriated from

the latter 's late and unfinished works, for what most

enthralled Merleau-Ponty with Husserl was "instead of
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his theses, the very movement
of

M« +v^^

..4

what
he discerned in Husserl's
work was a trajectory, a path
of projection whose course
and value emerged as much
in
the impossibilities, shortcomings
and dangers illuminated
in the early steps as in the
later more sophisticated
formulations.
Even more important was the
"unthought

thought- which Merleau-Ponty perceived
to be implicit in
the partial successes and failures
of Husserl's thoughtas-movement. Husserl's thought was, in
Merleau-Ponty
view, a gesture, and as such its meaning
was not to be
'

found so much in its specific statements
as in that which
was beyond itself towards which it moved.
Merleau-Ponty

was not interested in producing an accurate
repetition
of Husserl's formulations, but rather in
resuming
the

movement of his thought, in formulating the "unthought-of
element in his works which is wholly his and yet opens
out on something else." 5
work,

For the purposes of the present

it matters little whether or not or to what extent

Merleau-Ponty correctly interpreted Husserl.

I

am only

interested in Merleau-Ponty 's discussion insofar as it
illuminates Merleau-Ponty and hence
to discover the "real" Husserl.

I

I

will make no attempt

will simply pursue

Merleau-Ponty 's reading.
I

will argue that Merleau-Ponty ' s development of

Husserl's "unthought-of element" led him to
of "depth being"

(etre profond)
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a

philosophy

but to begin, we must

briefly explore his understanding
of Husserl's "movement."
He summarizes this movement
most revealingly in the
following:
Originally a project to gain
intellectual possession of the
world, constitution becomes
increasingly, as Husserl's
thought matures, the means of
unveiling a back side of thing s
that we have not constituted.
This senseless effort to submit
everything to the properties of
"consciousness" (to the limpid
play of its attitudes, intentions,
and impositions of meaning) was
necessary - the picture of a wellbehaved world left to us by classical
philosophy had to be pushed to the
limit - in order to reveal all that
was left over:
these beings beneath
our idealizations and objectif ications
which secretly nourish them and in
which we have difficulty recognizing
noema.
(My emphasis.)
On Merleau-Ponty's account, Husserl's early phe-

nomenological efforts exemplify classical philosophy's

most extreme attempt to flatten being.

They are an

attempt to "arrive at an evidence concerning [reflective
consciousness] which is absolutely final" in which "what

appears and what is are not distinct." 7

Husserl went

through remarkable contortions to maintain this absolute

transparent certainty with respect to the subject and the

world it experiences

- a

transcendental world devoid of

Otherness yet the most general contours of his project are
captured in the final words of the Cartesian Meditations
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:

"

"I must lose the world by
epoche,

in order to regain it

by a universal self-examination,"
followed by Augustine's
famous line in De Vera
BgligigHS, "Noli foras ire, in te
redi, in interiore homine
habitat Veritas.
(Do not wish
to go out; go back into yourself.
Truth dwells in the
8
inner man.
)

Hence Husserl 's attempt to flatten
and reduce the
meaning of the world to being a
"universal constitutive
synthesis" of the transcendental ego was
intricately

entwined with

a

rigorous self-examination in which all

that was other would ultimately be shown
to be rooted
in the transcendental consciousness.
While Husserl
of the Cartesian Meditations realized that
"the world
*

transcends' consciousness,

»

he nevertheless maintained

that "it is conscious life alone, wherein everything

transcendent becomes constituted." 9

Augustine's search

for the transcendent God within was transformed by Husserl
in to the search within for the transcendental ego as the

source of the world's intelligibility.

in the depths of

the ego Husserl seeks a flattened world and a flattened

empirical self.
But as the passage quoted above at length indicates,

Merleau-Ponty thought that Husserl increasingly came
up against "the back side of things," an intransigent

world that resisted his scheme.

Husserl pushed classical

thought as far as it could go only to discover an endless

186

.

horizon beyond his well-behaved
world.
attempt to objectify inadvertently

The relentl,.ess

led him to reveal the

essentially inexhaustible dimensions
of being which in
part nourished, but also resisted
his objectif ications
Merleau-Ponty claims that in Husserl's
late works his
project fundamentally changed with
his heightened
recognition of the lebenswelt (the
life-word the self
discovers herself in the midst of) as
the inexhaustible
ground out of which reflection arises
and to which
it

must return.

Husserl's attempt to possess the world

was short circuited and moved towards
becoming a project
that revealed the impossibility of complete
possession.
"Willy-nilly, against his plans and according
to his
essential audacity, Husserl awakens a wild world

and a

wild mind." 10

("Sauvage," here translated as "wild,"

also means untamed, uncivilized, savage, rude.)

discovers the depths of being.

Husserl

(That the "wild" is

"depth" will of course only become intelligible after

the discussion of Merleau-Ponty' s conception of being
as depth which comes later in this chapter.)

According to Merleau-Ponty, Husserl's uncovering of
depth changed Husserl's project from being one aimed at
"possession" of otherness to one aimed at revealing the

surplus of being beyond our objectif ications in order to

challenge our possessive comportment towards the world and
open us to a relation that is more genuinely dialogical.
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"Making explicit" becomes largely
a task of revealing
the forgotten "dehiscence" of
Being, so well concealed
by objectifying thought.
short "phenomenology 's task
was to reveal the mystery of
the world and reason. nil

m

Of course, phenomenology was
not simply to lead us to
an open mouthed awe in the face
of being, but this awe
was to be the strange foundation
of its more constructive
efforts at self -understanding, ethics
and politics.

Gone is the notion of an "inner man"
which we
should strive to return to in our quest
for truth.

in

the preface of the Ph enomenology of PP rrppHnn
MerleauPonty repeats the phrase from Augustine's Of
True Re] ig inn

which closed the Cartesian Meditations

-

without even

mentioning Husserl's appropriation of the passage
order to define what phenomenology is not.

-

in

"There is no

inner man, man is the world, and only in the world does
he know himself." 12

Humans are thrown into the depths

of being, and the task is not to eradicate this and

recover an original flat self-possessing being in the
depths of the self, but instead to inform and guide our
lives in recognition of and dialogue with being as depth.
It is this latter notion to which we now turn,

beginning with Merleau-Ponty

'

s

critique of rationalism

and empiricism, followed by his development of his

philosophy of depth.
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Beyond Classical Thoug ht

^ nd

Toward

riop -n

The starting point for
Merleau-Ponty

.

s

development

of his philosophy of being in
Phenomenolp^

consists of a careful analysis and
critique of rationalist
and empiricist theories of our
knowledge of the world.

Rejecting the notion that the two
radically contest one
another, Merleau-Ponty argues that
in fact both

approaches

are situated on "the same terrain." 13

Both posit a com-

pletely determinate, unambiguous objective
world as the
ground of their investigations. Empiricist
theories

attempt to explain experience in terms of
atomistic
"sensations" which are conducted from the entirely

determinate world to our brain by our sensory
apparatus.
Our brain then discerns a world of things by
connecting
the array of sense-data atoms (which correspond to
the

world itself) through "association," which is supposed to
result from their de facto contiguity.

The outcome of

course is a perfectly objective experience of

a

perfectly

objective world.
Rationalist or "intellectualist" theories of

knowledge likewise presuppose the objective world as
the basis of their analyses.

However, while empiricism

treats this world as "in itself," rationalism treats
the world as the product of a constituting consciousness

"which eternally possesses the intelligible structure
of all its objects." 14

Subjects are related to this
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world through "attention,"
which illuminates and elucidates objects like an unconditioned
search light, with
the strange power of bringing
to consciousness what
consciousness itself constituted
and already
included.

Although rationalism explicitly
rejects the empiricist's
notion of sensation - arguing
that sensations are
imperceptible themselves - and replaces
it

"judgment," in fact, judgment

is

with

ultimately dependent

upon sensation at "the boundary of
our consciousness"^
as that which it interprets in a
logical
fashion.

Both empiricism and rationalism relate
us to

a

world which is completely given as objective
(whether
"in itself" or surreptitiously constituted
by

the self),

the former through a process of causal
relations, the

latter by way of consciously constituted
relations.

Merleau-Ponty subjects these theories to extended,
thoroughgoing and persuasive criticism which

I

wish to

selectively summarize only in the briefest of ways. 16
To begin with, Merleau-Ponty finds that neither theory
can account for the way we go about learning of the world
-

an important criticism given that this is the stated

goal of both approaches.

Empiricism, which admits only

of knowledge "produced" by the world,

"cannot see that

we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we

would not be looking for it," while intellectualism,
which conceives of

a

world completely constituted by
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consciousness, "fails to
a+ we
ro see 4-v,
that
need to be ignorant
of what we are looking j-ur
^
y for or erm»n«
egually again
we should
not be searching." IV At the
root of this problem is
that whether as an effect of
the world on a passive
consciousness, or as a result of
a consciousness which
constitutes the world, both theories
can conceive only
° f 9 c °™Pletel Y detPrmin.tn
knowledge and a completely
determinate world, and hence are
unable to grasp the
"circumscribed ignorance" which both
motivates our
relation to the world and necessitates
that there by
something to be learned.
.

•

This leads us to the heart of Merleau-Ponty
cism.

'

s

criti-

In positing our presence to a world
of objects,

each of which is completely determinate
"in itself,"

rationalism and empiricism falsify our experience
of
the world and indeed make experience itself

impossible

(except perhaps in the case of rationalism, that of
a

god both totally present to and unmotivated by the world)

Examining our experience more carefully (following Gestalt
theory) he finds that there are no objects given purely
in identity with themselves and that the most basic unit

of experience emerges from difference

figure and a background.

sensation "in itself"

-

-

that between a

Pure identity - the homogeneous

cannot be experienced, rather it

is this difference which gives birth to our perceptions

of the world.

This indicates that rather than being
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a

composite of given sense atoms,
the perceived world comes
into being through a structuring
of differences in which
a
figure emerges from an
indeterminate background which is
itself prior to and the condition
for sensing identifiable
things within the perceptual
field.

The identity of an

individual thing, for example the
yellow pencil on my grey
desk, is perceptible not simply
"in itself," but to the
extent that its color, shape, texture
stand out from those
of the desk which is its background.
Yet the figure-ground structure of
the perceived
world does more than indicate the extreme
inadequacies
of sense data atomism.
More fundamentally it calls into
question the rationalist and empiricist
notions that the
"objective world" is the stuff of experience.
For it is

obvious that the figure-ground structure in
which the
world always appears does not present us with a
completely
given and determinate experience of things, but
instead

shows the experienced world to be something which has
a degree of ambiguity and is partially contingent
and

variable.

If an employee for a logging company is

calculating the board-feet of timber that

a forest

will yield, during his transects through the forest
his perceived world is likely to be dominated by tree

trunks of varying quality, diameter and height.
else may appear to this person.

Little

On the other hand, an

artist strolling through the same forest may become
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totally engrossed in the
vibrant green of this
spring's
new growth - its resonance
with the brilliant sun
and
bright blue sky.
It is guite possible
that the logger*'s
and the artist's perceptions though both emerging

from

their contact with the same forest

-

would be remarkably

discrepant (even though their
differences well out of
certain shared experiences at the
most basic level - due
to their both being embodied
human selves - which hold
out the possibility of a degree of
communication
and

understanding).

More agonizingly perhaps, the
logger

and the artist might be different
dimensions of a single
person, resulting in frequent and
discordant shifts in
her structuring of the perceived world.
At any rate,
what is central for Merleau-Ponty is that
at the most
basic level, the world we experience, far
from being
the determinate objective world of classical
thought,
is a world essentially open to diverse
"structurings"
-

diverse determinations

-

through which it is

simultaneously revealed and concealed.

The world

always retains an inexhaustible reserve of otherness

which exceeds the perceptions that emerge from our
contact with it.

This quality of the perceived world

as structured-yet-open is that which both motivates and

makes possible our living experience of the world.

Our

new perceptions always emerge from and are motivated by
our past experiences (rather than being determined by them
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or arising fro. nowhere as
with classicai episte m olo
gy)
and are possible preoisely
beoause the past did not
offer
us the world in completion.

This essentially ambiguous
world which Merleau-Ponty
begins to unveil, no longer
rests within the objectivity
of the "in itself." Along
with the perceived world's
essential transcendence (its
openness and elusive
otherness)
Merleau-Ponty discovers an essential
,

immanence

:

an ineliminable relation
between self and

world.

The phenomenological world is
always revealed
as "perceived by" an incarnate
self, a being embodied
within it from whence it is witnessed.
The appearance
of the world is always bound up with
my spatial and
temporal position (and the positions I
can possibly
inhabit) in it, as well as my incarnate
history in a
social, cultural, economic and political
world.

This

is already apparent in the example of the
logger and

the artist.

The intersection of each social incarnate

self and the world gives rise to perceptions which
are

always rooted in

a

particular existence.

The self and

the world refer endlessly to one another in a process
of co-creation.

If the phenomenal world is always in

part sustained by an incarnate self, this is not for

Merleau-Ponty a return to subjectivism, for the self
is in turn its relationships with a world that is not

entirely of its choosing.

The self and world are
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reciprocally intertwined, and
as one Merleau-Ponty
scholar has put it, "the edge
of [this] dialectic
moves too quickly to be caught
at rest.... "18
Thus far we have briefly
sketched some of MerleauPonty's philosophical ideas in
a most basic manner,
what
we begin to see is a world which
is far different than
that of classical thought; a world
which most fundamentally appears not as simply "in
itself" but through
our intersection and communion with
it.
However,

Merleau-Ponty notes that this world
and transcendent

-

-

both immanent

is not the world that we recognize

in our everyday life.

in our everyday attitudes we tend

unreflectively to take the world as simply and
completely
"there." We generally lose sight of the way
it is
rooted

in our living relations with it and the
extent to which it

maintains itself as partially other than and resistant
to
our sense of it.
in short, Merleau-Ponty argues that
in

our everyday unreflective attitude we usually accept
the

world as an objective thing

-

something closer to the

world of classical thought than the phenomenological
world Merleau-Ponty seeks to bring forth.

Nevertheless,

Merleau-Ponty claims that this "objective world" always
rests upon the world of our primary experience which

emerges from our brute intersection with the world.

Humans perpetually lose sight of this, he argues,

because it is the essence of perception to forget
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itself, to lose itself in
the things which appear
in
the perceived world.
indeed its ability to lose
itself
is precisely what allows
there to be "things" for
us.

"Obsessed with being and
»u foraetfm
rorgettul of «-v,
y
the perspectivism of
my experience, I henceforth
treat
it as an

object....""

However, for all the manipulative
capabilities which this
attitude gives rise to - including
scientific thought,
which Merleau-Ponty wants not to
disregard, but to limit he contends that it conceals the
fundamental being of the
world upon which it rests. This f
orgetf ulness obfuscates

the nature of both selves and the
world, and has dangerous
methodological, ethical and political
manifestations which
Merleau-Ponty finds accentuated in various
aspects
of the

modern world.
In contrast to the "objective" world,
Merleau-Ponty

seeks to explore the world as it is given to us
in our

primitive experiential contact with being in order to
reformulate our conceptions of self and world, and
conjointly, to develop an ontology that is radically

different from that of classical thought.

He seeks to

unveil the world as we experience it prior to our familiar

acceptance of "things" and prior to our theoretical grasp
of it.

In other words, he aims at

" return

[ing] to that

world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always
speaks

.

20
"

This forgoing of our everyday acceptance of

the world is what Merleau-Ponty
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-

following Husserl -

calls "phenomenological
reduction."

it is the attempt

to grasp the world as it
emerges into being for us,
not
in order to reveal it as the
correlate of a transcendental
ego as Husserl did, but in
order "to reveal the mystery
of
the world and of reason" 2 *
which is concealed by classical
thought.
Merleau-Ponty's philosophical
explorations of
the phenomenological world intend
to provide us with
understandings of the world which
heighten our awareness
of its paradoxical and ambiguous
nature and illustrate
that the mystery of the lived world
is not its weakness,
but precisely what lets it be "there."
Of rationalism
and empiricism, Merleau-Ponty remarks,
"they levelled out

experience." 22

m

opposition to this flattened world,

Merleau-Ponty seeks to disclose being as depth.

Yet

the disclosures of the phenomenological
reduction never

coincide with immediate experience, for they themselves
are a form of reflection and as such never present
us with

brute experience, but instead, with unreflected experience
as it is understood and worked over by reflection.

While

returning to the lived world provides Merleau-Ponty with
a vantage point from which to critique decisively forms

of objectifying knowledge based on identity, neverthe-

less the lived world does not signify a privileged domain

capable of providing the existential phenomenologist

with a complete knowledge.

Rather, by pointing to the

lived world Merleau-Ponty gestures to that
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- all

too

forgotten - mysterious region
which calls us to a
continual questioning engagement.
Living experience,
in its depth, always transcends
our reflection upon it
and ushers forth a dialogical
relation with being which we
must continuously renew. Hence
while the phenomenological
reduction is central to Merleau-Ponty's
philosophical
strategy, he cautions from the
beginning that
the "most

important lesson which the reduction
teaches us is the
impossibility of complete reduction.""
The wondrousness
of the world rests in part in its
ability to exceed
even

our attempts to grasp its wonder.
An important dimension of this paradox
is that
for Merleau-Ponty, both the experienced
world and

philosophical reflection are in a perpetual process
of co-creation:

The phenomenological world is not
the bringing to explicit expression
of a pre-existing being, but the
laying down of being.
Philosophy
is not the reflection of a preexisting truth, but, like art,
the act of bringing truth into
being. 24

There is no pure and absolutely
unexpressed life in man; the
unreflected [irreflechi] comes
into existence for us only
through reflection. 5
In these passages, we glimpse the circularity which is
a central theme in Merleau-Ponty's ontology and manifests
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^

itself in almost all of his
work
0n the one
refiec _
tion always refers back to
a layer of unreflective
life
out of which it emerges. On
the other hand however,
this unreflective life does
not exist for us unlesswe
return to it and bring it forth
through reflection. Yet
unreflective life is neither everything
(according to
a superficial reading of
"the one hand") nor nothing
(according to a superficial reading
of "the other
hand").
Instead, it should be conceived
of as not
fully determinate existence which
is open to a variety
of appropriations and resistant in
varying degrees to
all appropriations as well.
Objective renderings of
.

experience are possible because of perception's
propensity
to forget itself, but as we have seen,
they are untenable
because they are unable upon close examination
to
eluci-

date a way in which humans could experience the
world.
In contrast, Merleau-Ponty creatively expresses
this wild

untamed level of experience

-

"brings it into being" -

in a way that places before our eyes and mind its very

ambiguity and renders our ability to experience it more

comprehensible
As noted, philosophical reflection transforms

being in its attempt to express

it.

Indeed,

"without

reflection life would probably dissipate itself in
ignorance of itself or in chaos." 26

Recalling Marx's

eleventh thesis on Feuerbach that "philosophers have
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a

only interpreted the world,
in various ways; the
point,
however, is to change it,
one should note that for
Merleau-Ponty, the philosophical
act of understanding
the world is already a
transformation of this world.
This is not in any way to assert
that Merleau-Ponty
advocated a praxis of inner life,
much of his writing
on politics and religion is
aimed at refuting this notion.
Nevertheless, if praxis does not end
with philosophy, it
takes an essential first step with
it.
Emphasizing the
seriousness of the philosophical project,
he writes:

We take our fate in our hands, we
become responsible for our history,
through reflection, but equally by'
decision on which we stake our life,
and in both cases what is involved is
a violent act which is validated by
being performed. 8

To conceive of being as depth as Merleau-Ponty
does
is to transform being,

it is to make being deeper.

As we

shall see, though being is depth, to conceive of depth

being and to create an individual and social existence on
the basis of such an understanding is to begin to bring

depth into life in a far "deeper" manner than was the case

prior to our efforts.
can be flattened.

Being is essentially depth, but it

The circularities involved here can

only be hinted at at the moment, and will have to await
the extensive discussion of depth below for further

elaboration.

Before we begin this later task,
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I

wish

to briefly indicate Merleau-Ponty's
understanding of the
stakes involved (this too will
be further developed in
the next chapter) by sketching
the dangers of flattened
notions of being.

Dangers of Flat R^ing
If one wants to understand why
objectifying and

subjectifying thoughts and practices which
flatten being
intensify, diversify and proliferate with
such ubiguity
in modernity, the works of Hegel, Marx,
Nietzsche,

Weber,

Lukacs, Heidegger, Adorno and Foucault are far
more fecund

than those of Merleau-Ponty

.

other than occasional echoes

of Hegel, Marx, Lukacs and Weber, and vague
statements
like,

"certain ideas have a pre-established affinity

with certain politics or interests because each of them
presupposes the same conception of man," 29 we gain little
historical insight into the increasing hegemony of these

thoughts and practices.

Indeed, Merleau-Ponty's apparent

belief that perception's propensity to lose sight of
itself is the germ cell of objective thought, while

insightful in some ways, lends itself to hopelessly

uninsightful and ahistorical understandings of contem-

porary discourses and practices.

But if he did not

delve deeply into the causes of reified thought, he
was not unaware of the dangers it harbored.
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in a brilliantly blunt
footnote in The_Visib^e_and

TheJnviMbl^, Merleau-Ponty writes:

"Every atte.pt to

reinstate the illusion of the
*thing itself is in fact
an attempt to return to my
imperialism and the value of
my thing.' .30 Tq pQsit

^ ^.^

^ ^

its determinate existence, of
which

I

am witness, as

independent of its relations with me.

To sever the

threads which connect us with things
and things with
us is to posit a world lacking both
immanence
and

transcendence (the latter, because our lack
of carnal
relations with things extricates us from the

world, and

affords us

a

complete and comprehensive view that is

unavailable to embodied vision)

.

This world and these

things are flattened to my view of them insofar
as

I

deny entirely the perspectival and carnal character
of
my vision and
"in itself."

lay absolute and exhaustive claims to the

However, rather than the "truth" which it

claims to possess, this thinking actually inaugurates
an "imperialism" because it flatly denies both "other"

aspects of the thing and all perceptions others may
have of the thing that are not its own.

Hence it is

simultaneously an imperial denial and conquest of
both nature and other people.

(It is particularly

imperialistic when another person is the "thing itself"
that is the object of the objectifying gaze.)
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1

Merleau-Ponty argues that in
addition to being the
aurora of the ontological dimension
of imperialism,

flat

disembodied thought perpetuates and
enhances its hold
on things by establishing itself
in a distanced and
supposedly free surveying attitude from
above.
From
the vantage point of a jet plane,
"high altitude

thought"

("kosmotheoros") perceives a flat world
below spread out
before it in entirety. Devoid of otherness,
devoid of
its intrinsic claims, devoid of the
claims of others, it

awaits manipulation.

In further attempting to define the

thing in terms of its thought and the "prior
possibility
of thinking it," this objective thought
"impose [s]
upon

the world in advance the conditions for our
control over
it." 3

in addition, by denying the otherness of the

world, this form of thought denies the violence it

perpetrates and legitimizes the silence it imposes.
It is,

I

think, this broad understanding of the

social and political tendencies of the predominant modern

philosophies, that drives much of Merleau-Ponty

'

s writing,

In any case, this understanding both motivates and is

central to the discussion that follows.

Philosophy of Depth
The centrality of "depth" (profondeur) in the

work of Merleau-Ponty has generally been overlooked or
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"

underestimated by his interpreters 32
.

However, many

of his texts contain
discussions of depth and he
uses
the word repeatedly in

The_JOsib^e_^Th^

in his attempts to distinguish
his philosophy from Kant,
Bergson, Sartre, Husserl and
others.
the Phen^ology
of Percep tion, Merleau-Ponty
states that depth is "the
most existential of all dimensions "33
In a working note
in Th ^ Risible and The
Invisible he says

m

.

that without

,

depth,

"there would not be a world or Being.

34

while

these passages taken alone are obviously
insufficient to
illustrate the claim that Merleau-Ponty
is most profoundly
a philosopher of depth, they do
indicate that
it is an

important notion for him and one that needs
to be carefully explored in order to understand his
philosophy.
They are especially provocative for the
present inquiry
given his explicit rejection on more than one
occasion
of a "deep self" or "deep truth."

if there would be no

Being without depth, and yet depth is not
-

objective truth, we are led to ask:

-

nor harbors

How must we

understand this depth which is so essential to Being
that Being would not Be if not as depth?

Let us look

more closely.

Merleau-Ponty 's first discussion of depth occurs in
Phenome nology of Perception

,

where as usual, he launches

his own analysis from a careful critique of empiricist and

intellectualist approaches.

Both theories, he argues, are
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alike "in denying that depth is
visible. "35 For classical
thought, which assumes that depth
is simply "breadth seen
from the side ," depth cannot be
seen because the seer is
in no position to see it.
it is either concealed by
the
first surface in sight which blocks
our vision of all that
is in the depths behind it; or
in the case of the distance
between our eyes and the first surface,
there is no way
of actually seeing this depth itself,
since "this distance
is compressed into a point" in our
36
flat visual
field.

The depth we are speaking of can only
actually be seen if
the observer moves to the side, in which
case it becomes
breadth.

Classical thought argues that we experience

depth not by seeing it, but rather by intellectually

interpreting it in terms of breadth from facts such
as
the apparent size of the object in our visual field

and

the angle of convergence between our eyes.

Hence the

experience of depth is here understood as a cognitive

activity in which we judge the objective breadth we

would discover between ourselves and things if we were
to see this distance from the side.

Merleau-Ponty finds serious problems in this
objectivist rendering of depth.

First, he argues that

these traditional approaches "do not give us any account
of the human experience of the world; they tell us what a

God might think about it." 37

In collapsing depth to an

interpretation of would-be breadth seen from the side,
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they conjure up an experience of
the world from the
point of view of a subject who
thinks of himself as
simultaneously everywhere - a subject
who must alwa y!
posit himself at right angles to
the line between hit-S
moving gaze and objects it contacts.
Such an experience
of the world inheres in no point
of view; it arises from
a subject who must occupy an
infinite number of points
in space (at least in some fantastic
mental sense)
in

order to experience depth as identical
to breadth wherever
he turns his gaze.
Yet Merleau-Ponty notes that this
is clearly not the case, and that the
essence
of our

experience of depth is precisely that it is the
experience
of an incarnate being specifically located
in the lived

world.

For this being, for human experience, depth is

not equivalent to breadth and height
are laid out in plain view before us.

-

dimensions which
its appearance,

more than the other two dimensions, speaks of its
inherence in a relation between

a

subject and the

world, rather than appearing simply as a quality of

the world itself.

The depth of the world always refers

to a particular perspective which implies a communication

between a self and the world at the origin of spatial
experience, hitherto considered unproblematically as given
"in itself."

By collapsing depth into breadth and then

conceiving of a "cerebral alchemy" which facilitates this
conversion, classical thought jumps over this difference
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between depth and the other
dimensions and assumes a
thorough knowledge of an entirely
uniform objective
space as the basis of our
experience.

However, this

assumption begs the question, which
is precisely to ask
how we come to experience space and depth itself in
particular - to begin with. Our
experience of depth must
be prior to sophisticated
calculations based on a
space

which depth itself gives rise to.
In contrast to these abstract
approaches which deny
both the specificity of depth and the
peculiar relations

between the self and the world which depth
indicates,
Merleau-Ponty contends that we must seek to disclose
the way in which depth comes into being for
us as depth

without basing our analysis on calculations we
supposedly
make according to an entirely objective and explicit
spatial network, the experience of which depth itself

gives rise to.

To do justice to this "most existential

dimension," we must explore the existential relations

between the self and the world towards which it gestures
as fundamental, since it is through these relations that

our experience of depth and the world originate.

must approach the experience of depth

through which it arises

-

- and the

We

relations

through the "phenomenological

reduction" in order to avoid falsely comprehending it
in terms of a world which is simply there "in itself"

and always already experienced as deep.
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The relations

between the self and the world
cannot be comprehended
"objectively, " and it is only through
these relations
that the experience of depth and
the world of things
springs forth.
if we simply assume that
which

needs
to be understood we will have
failed our task miserably.
Prior to the world in which science
has "levelled down
the individual perspective" we must
rediscover "the

originality of dep th." 38

Instead of explaining the

experience of depth by phenomena in the
given world,
we must seek the origin - the birth - of
our experience
of the world in depth.

Merleau-Ponty takes depth's gesture towards the
relation between the self and the world seriously,

and

hence he makes this relation the starting point of
his
analysis.

The experience of depth is fundamentally "a

possibility of

a

subject involved in the world." 39

The

subject ceaselessly finds itself thrown into thickets of

being of which it is not the author, and it responds to
this thrownness through a continual effort to get a grip
on this wild and indeterminate world which surrounds it.

Yet the self's partial ability to get a hold on being
to sense something

,

rather than being condemned to thrash

aimlessly forever amidst
entirely foreign

-

-

a

world entirely ungraspable,

is not simply a result of its own will,

but rather emerges from the fact that it belong to

a

more primordial and "general existence" from which it
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s

originates as divergence, separation
(ecart)
general existence is referred to
in the

.

while thi;

Phenomenon

of Perception 40 and often
implicitly underlies
,

hi,

discussions even where it is not
mentioned, Merl,.eauPonty does not submit it to a more
careful and developed
analysis until his later discussions
of the "flesh."

Without fully developing this notion
until later, I wish
to begin with a very brief and
simplified discussion of
flesh, since it sheds a certain light
on Merleau-Ponty
earlier experiential discussions of the
self-world
relation with respect to depth which will allow
'

us to

explore them while avoiding some of their obscurity.

Among other things, we find in his notion of
flesh
the ontological possibility of the "self," the
"world" and
the relations between them. Merleau-Ponty calls not
only

my carnal existence, but also that of the world flesh in
order to indicate a "kinship" between them which makes

possible the sensible world which emerges through their
communion.

Indeed, the communication between the self

and the world is only possible because, in a general
sense, they share the same flesh.

Expressing his theory

of embodiment in its more developed form as "flesh among

flesh," Merleau-Ponty writes:
If [the body] touches [things] and
sees them, this is only because,
being of their family, itself visible
and tangible, it uses its own being
as a means to participate in theirs...
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because the body belongs to
order of the things as the the
world
is universal flesh. 41

My flesh can be present to that
of the world because at
a certain level they are
similar stuff. My body lends
itself to the world and the world
inscribes my body
because they "belong together" as
differentiations
of

a common flesh.

be "there."

Without this commonality nothing would

Just as

I

can touch my own body by applying

flesh to flesh, so too can

because

I

I

sense the rest of the world

am thick like it is; and when

I

palpate it

with my touch or my gaze it resists me, forming
at the
interface a surface of sensibility. Merleau-Ponty

uses

the term flesh in part to indicate this commonality,

and in addition to distinguish his philosophy from
any

materialistic philosophy which would reduce the "coiling
over" of flesh upon flesh to a relation among mere "things
in themselves."

Flesh is

- as

we shall see - "a general

manner of being," 42 inexhaustible, and not to be subjugated to our experiences of it as object.
As humans we thus find ourselves tossed in the jungle
of flesh, and our existence is at a most fundamental

perceptual level a constantly renewed attempt to establish
and maintain a hold on the world.

It is not the easy-

going hold of a subject and a world which are rationally

designed for one another.

No, Merleau-Ponty ' s "world

ceaselessly assails and beleaguers subjectivity as waves
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s

wash around

a

wreck on the shore.""

The commonality Qf

the self's flesh and that of
the world does not ensure
a
harmony, merely the possibility
of something rather than
nothing.
the midst of this condition,
existence is the
primordial attempt to make being
determinate for oneself,
the effort to experience a world
with distinctions,

m

significance, references and potentials a world with
a degree of familiarity in which
we can find and guide
ourselves.

Because my sensual field belongs to the
finitude of
an historical bodily being which is
submerged deep in the
world, in the most basic sense I cannot be
everywhere at
once nor present all at once to everything.
Nor even
can I be present simultaneously to everything
which most
immediately surrounds me. The finitude of my being
which

precludes ubiquitous presence to every-thing, behoves
that

my perceptual contact with
world be through something

.

my perceptual hold upon

-

the

Hence my perceptual bond with

the world must be essentially directional, proceeding to
and fro between myself and something in the world.

It is

through this directional attempt to grasp the world so as
to further direct my existence within it, that depth comes
into being for us.

"Depth is born beneath my gaze when

the latter tries to see something " 44
emphasis).

(Merleau-Ponty

'

At a most basic level, the perception of

anything is (as we have already seen) the accomplishment
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of a depth organization of
the perceptual field into
figure and ground. To perceive
something, it must "stand
out" - a trope which already
indicates the essentiality
of depth to perception:
the figure must stand out from
the depths of the background.
The emergence of a distinct
something implies the submergence of
the rest of the world
into the depths of varying degrees
of indeterminacy.
it
is these perceptual distinctions,
Merleau-Ponty contends,

which give birth to the phenomenological
world from an
indeterminate sensory field by rendering it
in a depth

organization that allows us to grasp the world
through
our operative finitude and take up an
existence with it.
Yet it should be emphasized that our grasping
of

the world is not at all the free act of
subject.

constituting

a

The phenomenological world emerges through

the carnal intercourse between the flesh of my body
and
the flesh of the world.

Depth emerges as

see something, yet "the act of

f ocusing.

.

I
.

"try" to

is equally a

response to a question put by the data [les donnees] and
this response is contained in the question." 45

if as

Merleau-Ponty says, it is impossible "to see the spaces
between the trees as things and the trees themselves as
background,

1,46

this is because the world demands that the

incarnate self perceive it within particular limits.

My

body cannot climb the space between the trees just as it
cannot pass through the trees as if they were space.
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As

.

my body moves, itu intersects
, j
interseo-hc; the world
in ever new ways;
and its movement is in a
relation of circularity with
,

,

.

its perceptual grasp of the
world in depth, insofar as
it simultaneously presupposes
and ceaselessly forms and
transforms this field. As the
world seduces, yields and
resists us in multitudinous ways,
our perceptual world is

called forth.

The world motivates my attempts
to grasp
it.
However, even these formulations
are abstract moments
of my body's relation to the
world - a relation in which
flesh "coils over" upon flesh, that
is more primary than
either of the moments. The body and
the world it
is

submerged in ceaselessly interpenetrate
one another
through reciprocal carnal "motivations."
The field

of depth emerges through this chasm
between them, and

ultimately "it is the field itself which is
moving
towards the most perfect possible symmetry, and
depth
is merely a moment in arriving at a
perceptual faith
in one single thing" 47

(my emphasis)

Let us further explore this perceptual field and

the depth organization through which all things emerge.

When Merleau-Ponty refers to "the originality of depth,"
clearly the figure-ground structure of all perception

which brings things forth in our sensual field is part
of what he has in mind.

This depth founds a world with

distinctions and texture which allows us to partially
grasp it.

Yet what is the essence of things which are
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.

brought forth in this field?

(i

use the word

Merleau-Ponty does, not as

a static nature,

instead of Wesen and ester

-

„

essence „ as

but thinking

active verbal essence. 48

)

Are they flat entities laid out
completely before us?
Merleau-Ponty 's response to the latter
question
is a

definitive "no."

Things are "things" not only
through

the depth of their distinction from
their surroundings,
but because they themselves have depth.
Indeed, this
quality is intertwined with their distinction.
"Depth
is the means the things have to remain
distinct, to remain
things, while not being what I look at at
present." 49

Without their own depth, things would be indistinct
from
their surroundings and indistinct from me as well since
I

would totally possess them; they would not be.

Hence,

contemporaneous with the birth of something in my
perceptual field is the rendering of the thing in depth,
and this depth implies the spatiality of the world as

well

Merleau-Ponty pursues this genesis of the experience
of depth in his discussion of our perception of a cube

sketched on paper.

I

see a three-dimensional figure -

rather than nothing or a mere incoherent juxtaposition
of lines - by inhabiting it and animating it with my gaze
in ways which the lines themselves call forth.

perception brings forth

a "thing," a
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This depth

"locality," which

gathers together the lines on
the page so thoroughly
that
their appearance is governed by
their mutual implications

Angles that are acute or obtuse when viewed
in terms
of the flat objective juxtaposition of
lines,

appear

immediately in depth as right angles and the
lateral
faces (objectively diamond shaped) appear as

"squares

seen askew."

Depth is precisely this bringing forth, this

gathering together, this instantaneous crystallization
of
a

significant perception in which some-thing and

appears

-

a

"there"

that is, a being, volume, locality, the multiple

parts of which "belong together" through their reciprocal
implications.

Prior to this there is no-thing, and no

"there," only vague indeterminacy.

Merleau-Ponty elabo-

rates this point with a discussion of our perception
of a sketched cube, because the sketch is sufficiently

ambiguous to partially disclose the manner in which the
depth rendering brings the field into being and holds sway
over the aspects of the field, endowing angles and shapes

with a significance they acquire through their relations
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with other parts, pulling forth
some lines, repelling
others back, separating the figure
of the cube from the
background of the page; in short,
giving birth to the
"there." However, what Merleau-Ponty
says of the sketched
cube applies to all perception
(except of course with
the

obvious difference that a real
three-dimensional cube is
rendered in a depth which has a tactile
thickness which
accords with its visibility)
When I perceive
a real

.

cube, say the sugar cube on the kitchen
table, its being

springs forth from the background as

a

thick angular

thing whose angles, shadows and faces cohere
together
in an originating spatial depth.
All perceived things
appear as things through this experiential pulling

forth

and pushing back which generally occurs instantaneously,

distributing their parts in

a

depth which sustains their

significance and calls forth the "there."
As we have indicated, this depth is not simply
a

quality of things themselves, but inheres in the

perspective of our perceptual field.

As my grasp on

the world, the world's grasp on me, the depth in and

through which things appear always expresses the stretch
between them and me.

Things appear not only as distinct

from a background, but distinct from myself as well.

Each thing is "being at a distance," 50 and it appears
as a significant thing only by cohering in a depth which

reveals the various distances of its different parts from
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me.

Without this implicit stipulation
no thing can be;
not even a flat juxtaposition
of lines

on a flat surface,

for "there are forms and definite
planes only if it is
stipulated how far from me their
different parts are. "51
This "stipulating" is not that of
an objective thought
which would measure the distance,
but more fundamentally
the depth which emerges with the
perceptual field as soon
as it is perceptually grasped as
"there," as soon as there
is anything to measure.
absence of this depth there is
only indeterminacy.

m

Hence we see not only that our experience
of things
originates in depth, but that in giving birth
to "being

at a distance," depth renders open the
"clearing" we

always find ourselves in the midst of.

it is the depth

of the perceptual field which clears being,
which holds

the field open, instead of smothering us in the
absolute

proximity of an indeterminacy from which we can distinguish neither ourselves nor a world.

Here we begin to

see the specificity and uniqueness of depth

Merleau-Ponty calls us to think

it.

-

the reason

Depth as the essence

of the clearing is not the "third dimension" of the world

which, like the other two dimensions, can be measured.

Rather, Merleau-Ponty speaks of depth as that through

which our experience of the world and the three dimensions
originate

.
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Depth thus understood is,
rather,
the experience of... a global
"locality" - everything in
same place at the same time,the
a
fr ° m WhiGh hei <?ht, width
lnTllll*
and
depth are abstracted, of a
volummosity we express in a word
when we say that a thing is
there 52
.

The "there" emerges in depth as
the visual field
"pulls forward," "pushes back,"
implicates, reveals
and conceals to present the space
of the world.

A volume
of experience is given birth to
within which we always

discover ourselves.
Merleau-Ponty's inquiry into depth calls
attention to
the paradoxical nature of the world's
presence
to us,

in

which the depth of each being is grasped on
the basis of
distinctions which allow it to "stand out" from

an eclipse

that which it is not, while in turn these distinctions
and this envelopment appear on the basis of each
being's
depth.

The enigma [of depth] consists in
the fact that I see things, each
one in its place, precisely because
they eclipse one another and that
they are rivals before my sight
precisely because each one is in
its own place.
Their exteriority
is known in their envelopment and
their mutual dependence in their
autonomy. 53

Indeed things are only "there" through a sort of selfeclipse, in which their present surface of visibility
is indebted to and indicative of a latent invisibility
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harbored in the depths of their
uneir h^inr,
being.
Emerging from
the depths of things throuah
niiuugn tho
tne r^-M
^
coiling over of flesh
on flesh, "the looK does not
overcome depth, it goes
round
it. "54
The world and the th ngs wh
ch
with
are this transcendence as depth,
this presence of the
inexhaustibl e.
•

.

.

^ ^

Thus far, our discussion of
depth has drawn
substantial support from illustrations
that are visual
in nature.
However Merleau-Ponty 's contention
that the
perceived world originates through a
depth rendering
in which things find both their
cohesion and their
distinction from other things, applies to
the perceived
world as such, not just visual perception.

As my fingers

run through the warm sand on a beach, at
least for an
instant the rest of the tactile world which
surrounds me
is partially eclipsed and driven back by the
thick being
of the resistant sand.

As

I

am captivated by Coltrane's

saxophone, it bubbles out of the depths of an irreverently

noisy book store, pressing the chatter, the jingle of
coins falling into a cash register, the squeaky door,
the sliding of books, into the deep reaches of its shadow,

eclipsing them so thoroughly that they are almost driven
from the room.

And his wild improvisation is only able to

do this because it is there

- a

thickness of inexhaustible

sound which both appears through and demands its distinction.

Merleau-Ponty writes repeatedly:
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"To be conscious

= to have a figure on a ground - one
cannot go back any
further. "55 The clearing of
the lived world is always
present in this depth structure
in which we do not

experience

uniform objective world, analogous
to
Cartesian space for all our senses,
but rather a world
that is "coherently deformed" around
figures which "stand
out "
a

.

However, if we have established that
depth renders
open the clearing of the lived world and
that it is the

dimension of transcendence, a crucial question
looms large
concerning the relationship between this experience
of
things and the flesh of the world.

correspond to the world's flesh?
flesh?

Does our experience

Does it express this

Is it attuned to this flesh?

After all, have we

not asserted an ontological collusion between the self
and the world by calling them both flesh?
I

wish first to develop Merleau-Ponty

'

s

response

to these questions by further elaborating his discussion
of our experience of the world; and then, to explore the

"indirect ontology" that grows out of this discussion and

remains incomplete in his final works.

In the latter,

he addresses the relation between our experience and the

Being of things.
As we have begun to see, the depth organization of

the perceived world simultaneously reveals and conceals
the beings which appear therein.

220

However, Merleau-Ponty

also employs metaphors

l ike

"express" and "transgress"

which are far less neutral and
far more illuminating for
the discussion at hand. 56 A close
look at
experienced
world indicates that each perception
of a thing is

^

ex-

tremely partial when compared with
the multiplicitous
being of the thing that is further
revealed through the
temporal elaboration of experience. More
profoundly each
perceptual moment organizes the field of
experience in a
manner which in part transgressively deforms
the world
that is revealed as our experience accrues
(and, as
we

shall see, the world is not exhausted in the
multiplicity
of perceptions)
No other type of perception is available
to us.
To have the world partially in our grasp, to
have
.

it in the depth of a perceptual field,

is to "express"

it in a manner that brings it into being in ever new
ways

which emerge from our intersection with it.

But it is

also essentially to render the world partially invisible
-

hidden in the backsides, the insides, the horizons of

our perceptual field

-

and to elevate and subordinate its

qualities and dimensions in ways which transform, bend and

transgress its polyphonous and often cacophonous being.
One particularly apt word Merleau-Ponty uses to

describe originating perception is "jaillir" 57
shoot forth, to gush, to flash.

-

to

To perceive is to

experience the figure of perception shooting forth in
a flash which captures my attention and blinds me - at
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least for an instant

-

from the rest of the world.

For

Merleau-Ponty, there is a sense in
which all perception
is dramatic.
As my gaze is fixed on the
point of contact
between my pencil and the page, the
motion of writing,
the presence of the page, hovers
over and dominates the
room.
Most of the world plunges beyond
our horizon
into

invisibility.

if we are usually unaware of
this drama,

Merleau-Ponty argues that it is because we
tend to lose
ourselves and the profundity of each instant,
in the

world which is revealed through continuous
experience.
We take this latter world as simply there,
yet

it always

originates in the perceptual field which gushes
like
spring out of our communion with things.

a

Summarizing the turbulence and transcendence of
things, Merleau-Ponty writes:

[Visible things] are always behind
what I see of them, as horizons, and
what we call visibility is this very
transcendence. No thing no side of a
thing shows itself except by actively
hiding others, denouncing them in the
act of concealing [masguer] them. To
see is as a matter of principle to
see farther than one sees, to reach
a latent existence.
The invisible
is the outline and the depth of the
visible. 58

However, this "masking," this "denunciation" which
is the essence of the visible,

reigns eternally.

is not that of a God which

Rather the perceived world is

"

wild

Being " (L'Etre sauvage) J7 and depth vacillates like the
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surface of a raging ocean, as
figures emerge and submerge
in the flow of experience.
As the face of an other with
whom I am conversing seizes the
perceptual field,
the

being of third persons, the clock
on the wall, the fly
buzzing against the window pane as
well as the facial

expressions which my present rendering
eclipses, do
not resign themselves to their
subordinated background
presence, but rather contest the field's
organization.
Things coexist as "rivals" in my perceptual
field,
ceaselessly upsetting its balance, imparting
perpetual
life to perception rather than subsuming
themselves neatly
in a vision that is "once and for all."
"Things dispute
for my gaze; and anchored in one of them, I
feel
in it

the solicitation of the others which makes them
coexist

with the first
to exist." 60

-

the demands of a horizon and its claim

My perceptual world, one dominated by the

animated face of my friend, is "coherently deformed" as
the clock almost leaps off the wall.

the other,

I

Now

I

barely hear

barely see him; the other struggles over

his loss of hegemony as

I

realize,

"I'm late."

And

I

am late, but the sudden expression of this truth, like
all truths, cannot but transgress other aspects of being,

like a storm cloud which brings darkness and lightning
to the world deep below.

itself unstable:

I

The newly structured world is

do not leave before
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I

swat a fly.

However, the world he describes
is not one of
incoherence in which the surface
transience of experience is its greatest depth. He
does not describe a world
that is predominantly discontinuous completely made
and remade - from one instant to
the next.
Rather, the
depth of our experience of the world
which renders things
both -there" and open to new and
different perceptions,
also ensures that there can be a degree
of continuity to
our experience - that it can cohere
and elaborate rather
than be ontologically doomed to proceed
as a succession of

discontinuous differences. 61

The figure which currently

dominates my perceptual field harbors in the
depths of
its background horizons the other things which
surround
it and hence implicitly implies them.

it is this mutual

implication of other things and other experiences in
the depths of each thing and experience that maintains
a continuity in our experience of the world.

The importance of this basic coherence and continuity
of the clearing cannot be overestimated.

It is this which

holds open the possibility that we might develop our perceptual and conceptual relationship to the world rather
than simply abandon ourselves to a nihilistic succession
of "differences."

It is this which allows that our

different experiences, no matter how discordant, might
speak in the conversation of our existence and offer us
the possibility of developing a greater understanding
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of ourselves, others and things
in the world.
this basic

Without

belonging-together-in-the-same-"there" of our
experience, existence could be
nothing but a gauntlet

in

which we would never be able to
rise to our feet.
Depth
vacillates like a raging ocean, but
as inhabitants of
this sea we simultaneously experience
the marked cohesion
of this massive fluid.
If Merleau-Ponty depicts "a world
of teeming

exclusive things which could only be
taken in by
means of a temporal cycle in which each
gain is at
the same time a loss," 62 this is not to
establish the
foundations of a philosophy that affirms all
perceptions
as "equally valid." Some perceptions
express the world
better and transgress it less harmfully than
others.
Those which close us off from different others
and close
us to the possibility of different experiences in
the
future transgress the depth of the world in a way that

fundamentally violates depth itself.
"coherent deformation"

-

Transgressions

-

that bring forth a dialogical

encounter with the world and maintain an openness to
the future are on the other hand

essence of depth itself.

If

I

- as

we shall see

-

the

see in the person before

me only the possibility of extracting surplus value,

I

am clearly transgressing this person far more and in a

way that is quite different than if

I

recognize in the

other a being which transcends me with her particular
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aspirations, pleasures and
desires.

The world itself

continually makes clearer the
relative values of our
perceptions as it "crosses out"
those perceptions that
prove to be unsustainable upon
further contact.

Yet even

perceptions which are sustainable
contain an ineliminable
transgressive quality. To render
the world into the depth
of the clearing is not just
to "deliver"
it into the open,

but to "rend" - in the sense of
to tear it open.
One of
Merleau-Ponty's most important insights,
it seems to me,
is that perception is unavoidably
63
a "violent
act."

However, the depth of the "there"
which always
violates things as it expresses them,
is equally that

which maintains the openness of our
experience and
provides the possibility of new perceptions

which reveal

dimensions hitherto dis-regarded.

The backsides, the

backgrounds, the horizons of my perceptual field,
absorb
my senses into the thickness of a fertile and
protean
soil capable of nurturing new visions which
unfasten old

closures.
I

Through the temporal elaboration of experience

can become aware of differences and otherness to which

had previously been oblivious.

But the will to eliminate

transgression from each and every perception, to be

present all at once to all differences, is unwittingly
the will to express nothing

-

to let no difference figure

on a ground.
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All of this discussion has
thus far taken place
at the level of experience.
Yet we are already closer
than we may think to an ontology
of "depth Being."
if
we have put forth such a lengthy
portrayal of MerleauPonty's discussion of experiential
depth, it is not
simply because of its intrinsic
value - although there
is a great deal of this - but
also because it
is in

keeping with Merleau-Ponty

'

make a direct ontology. "64

s

contention that "one cannot
"For how would we speak of

Being, since those beings and shapes
of Being, which
open to us the only conceivable access to
it, at the
same time hide it from us by their mass
"65
Instead,
we must proceed through a careful examination
of beings

and experience in order to "advance obliquely"
towards
an ontology of this elusive Being. 66

Understood in

this light, Merleau-Ponty s work at least from the
'

Phenomenology of Perception on can be seen in retrospect
as part of his working out of an "indirect ontology"

which supports his final work, but also requires the
final unfinished writing to show that the earlier effort
"is in fact ontology. "67

Presently the task at hand is

to discern the trajectory of his final work in an effort
to illustrate the way in which he gathers together his

earlier insights into an ontological development that

significantly deepens them.
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In a "working note" entitled
"the

dimensionality

-

»

senses' -

Being," Merleau-Ponty ponders
the

relation between "the sensible" and
Being in a way
that is extremely insightful and
opens the door to a
discussion of his ontology. He writes:
What is proper to the sensible ... is
to be representative of the whole
not by a sign-signification relation,
or by the immanence of the parts
in one another and in the whole,
but because each part is torn up
(arrachee) from the whole, comes
with its roots, encroaches upon the
whole, transgresses the frontiers
of the others. 8
This is a passage of great fecundity, for in
it MerleauPonty begins to illuminate the relation between
"the

sensible" and "the whole" (Being) which it represents,
in a manner that sheds a great deal of light on
his

understanding of the active essence of Being itself.
In stating that the sensible is "torn up" from the

whole, he indicates a profound kinship between the

sensible and Being, which is central to his ontology.
The sensible is not a phenomenal fabrication of a noumenal

being which is completely other than what we sense:
is it simply a violence we do to things.

nor

Instead the

sensible is a "part" of Being, and hence it speaks to us
-

if only indirectly through "the voices of silence" -

of Being itself.

The task of Merleau-Ponty

'

s

"indirect

ontology" is to "rediscover this world of silence" which
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speaks through the beings we
perceive; to disclose the
Being of beings in such a way
as to gain insight into
both our experience of things and
their transcendence our experience of beings as
transcendent.

Our exploration of the "wild
Being" of the perceived
world revealed a primordial layer
of experience which
is ceaselessly transformed and
deformed as it becomes
present in diverse depths. But what
is the Being of this
fluctuating yet coherent vision? What
sort of nature
is

open to such diverse renderings?

These are the questions

which Merleau-Ponty's interrogation of
"brute" experience
gives rise to, for the latter illustrates not
only the

untenability of past ontologies, but the pressing
need
for ontological reformulation as well.
We must approach his ontology carefully, for
even

the question "What is Being?" can lead us astray
if we

take it to gesture towards some sort of "in itself."

Merleau-Ponty responds to this question

-

and he does -

it is precisely by changing the meaning of each of the

terms; for "what," "is" and "Being," each harbor a

thickness and inertia stemming from their employment
in traditional philosophy which powerfully implies

ontological conceptions that he explicitly rejects.
To inhabit the question without transforming it is
to be carried along in

a

blindness that renders the

interrogation which the question mark calls forth
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if

meaningless from the start.

Hence,

it is crucial to

note that the governing idea of
Merleau-Ponty' s ontology
is that Being "Is not only
what it is." 69 Let us explore
this latter assertion more carefully.
In his interrogation of this
elusive Being, Merleau-

Ponty uses a cluster of terms;
however by far the most
important concept is "flesh." "Flesh
is what
lines' the
visibles, ^sustains them, nourishes
them.'" 70 Flesh is
that out of which the sensible is "torn
up."
it is that
which the visible transgressively presents.
Yet it
»

is

not itself a "thing."

Rather flesh is "a pregnancy of

possibles," 71 "polymorphism," a "latency,"
"openness"
most profoundly "depth" and "nowise a layer of

-

flat

entities or the in itself." 72

it is in this notion of

"pregnancy of possibles" that we begin to see the way
in which Being is not only what it is.

Earlier in our discussion we indicated that one
reason Merleau-Ponty calls being flesh is to emphasize
the commonality between the pulp of my body and that of

the world.

However Merleau-Ponty deepens this insight

significantly when he argues that the commonality is not
just one of "similar stuff," but "similar style" also.

Merleau-Ponty calls Being "flesh" because my bodily flesh
"is to the greatest extent what every thing is." 73

To

say that Being is flesh, is to say that the Being of

everything somehow resembles that of my flesh.
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Being

is called flesh in an effort
to evoke a quality - an

essential activity

which is most proxixnally
experienced
in my own flesh and further a
quality of which my flesh
is the most profound amplification,
what characterizes
my flesh, Merleau-Ponty maintains,
is its "reversibility,"
the fact that it is both sentient
and sensible. My flesh
is both a being; that perceives and
a perceived being.
it
is neither exclusively "in itself"
nor exclusively "for
itself," but rather - and more primordially both at
once.
It is both a field or clearing and what
appears in
the clearing. This flesh "is a relation of
the visible
-

with itself that traverses me and constitutes me
as
seer, this circle which

I

a

do not form, which forms me,

this coiling over of the visible upon the visible." 74

My flesh is not an inert mass, but a being which has
itself and other beings in a sensual field

- a

being

which is not contingently this way, but essentially
so.

I

cannot detach myself from the visible.

I

am

this essential activity ("Wesen," "ester") which is
the visible 's relation to itself such that a dimension
is cleared in which it appears.

This is the openness,

latency, pregnancy, depth of flesh

-

not just the flesh

of my immediate body, but (in a way that is very similar

yet very different) the flesh of the world as well.
Yet one will protest that rather than being what

characterizes the similarity between my flesh and the
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world, the quality we have just
described is precisely
what disting uishes the two.
is not to argue otherwise
to return to a strange philosophical
position resembling
early Greek hylozoism? in response
to this imaginary
interlocutor Merleau-Ponty explicitly
asserts that "this
7
is not hylozoism.
5
"The flesh of the world is not
selfsensing (se sentir) as is my flesh it is sensible and
not sentient." 76 However, in spite of
this crucial

distinction Merleau-Ponty nevertheless argues
that all
flesh is a mode of reversibility: all flesh

both appears

in the clearing and participates in clearing
the clearing.

In another working note we find:

My body is to the greatest extent
what everything is: a dimensional
this.
It is the universal thing
- But, while the things become
dimensions only insofar as they
are rec eived in a field my body
is this field itself, i.e., a
sensible that is dimensional of
" 77
itself
(My emphasis and his.)
r

Hence, this dimensionality of things

reversibility

-

-

their mode of

comes into being only when things are

presented in the sensual field of my body.

But this is

not to say that in the last instance the dimensionality
of things is simply a quality which
- a

I

impart to things

quality which does not belong to them as well.

If we

recall our earlier discussion, we note that our perception
of things - their appearance within a perceptual field
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is neither our creation,
nor a quality of things
in

themselves, but rather that
which emerges through the
intercourse between the flesh of
my body and that of the
world.
This intercourse brin s_f

S

^th_^^

J

that were only latent possibilities
beforehand.
thing's appearance does not lie
"in itself.")

(The

Yet

along with any thing's appearance
in the clearing, we
simultaneously elicit another essential
possibility of
the thing:
its dimensionality.
This dimensionality is
a dependent dimensionality,
but it belongs as essentially
to anything which appears as its
very appearance
itself.

Hence the Being of things is to not
appear to us
simply as inert beings within a perceptual

field, but to

participate in clearing the field as well:

to "repre-

sent," to make present (and thereby partly
conceal) the
Being of which they are a part. All things we
perceive

simultaneously give birth to the field they appear in.
Things and parts of things interact not just as "things,"
but by being "dimensions" through which other beings

(and

other parts of themselves) are expressed, brought into
being, presented.

Depicting this mode of reversibility

Merleau-Ponty writes:

"there is dimensionality of every

fact and facticity of every dimension - This is in virtue
of the

x

ontological difference.'" 78

it is this ontologi-

cal difference that is the depth of Being.
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Let us explore this a bit
more carefully.

The

dimensionality of the world is
perhaps most simply
revealed in Merleau-Ponty s
discussion of color in the
working note with which we began
our discussion
'

of the

indirect ontology of The VisihTo and Th^ Tn,n^
H
Yellow, he argues,

.

is not merely a sensible
color but

"surpasses itself of itself" as soon as
it becomes the
color of the illumination, the dominant
color of the
field,

it ceases to be such or such a
color,

therefore of itself an ontologies function
apt to represent all things. 79

it has

it becomes

,

Yellow is a dimension

in the sense that it is not simply the
presence of a

particularity, but a sensible which opens the world
as
well:
it
...gives itself as a certain being
and as a dimension the expression
of ever y possible being
As the
illuminating color, yellow presents
the rest of the world, expressing
and transgressing it in the process.
However, dimensionality is not just
a quality of sensible beings which
so clearly radiate throughout the
rest of the world. All sensibles
are dimensional (to varying degrees)
in that they partake in opening
the perceptual field as a whole.
Perception is not first a perception of things, but a perception
of elements
.of rays of the world
of things which are dimensions. ..
slide (glisse) on these "elements"
and here I am in the world. °"
,

.

.

.

,
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When

perceive the room around me,
it is not present
completely and all at once, but
rather present through
various fragments which reveal it
to me.
it may appear
through my absorption in a Picasso
print on
I

the far

wall or through the close proximity
of the page I am
absorbed in as I write.
each case the sensible which
is torn out of Being and "figures"
in the perceptual field
presents the room as a whole:
for example, I see "room
through my absorption in the page." I
"glisse"

m

on the

page and enter the world through it - a room
which is
highlighted and shadowed, amplified and muted,
and in

general appears with a certain significance endowed

largely by the page.

If I meet a large man with a

knife on a dark street, he does not just appear
before
me as a human being in the visible.

His appearance has

an "ontological function," it reveals the world around
me.
I

My openness to Being takes place through this being

encounter.

The world springs forth as Dangerous and

everything around me is revealed as primarily either
an enhancement or an abatement of this Danger.

Hence

the "dimensionality of every fact"; a dimensionality

which along with the facticity of the sensible, is
"torn out" of Being and expresses everything which
it presents and everything it claims to be through

encroachment and transgression.
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As

have noted, this "reversibility"
of being
- the simultaneous facticity and
dimensionality of the
sensible - is central to
Merleau-Ponty' s understanding
of Being as "pregnancy of
possibilities," latency, openness and depth.
if beings were not this
reversibility
I

one might argue that Being was
infinite and never subject
to complete experience, but not
that it was a pregnant
openness.
Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza all
took this

approach to Being, conceiving of it as

a

"positive

infinity" which is effectively more than
we will ever
be able to know.
As infinite, the world is conceived
as a determinate endlessness (Unendlichkeit)
of which
we ceaselessly uncover small fragments
which leave so
much remaining in the dark. The visible manifests
only
the little pellicle of being that it is. The

invisible,

the unknown, is conceived as "a positive only
absent." 81

Given this understanding of being, there may be endless

cross-sections of each thing, but in each of these
views, everything would stay put in its own proper

place; everything would be present in the stillness

and "in itself" proportionateness of the Renaissance

perspective.

Each view

-

at least when cleansed of

prejudice would express perfectly
infinite.

But this is not

which Merleau-Ponty speaks.
"operative infinity":

a

fragment of the

at all the infinity of

His infinity is an

"the infinity of Of fenheit
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[openness] and not Unendlichkeit
[endlessness] "82
It is an infinity that
ceaselessly P rolif e rH-~ not
.

simply because there are an
endless number of crosssections we can make of any thing,
but because each
sensible, as a dimension, brings
forfch

into the visible,

the thing and world from which
it is torn in a new way
(partially transgressive) and thereby
establishes within
each being and among beings, relations
which are not
simply those belonging to things "in
themselves" (which
at most could be endless) but relations
of re -presentation
which multiply by ceaselessly giving birth
to both the
visible and an ever-replenished pregnant
reserve in the
depths of the invisible. This reserve is not
just a

hidden thing which can be revealed, but

a being,

which,

when made determinate will itself represent the
world
anew - coherently transforming and deforming the

world.

These relations of "clearing" within being make possible
and necessary an expressive-transgressive activity within

Being which is utterly other than the "in itself."
In light of this fact, Merleau-Ponty 's contention

that Being is depth begins to be comprehensible.

Depth

cannot ultimately be consigned to the side of a "for
itself" which must render the world in depth in order
to experience it.

No pellicle of the visible rests

passively "in itself."

Rather the intercourse of our

historical bodily flesh and that of the world brings
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forth a world in which each
part partakes in relati,.ons
of depth with other parts:
pulling things forth and
pushing things back in the depth
of the clearing.
These
relations are not secondary aspects
of things but belong
as fundamentally to things as
their very appearance.
Facticity and dimensionality are
abstract moments of the
reversibility which characterizes the
thingness of a thing
- that is, the depth, the "there is"
of things which
is

never that of a neutral visible.

in its intersection with

our body the sensible presents things,
but it does so in a
depth which maintains them at a distance;
repels things as
it brings them forth.

"Depth is the means the things have

to remain distinct, to remain things, while
not being what
I

look at at present.

the simultaneous.
or Being." 83

It is preeminently the dimension of

Without it there would not be a world

We might add, that with it the world that

emerges is "wild Being," a Being with an operative depth
that proliferates everywhere we look and maintains the

ineliminable otherness of things.

In marked contrast to

identifying thought, Merleau-Ponty argues that otherness
is the very Being of things and the world.

If identifying

thought remains oblivious to the uniqueness of depth, it
is because depth is the dimension in which things remain

other, different (and this is the basis of the possibility
of their non-possessed identity)
is not an accident,

.

This oblivion to depth

it is necessarily intertwined with
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sets of thoughts and practices
which are oblivious to the
otherness of things; thoughts
and practices which def
ine
the world as being completely
suited to possession.
opposition to this conquered world,
Merleau-Ponty posit s a
"different" world springing forth
in inexhaustible depth.
"[T]he look does not overcome depth,
8*
it goes round
r

m

it."

Yet Merleau-Ponty does not posit
a complete and total
otherness in the place of a complete
and total identity.
If things remain distinct in depth,
so too, they are
presented in depth, though never in the
purity
of an

expression without transgression.

There is a certain

complicity between the historical body and
the world,
but one in which expression and transgression,
like

Hobbes and fear, are "born twins."

which enables there to be

a

it is a complicity

dialogue between the self

and the world, but one which gives rise to
extreme

contestation as well as agreement.
It must be emphasized that all we have said about

the self's relation to the world extends to the self's

relation to its self as well.
own depth." 85

"I who see have my

(Indeed, as we have seen,

it is in

communion with the reversibility of my own flesh that
things spring forth as reversible themselves.)

"exemplar sensible"

I

As an

am not self-present simply and

all at once, but rather

I

am continually rendered present

in and as a depth which violates dimensions of my being
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:

just as it brings others towards
creative fruition.
I
never coincide with myself in
a complete self-presence,
and it is precisely this
invisibility and absence - which
characterizes even my most inward
experience of myself that allows me to open out upon
and experience a world
that inheres in its otherness.
A flat self-possessing
cogito could never allow a wild
mysterious world to seep
into its hermetically sealed
experience of certainty.
On the other hand, the deep
non-coinciding self is thrown
into the depths of the world. As
non-identical
it is

confronted with the task of creating itself
in contact
with its own and the world's otherness.

Depth:

The Dim ension of Being-With Others

Thus far we have explored depth as that which
most

characterizes beings and the clearing which emerges
through the carnal intercourse between the body and the
world.

Depth is the Being of flesh which continuously

coils over upon itself, giving birth to the visible

pregnant with the invisible.

Yet if the discourse were

to end at this point, it would perhaps obfuscate depth

more than illuminate it.

If the world were to break off

here, we would be far more Cartesian and far less deep

than we imagine.

For depth is essentially intercorporeal

it springs forth through our contact with others who are
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different.

m

absence of these others,
depth is^ot.
Hence, to speak of the
experienced world as deep only
or
even primarily in terms of
a single self's
communion with
the flesh of the world is,
once again, to flatten
depth.
It is to assume once more
the philosophical stance
of a
tradition which denies depth most
primordially in assuming
that we can speak of a self, a
world and their relations
in absence of others.
it is to assume that
philosophical
questions can and should be approached
most fundamentally
by probing the relations between
an isolated individual
and the surrounding world.
it is to perpetuate that flat
"I" which Virginia woolf sees
materializing across the
pages of a proliferating literature written
mostly by
86
men.
When Merleau-Ponty writes that those who
attempt
to construct phenomena starting from the
"solipsist layer"

"ignore the profoundest things Husserl is saying
to us," 87
he is speaking as usual not only or perhaps
even primarily
of what is important in Husserl 's philosophy,
but of that

which is central to his own.

For Merleau-Ponty (and his

Husserl) the isolated self, the "solipsist layer," is not
at all primary, but rather a "thought experiment intended

more to reveal than to break the links of the intentional
web." 8 8

Thus far we have discussed depth without

explicitly addressing others, in an effort to disclose
some of the primordial characteristics of our relationship

with the world.

Equally primordial
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-

and without which

we would not in an important
respect experience the world
in depth - is our relationship
with
others.

It is only

in elaborating the circularity
between our discussion
of depth thus far and our
relation with others that our

task will assume its true value.

m

approaching "the

profoundest things- Merleau-Ponty
is saying to us, we must
show not only that depth renders
possible our experience
of others, but equally that
others give birth to a central
dimension of our experience of depth.
Only then will „ e
kick the habits of the flattened "I" its flat
ontology,

ethics and politics.
We have shed light above on Merleau-Ponty
's comment
that without depth there would not be a
world or
Being.

He could equally have written that without
others who
are different there would be no experience of
this

"Etre profond."

As we have seen, the world is "there"

as a voluminosity of experience which opens up
as it is

rendered in a depth in which things appear as distinct
individuals.

However, Merleau-Ponty argues that prior to

"intersubjective life" there is no "there"
of a world in depth

-

-

but only anonymity in which "there

is neither individuation nor distinction. 89
a confused realm lacking differentiation,

and depth.

no experience

There is only

transcendence

The self merges with the world, the world

with the self, and hence neither emerges in its own
right.

It is only after the self is distinct for itself
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something as we shall see which
emerges simultaneously
with its grasp of others who
are different - that the
world emerges in its transcendent
depths.
Prior to this
there is only a "primordial
generality"^ lacking
-

the

depth through which things appear
"at a distance." This
is not to say that without
others who are different our
senses would cease to open out upon
the world.
For
example, I would still see the yellow
mass that is my
bicycle helmet. Yet I would not see
it as a thing
distinct from me and hence it would not
exist
for me

in the depth which separates it from
me and allows it
to be "there" in its own right. As
I have argued, depth

and distinction are co-originary
note,

.

what is crucial to

is that the primordial, distinction with
which

the depth of the "there" fully emerges

-

the primordial

difference which releases beings from "primordial
generality" and into the depth of the clearing

-

is

that between the self and all that it is not, which

bursts forth as the self confronts different others.
This is an insight of no small importance and calls
for further careful elaboration.

more clearly Merleau-Ponty

'

s

In order to understand

circular comment that "the

fully objective thing is based upon the experience of
others, and the latter upon the experience of the body,

which in a way is a thing itself" 91 we need to address
several issues.

First,

I

will very briefly summarize
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his discussions of what it is
about the nature of our
bodily being that opens us to the
experience of an
"other." second, I will discuss
the importance of the
"difference" between selves as essential
to the perception
of both ethers and the self.
Finally, I „ Ul discuss
the way in which our existence as
beings among different
others confers objectivity and depth
upon the clearing
to which we belong.

The modern problem of the other stems
from Descartes'
formulation of the cogito, in which the fact
that "I
think" is taken as the first absolute and
most fundamental
ground of my certainty. He argues that all other
knowledge is rooted in this transparent fact and has
the

status of being the cogito's mental judgment of its
representations.

Descartes himself avoids the solipsism

this position lends itself to through his "proof" that

there exists an undeceiving God, one who guarantees that
my most rigorous representations of the world and others
are not merely illusory, but representations of beings

which do exist in fact.

However,

for those lacking

Descartes' certainty in God, the existence of others
and otherness becomes a Problem.

If transparency and

pure self-presence are the ground which assures my

certainty of a being's existence (namely that of my
own res coqitans

)

,

then how can

I

possibly be certain

of the existence of another "for itself" - a being
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defined by its absence from me
insofar as
coincide with it? How can the
other

I

can never

be for me anything

but my representation (and hence
not truly an other)?
Our presence to others as such
is an unsolvable probl,.em
for the philosophy of consciousness,
and this probl,.em
is perhaps the greatest testimony
of its poverty.
Nevertheless it is a pervasive poverty,
one which dominated
the intellectual milieu from which
Merleau-Ponty emerged
and hence one which he felt compelled
to address. 92

However he does not, of course, address
the probl..em
on its own terms.
Indeed his approach to the
probl..em

demands a radical transcendence of the
philosophy of
the cogito from which it emerges. Merleau-Ponty
writes
"[w]hat is interesting is not... to solve the
problem of
the other" but rather "a transformation of the
problem." 93
The essence of this transformation is to ask not
how my

constituting consciousness can come to know of another
constituting consciousness, but rather how my bodily
being experiences another bodily being.

The secret

to the latter question, he argues, can be partially

illuminated by re-examining the way in which my body

perceives itself, for the perception of others "presents
us with but an amplification of the same paradox." 94

Unlike the Cartesian cogito which is completely

present to itself at each instant of its thought
to perceive itself perceiving

-
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-

able

the self-perception of

Merleau-Ponty's incarnate self is
characterized by a
certain absence. As my right
hand attempts to touch
the actual touch of my left
hand, the latter retreats
into the depths of my being
just as my right hand is
about to succeed. My body is never
completely present
to itself in the act of perception,
because perception
is an "ek-stase" in which the
self is thrown outside

of

itself and into the world (world in
this instance meaning
this visible body of self-perception)
Perception must
in part lose itself to gain access
to the
.

world.

in

this perpetual thrownness the self-as-sensing
recedes
into the depths of the figure of the
self-as-sensed.

My left hand is given as an animate sensing
thing, but
one whose sensing my right hand cannot be
completely

present to.

Hence Merleau-Ponty writes that "the

reflection of the body upon itself always miscarries
at the last moment." 95

This remark goes a long way, for it forces us to

abandon Cartesian self-presence and resituate our sense
of self in the depths of the world to which we belong.

The body's presence to itself has no absolute privilege
over its sense of the rest of the world, for

I

am given

to myself, as a part of the world and "I who see have

my own depths." 96

Because all that is present including

myself is "there" in a depth which presents an absence
as well, the fact that

I

am unable to coincide with
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the perceiving being of an other,
no more threatens her
existence for me than my lack of
coincidence with my own
perceiving being threatens my existence
for myself.
And
if I know myself as part of the
sensible world - as
an

animate being presented with a living
grip on the world then why, when I see other similar
animate beings, would
I not recognize them as "others"?
Indeed, it is because
I know myself as a "perceiving
thing" in the world that
I am able to sense and corporeally
understand that there
are "other myselves." Merleau-Ponty writes:
My right hand was present at
the advent of my left hand's
active sense of touch [in depth,
as we have described]
it is
no different fashion that the
other's body becomes animate
before me when I shake another
man's hand or just look at him. 97
.

My body is able to recognize an other when it witnesses
the latter livingly engaged with the world, intertwined

with the visible in a manner which bears an undeniable
human style.
But what sparks this sudden recognition of an other

living human being?

Though Merleau-Ponty never gives this

question as extended an analysis as one would hope for,
he addresses it briefly in various texts in ways which

are highly illuminating.

The central notion that runs

through these discussions is that the other is revealed as
an "other" when

I

encounter her difference from myself and
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.

my expectations.

Prior to the unexpected,
the strange,
the shocking encounter with
another, the other^s_such

does not really appear,

m

The vi.i h1o

Tm,^„„

Tnp

.

Merleau-Ponty writes:
Here is this well-known countenance
this mile, these modulations of
voice
whose styles is as familiar to me
as
myself.
Perhaps in many moments of
my life the other is for me reduc ed
to this spectacle, which can be
a
charm.
But should the voice alter,
should the unwonted appear in the
score of the dialogue, or, on the
contrary, should a response respond
too well to what I thought without
having really said it - and suddenly
there breaks forth the evidence that
yonder also, minute by minute, life
is being lived:
another p rivatP
world s hows throug h through the
fabric of my own and for a moment
I live it. ys
(My emphasis.)
.

.

'

.

r

It is then, the unusual which kindles our sense
of the

other, whether it be a direct difference of content
or
style, or an uncanny proximity ("responding too well")

which upsets established proper distances.

Merleau-Ponty

makes a similar argument in the chapter on "Dialogue and
the Perception of the Other" in The Prose of the World
"If the other person is really another
I

,

:

at a certain stage

must be surprized, disoriented" 99 (my emphasis)

.

In an

earlier work still, he emphasizes the discrepancy which
gives birth to our experience of the other in stating
that,

"the body of the other.

.

tears itself away from

being one of my phenomena, offers me the task of
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a

true

communication..... .100

what is crucial tQ

^^ ^

that we do not fundamentally
recognize others in realizing
that they are human beings who
are "the same" as we expect
them to be.
It is through this sameness
that the other
slides into the status of "one of
my phenomena" and hence
ceases to be "other" for us.
it is precisely
in others'

difference (here

I

include their shocking concordance

with us as well as their more straightforward
differences)
that we recognize them as "other" beings
who like
us

participate in being human.

Emphasizing the importance

of difference (here in the straightforward
sense)

in

giving birth to a mode of coexistence that is
distinctly
"there" in depth, Merleau-Ponty speculates that
[one] might even say that
what Heidegger lacks is... an
affirmation of the individual:
he does not mention that struggle
of consciousnesses and that opposition of freedoms without which
coexistence sinks into anonymity
and everyday banality. 101

With Hegel, Merleau-Ponty contends that the recognition
of self and other emerges simultaneously in the tension

between others who are different. 102
Being with different others pulls us out of anonymity
and hurls us into an intercorporeal world with depth and

distinction.

And at the instant that

I

become aware of

an other perceiving being, so too, for the first time,
I

become aware of myself.

As

I
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perceive the other,

»[f]or the first time, the
seeing that I am is for me
really visible; for the first
time I appear to myself
completely turned inside out under
my own eyes." 11"
^ S I realize that
uucit x
I "fimiroii
ngure" in <-v.
the perceptual field
of an other, I become distinct
for myself as
well.

The perception of self and other
spring forth together.
Indeed, the notion of my. self only
has meaning
in

contrast with other selves from which

I

am distinct.

Hence (following Lacan's analysis of the
"mirror
stage") 104 Merleau-Ponty completely
leaves the terrain
of the cogito which takes itself as
the starting point
of all understanding, and asserts on the
contrary that
the cogito emerges only through contact with
others who
,

are different.

Thus, though my body is such that it

prepares me to experience the other insofar as its own
self -presence can only be in depth, its depth should
not
be thought of as a "prior reality " upon which the rest
of our experience is based.

The body as depth being is

only realized with different others:

"The constitution

of others does not come after that of my body; others and

my body are born together from the original ecstasy" 105
-

that which occurs when they are thrown together.
As we noted above, this original ecstasy which gives

birth to the self that senses itself, simultaneously gives
birth to both the distinction between self and world, and
the depth of the "there."

However, at the same time that

250

our experience of others
inaugurates the difference which
releases us from "primordial
generality," the presence of

their perceptual opening upon the
world which we share
brings forth a clearing with a far
more textured distinct
"visible" and an "invisible" of which
we are far more
aware - in short a clearing with
a far greater depth than we could experience in absolute
solitude (supposing
that the latter itself was possible).

Indeed, the

presence of the perceiving other "confers
on my objects
the new dimension of intersubjective being
or,

in other

words, of objectivity." 106

Merleau-Ponty's elaboration of this insight is
perhaps sharpest in an early section of The Visible.
and The Invisible, which presents us,

some of his most fascinating writing.

think, with

I

Here he describes

the intercorporeal world through an analogy with the

world that springs forth in binocular vision.

The visual

images which each eye alone is able to render, deliver us
to a relatively flat realm of "phantasms," lacking both

the distinct presence and the latency which emerges with

the depth world that appears as both eyes focus together.
In the latter instance the different images of each eye

synergistically combine to produce a world which is
"there" in a far more convincing manner.

Similarly,

the different perceptions of others combine in communica-

tion xu

to bring forth a world which is "there" far more
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"

profoundly (thinking here of the
French "profond" which
also means "deep") than the
"private world" presented to
a single self:
"communication makes us witness
to

one
sole world, as the synergy of
our eyes suspends them on
one unique thing. "108

^

^

^^

phantasms could not compete with the
thing [seen by both
eyes], so also now one could
describe the private worlds
as divergence with respect to
the world it.sMf "109
As two persons are present to each
other in and through
the world that is before them, each
of the "private

worlds" which appear in their respective
perceptual
fields "is given to its incumbent as a
variant

of one

common world." 110

while each person becomes present to

this common world through the synergy among
others, no
one possesses it completely, for each field is
only a
"divergence.

The depth through which we come to witness a common

world does not homogenize our different perspectives any
more than the depth which emerges as we train both eyes
upon a thing demands that each eye have an identical
vision.

Instead, in both cases, depth emerges as the

being of things which both makes possible divergent views
and is called forth as divergences are brought together
or "suspended" upon one thing.

Depth is the dimension

in which differences join in a thing not to be squashed

and extinguished, but to communicate and give birth to
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a sense of the richness
and wildness of the world
which

far surpasses that which the
differences are able to
present in isolation. Depth
deepens most profoundly
not when two or more persons
realize that they see the
same world in the same way, but
in the tension which
arises as they recognize that they
see the same world
differently.
it is in the attempt to
elaborate and

communicate these differences that my
private world
must deepen in order to harbor that
which belongs to
the things I see while not having been
or perhaps not
even being present immediately before me.
As I attempt
to recognize the otherness of the
other's perceptions
of the world to which we both belong,
my world attains
a texture and latency that it did not
have before.
I

realize that the world
I

see,

I

am present to is much more than

far more "there" than my singular vision attests

to.

However, if the monocular-binocular analogy is ex-

tremely revealing in certain respects, we must be careful
not to let it mislead us.

The depth which emerges through

the synergy of our two eyes gives birth to a world which
is so convincing that we are almost never aware of our

single eyes as divergent visions.

Yet this is not so

thoroughly the case with the intercorporeal world which
emerges among different others.

Indeed, here there is a

ceaseless sense of discrepancy which gives birth to the
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1

world as such, but which is not
subsumed so harmpjiio^
within it. Rather, the social
world is that which
...envelops the individual,
simultaneously soliciting him
and menacing him... each consciousness both finds and loses itself
in its relationship with other
consciousnesses. .the social is
not collecti ve consriousness but
intersubjectivity, a living
relationship and tension among
individuals. 11
.

However, once again, this tension should
not be thought
of in terms of differences each of which
exist completely
in their pure self-same identity and
henceforth partake

in the commerce of discussion.

worlds

-

Our selves

-

our divergent

are variants of this intersubjective world
which

envelops us, and it is as variants that we are
different.
We are with others as variants of an "anonymous visibility" which "inhabits us both"; as different positions
in a

conversation of which we are not so much the constituting
agents, but rather beings borne along by this lively

being-in-tension with respect to which we are formed as
we attempt to specify our differences.

When Merleau-Ponty

writes that my body and others are born together in an
"original ecstasy" he conceives of our being thrown into
the world itself as an intercorporeal structure
The other's words, or mine in him,
do not limit themselves to vibrating
like chords the listener's machinery
of acquired significations....
Their

254

:

flow must have the power
of throwing
me in turn toward a
signification that
neither he nor I possessed
before. "9
It is perhaps here,

in rediscovering the depth
of

the clearing which emerges in
the intercorporeal world,
that we can most appreciate
Merleau-Ponty s Husserl and
the meaning of his comment that
"Husserl awakens a wild
world and mind." Merleau-Ponty 's
encounter with Husserl
reveals a world in depth which is
entirely obfuscated
by most western philosophies.
it is depth which is born
as the self becomes distinct as it
recognizes itself
'

in

its intersection with an other.

it is a depth clearing

which is far more "there" (both in terms of
presence and
absence) than that which might exist in
"isolation."

My

dialoqical relation with a different other continually
confers upon the world a distinctness and specificity

which it would never have if
alone.

I

were a being completely

(Non-dialogical relations have quite a different

effect, as we shall see.)

As we stare at the sunrise

our conversation brings forth a world with more and more
texture:

the greens near the horizon, the rays of light

flashing above the clouds which

I

had not seen before,

spring out of our dialogue and throw me into
cannot quit.

a

world

I

The agreements that are achieved among

different others combine in the world to multiply the
density, complexity and fertility of the figures which

appear before us, as well as our sense of reality.
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But

also, the things the other
sees there which

I cannot
quite accomplish in my own vision,
reveal the horizons,
the backsides of my own immediate
perceptual field. My
field harbors an invisibility
in its horizons which makes
it even more "there" than it
immediately appears to

me.

am struck by the world's transcendence,
its capacity t o
outstrip and resist my attempts to
grasp it.
I am brought
before a depth world that is other,
a depth that calls me
into a continual dialogue with the
natural world as well
as the world of others.
I

At this point it is perhaps helpful to
summarize and
clarify the understanding of the experience
of depth that
has thus far been presented. We began with
a discussion
of the birth of the perceptual field in the
depth of the

figure-ground structure.
a latency,

Here the field is presented with

an indeterminacy - a depth which is essential

and cannot be overcome.

This depth emerges as soon as

our senses open out upon the world and it is with us
until our perceptual contact with the world ceases.

Paradoxically however, Merleau-Ponty maintains that
the solipsist rendering of our perceptual field into

figure-ground is not sufficient to give birth to
"world" proper.

a

In fact, prior to "intersubjective

life" there is "neither individuation nor distinction"
in any "real" sense, no "fully objective things," no

"depth" in an important respect that is different yet
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related to that described above.

This is as we have

seen, because we do not become
"distinct selves" until
we become aware simultaneously
of others as perceiving

beings and the fact that we "figure"
in their perception.
It is this "distinguishing" through
which the world
emerges from its submergence in an
anonymity to become
"Etre profond" - a real "there" with
both particularity
and latency.
Through this distinction the world
"figures"
for me on the background of my body
(and vice
versa) and

as such appears as depth in the fullest
sense.

Prior

to this distinction particularity has not
been released

from the merging of self and world and latency
as such
is not experienceable since it lacks a
referent.

Thus

Merleau-Ponty seems to argue that while there are figures
and grounds prior to others, at this level we do not
experience the real distinction of what figures in our
field and hence we do not experience things as such.
If this is correct "Etre profond" is born when the

distinction and latency of our perception is "realized"
in the realm of intercorporeality

.

Dialogical being

with others continually presents us with the unexpected

polyphony and mystery of the world.
However, let us not sound so optimistic.

For

this intercorporeal world which brings forth depth

also menaces the depth of selves as it does so.

We

are so often flattened, torn up, obfuscated in our
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lives with others.

Yet this assertion ostensibly
has

an odd ring within the philosophy
we have just elaborated.
Have we not argued that the world
is essentially "Etre
profond"? What does it mean to speak
of "flattening"
in this context?
I will address this
question in two
parts, first indicating a couple of
places where MerleauPonty seems to indicate an awareness
of the danger of
some sort of flattening, and second,
by elaborating a

possible phenomenology of flattened being.
That depth itself appears at some level
yet unspecified

-

- as

to have an aspect of contingency

is hinted at in a passage we have already
quoted above

where Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the importance of
different
others and recalls "that struggle of consciousnesses
and

that opposition of freedoms without which coexistence
sinks into anonymity and everyday banality." 113

Were

the agonistic tensions and bizarre proximities of our

lives with others to begin to wither away in some sense,
the depth which is born in this realm would begin to

disappear as well.

Coexistence would move away from

the distinction and latency which characterizes the

depth of the "there," towards "anonymity."

If our

distinctive individualities were to be increasingly
normalized, rather than illuminating a world of depth,

our intercorporeal existence might increasingly present
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an anonymous flattened view
of the world - a view

perpetuated in

continual exchange of flat
agreement.
For Merleau-Ponty this is not
simply an imagined
danger, but a menace which is
steadily at work in
modernity's persistent attempt (in
a variety of forms)
to flatten the wildness of Being
with objectivist
understandings of humans and the world.
These
a

conceptualizations reduce humans to

a set of

trans-

parent operations which eradicate the
otherness in
others and ourselves and substitute it with
a thorough
"intelligibility." Yet it is not simply a
"misconception"
that Merleau-Ponty is concerned with, it is
an erasure
of Being.

Expressing this prospect, he writes that the

danger of increasingly
...set [ting] out to construct man and
history on the basis of a few abstract
indices (as a decadent psychoanalysis
and a decadent culturalism have done
in the United States) is that, "since
man really becomes the manipulandum
he takes himself to be, we enter into
a cultural regimen where there is
neither truth nor falsity concerning
man and history, into a sleep, or
a nightmare, from which there is no
awakening. 114

This is a strongly worded statement and it is

strange to read this philosopher of contingency speak
of what seems like the contingency of radical contingency
itself:

ing."

a closed regimen "from which there is no awaken-

Perhaps we have before us an exaggerated rhetoric
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designed to shock us into an
awareness of
Almost everywhere else Merleau-Ponty

a

great danger.

has argued that the

contingency which threatens us
equally prevents the evil
in the present from attaining
the status of absolute
finality.
Whatever the case may be with
regard to the
possibility of an "ultimate flattening"
however, what
seems quite clear with respect to
the quoted passage
is that Merleau-Ponty sees in
modern objectivist

constructions of human being

a

certain flattening of

being which at least works towards
as it proceeds.

ingly becoming

a

kind of closure

By taking ourselves to be - and increas-

the "manipulandum" we increasingly close

ourselves to the polyphonous character of our
being and
simultaneously close ourselves to the experience of

different others.

in short, we become increasingly

severed from the depth of the clearing.
But what could this possibly mean?

What might

Merleau-Ponty have in mind when he speaks of an anonymous
coexistence, a nightmare from which there is no awakening?

What could an experience of flat being be like?

Merleau-

Ponty does not pursue this question riqorously with

respect to the passages above, so we can only formulate
what he might have said in light of what he writes in

other contexts and in light of his philosophy as we
have explored it thus far.
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The only place Merleau-Ponty
attempts a phenomenology
of flat being is in his
discussion of hallucinations in
the Phe nomeno1 ogy of Percep tion.
While the flatness we
are concerned with will obviously
be different from the
individual hallucination in important
ways, nevertheless
I think one can argue
that objectifying and normalizing
theories and practices flatten being
in several ways which
are hauntingly analogous to that
of the hallucination.

What distinguishes the hallucinatory
thing from
a real thing in the world, is that
the former, unlike
the latter, is not a "depth being" (Etre
115
profond).

While the thing in the world is present in
a depth which
simultaneously prevents us from ever completely
possessing
it and allows it to remain distinct, the
hallucination
lacks a certain transcendence, and is "an
artificial world

answering to the total intention of [the hallucinator's]
being." 116

This lack of depth has several important

manifestations.

To begin with, while the real thing

is open to endless and inexhaustible exploration as our

senses move around its depth, and as we rend open our

current perceptions to more detailed examinations, in
contrast, "[the] hallucinatory thing is not.

.

.packed with

small perceptions which sustain its existence.

It is

an implicit and inarticulate significance." 117

It lacks

the "consummate fullness" of the thing in the world which

presents itself with textures, details and other sides
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that are implicit in the
horizons of my present percept
ion
though not explicitly before me.
contrast to thi s
fullness, which harbors the
invisible that both calls
forth and unfolds through the
temporal elaboration

m

of

experience, the imaginary thing is
"there" as complete
- a pure correlate of our intentional
being that "has
no depth and does not respond to
our effort to vary our
points of view. -1" It
completely as it is presented
in the hallucination, not as a
being with reserves.

^

Indeed, because its being is absolutely
complete and
lacking horizons, it is "played out on a
different stage
from that of the perceived world." 119
it is simply

there, superimposed upon the world, but not
existing

within it.

The hallucinator can find no paths to connect

the hallucination with the rest of his experience
and that
of others - it is wholly outside the intercorporeal
realm.

Because of this the hallucination cannot be successfully

challenged by others.

The hallucinator has an awareness

that the hallucination does not exist at all for others,
but that does not devalue it in the least:
the food refused by the victim
of hallucination is poisoned only
for him, but to this extent it
is poisoned irrefutably.
The
hallucination is not a perception,
but has the value of reality and
it alone counts for the victim.
The world has lost its expressive
force and the hallucinatory system
has usurped it. 120
,
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The hallucination is a "running
wild" (1'aff element)
of the body's perceptual power
to the extent that fragments of the world are unrecognizably
distorted,
or in

even more extreme instances,
the world is lost altogether.
The clearing no longer emerges
"through dealings with
harsh, resistant and intractable
world which has no
knowledge of us," but rather in the
fabrication
of an

isolated fictitious setting" 12 !

- a

setting which, in

the complete flatness of its presence,
is unsusceptible
to interrogation by the self or others,
and hermetically
sealed from the expressive force of the world.
In what sense can the anonymity of objectified
and

normalized coexistence be compared with the hallucination?
Clearly they are quite different insofar as the halluci-

nation is a private experience, while the anonymity to

which we refer is a collective phenomenon.

Furthermore,

the flattening in which we are interested concerns the

perceptual realm

-

not a "different stage."

of these differences however,

I

In spite

think the perceptual

field associated with objectifying and normalizing

practices acquires a flatness that is markedly similar
to the flat completeness of the hallucination.

Clearly

we do not mean that the perceptual field loses the

depth of its figure-ground structure.

However, as

our perception becomes increasingly normalized, this

structure becomes increasingly "frozen."
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The latency

of the perceptual world
which once solicited our
sen,
lses
and provided ever-new
perceptions of things, is more
and more locked out of the
foreground.
For example, for
many men, women may only "figure"
in the perceptual world
according to normalized objectified
indices of femininity
and sexuality.
The rest of women's cacophonous
being is
frozen in a background which,
for all practical purposes
may be inaccessible. Similarly,
as nature is reduced
to the status of "object," all
those dimensions which
do not fit within this general figure
are frozen out of
our experienced world.
The multiplicity of selves and
the world is increasingly closed out
by normalized

perceptions which intensify as they circulate
among
people in institutions, discourses and practices.
We saw that central to Merleau-Ponty

'

understanding

s

of the depth which emerges in the perceptual
field was

being as a "perpetual pregnancy."

Yet it is precisely

this which withers as our figures freeze.

What is at

the heart of the normalizing gaze is a denial of the

possibility of a background that might be surprising and
disruptive.

This gaze parades in a flat completeness

that is parallel to that of a hallucination.

As we

approach the world and others through this conceptual
and perceptual schema it becomes for us a being

increasingly lacking transcendence.

Yet as we have

seen, transcendence is the essence of the world for
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Merleau-Ponty.

Hence we become present to
something
that less and less has the
character of "world" in
the deepest sense, and more and
more begins to acquire
qualities of the hallucination.
Beings increasingly
appear as correlates of the subject in this case
collective - and in this mode of
presence interrogative
relations which might upset this basic
misperception
are less likely to arise.
Of course, Merleau-Ponty was not a
theorist of "one-

dimensionality."

As much as he was aware of the dangers

of flattening in which that which is other
than and in
the background of the established visible is
"locked out,"

nevertheless, what appears always does in fact appear

with a latency which though effectively locked out
not nothing.

is

Hence even as the world is flattened it

harbors the possibility

-

which can be reduced but

not extinguished - of resisting flattening modes of

perception.

Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty understood

the world to be full of tensions and contradictions

which counteracted the leveling tendencies he saw at
work in modernity.

Thus, while he viewed most western

philosophy since Descartes as operating within flattening
objectivistic assumptions, he was also well aware of
elements in Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche and
Freud which resisted this trend. 122

Similarly, within

the human sciences, while he believed that objectivist
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constructions were prevalent, he
also saw movements within
these sciences which he thought
contained the germ cells
of a radical reformulation. 1"
Again while he „as
aware of the violence and injustice
of

^

,

capitalism, it was

not for him a seamless reality:

history thus far remains

open.
If we take such pains to illustrate
the similarities

between the hallucination and
operationalized coexistence,
it is to underscore that what is
at stake in taking
this

latter path, concerns important aspects
of the depth of
the experienced world.
If the "unwonted" is in MerleauPonty's view essential to the depth of the
clearing,
it

is equally important to realize that the
objectifying

norm takes aim at this very depth.
What emerges from Merleau-Ponty

'

s

discussion of Being

as depth and the possibilities of flattening,

quite profound.

is,

I

think,

Implicit in this discussion are the first

steps of a path out of modernity's nihilistic inability
to affirm any values.
-

For the fact of the world's dep th

the depth through which things are "there" in the full

sense as visible and invisible with latency

-

far from

being devoid of value, implies a recognition and reaffir-

mation of the value of different others (who are willing
to make a similar affirmation) and more generally, the

otherness of the world.

For the singular self or the

collective subject which denies all difference, the world

266

is increasingly flattened
and supplanted by a complete

depth-denying presence.

The expression pf

that

they appear in the openness of
the clearing, demands an
affirmative valuation of otherness.
This expression
implies transgression; but it is
a transgression which
brings forth something into our field
of perception with
a latency in which the temporal
elaboration of experience
may bring forth previously transgressed
elements.
The
objectifying gaze brings forth no-thing and
makes present
a frozen image beneath which the
world - unrecognized -

held in a transgression that denies its own
violence and
seeks to eternalize itself.
In pursuing the phenomenological project of

exploring the origin of the world's wondrous presence
to us, Merleau-Ponty discovers that "principle of
an

ethics" which he adumbrates at the end of his prospectus
for the College de France.
as such,

As an ethic of the world

it provides us with an important step in

"revaluating values" and frees us of the nihilism

which necessarily accompanies objectivist understandings
of the world as simply and completely there (i.e., not

there at all)

.

Our bringing forth, listening to and

engaging with the depth of the world is,
fundamental value for Merleau-Ponty.

I

believe the

Empty?

Only for

those who, longing for "the complete," are oblivious
to the wild flowering fullness of the world which not
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only lies at the heart of his
philosophy, but is too the
deep spring of his celebration and the source of his
caution and sense of danger.
However, the recognition of
different others which is so crucial
to this engagement
is at this point quite vague.
In the following chapter
we pursue some of the ethical and
political implications
of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy in
order to elaborate the
sense of this recognition in terms of
our coexistence with
others

Ethics

a nd

Politics of

np.p th

Introduction
A great deal of Merleau-Ponty's work directly

addresses ethical and political issues.

However,

while he developed penetrating and lucid critiques
of some of the central ethical and political thoughts

and practices of our age, the affirmative directions of

his thought were left very far from being fully developed.

There are powerful and suggestive insights into these

questions in almost every text he wrote, but they call
for further thoughtful elaboration.
It is clear that Merleau-Ponty sought to develop

his theories of perception, expression and his ontology
in part, to provide us with fresh insights into how we

might live together as political and social beings in
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ways that minimize "terror"
in both its explicit and
more insidious forms.
it is no accident and
of no small
importance, that in the prospectus
of his work which he
prepared for his candidacy to the
College de
France, he

closes by noting that a successful
elaboration of the
"wonder" of expression "would at
the same time give us
the principle of an ethics. "124
Even

^^^^

saw published, a work on aesthetics
and ontology that
might seem far removed from ethics and
politics, is in
an important respect, an attempt to
reawaken the "brute"
world of the painter as a first step in
formulating an

alternative to the nightmare of "operational
thinking"
and being which threatens us in modernity. 125
But what exactly is the nature of this
nightmare and

what might be the alternative?

In this chapter

I

that the power of illumination which Merleau-Ponty

maintain
'

writing lends to an exploration of these questions far
exceeds his explicit attempts to address them directly.
Hence, rather than limiting the present discussion to

the latter,

I

wish to develop the ethical and political

implications of the philosophy of depth elaborated in the

previous chapter, and to bring into focus and distinction
his more explicit ethical and political insights within

this context.

Only in so doing does the richness and

depth of Merleau-Ponty 's work

- as

well as the necessity

of confronting it - become fully apparent.
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Some historians of ideas will
probably say that
what follows is not a faithful
remembrance of MerleauPonty; that one should stick to
a more literal reading.
But I do not wish - to use his
own phrase - to condemn
Merleau-Ponty to the "museum."
what follows,

m

I

take most seriously his view that
art, philosophy and
politics thrive not in preserving the
past by constructing
identical copies, but through "the duty
to start over
again and to give the past, not survival
which
is the

hypocritical form of forgetfulness, but the
efficacy
of renewal or

memory." 126

*

repetition,

Here

I

'

which is the noble form of

do not wish to record so much as to

continue the philosophical effort which still lives
and
breathes on each page - so long as we do not treat
them
as artifacts to be dated and located in an entangled
web
of dead relations. 127
In this chapter

I

attempt to draw out the ethical

implications of his understanding of the artist in order
to articulate a theory of the self and its relations
to the surrounding world.

Next

I

consider some of the

social and political arrangements which Merleau-Ponty

believed fostered flattening and hence were untenable.
I

then proceed to carefully explore the affirmation of

parliamentary democracy in an effort to gain ethical
and political understandings which extend beyond the

institution of parliament itself.
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Finally,

I

argue

that an affirmation of the self
as a work of art is
essential to shifting the function
of politics away
from the imperative of ever-enhancing
and legitimizing
reified systems of productivity,
towards an affirmation
of diversity and dialogue that
transcends "the existential
requirements of a particular political
order." 128
What sort of lives and social
practices would more
successfully recognize and affirm ourselves
as different
as well as different others? The
most superficial
con-

clusion one might draw from the above insight
is that
its realization calls for anarchical liberty:
let

everyone be absolutely free to express all
"difference."
Let each "become different" from one instant
to the

next.

Yet Merleau-Ponty is "not speaking in favor
of

an anarchical liberty," 129 for it simply denies
the

reality of

- as

well as the necessity of

-

confronting

the violence which springs forth in the interaction

between people who were not designed ahead of time to
spontaneously enter into harmonious relations.

It

assumes that human society is naturally a "community
of reasonable minds," whereas, the task of both philoso-

phers and political theorists is to "explain the upsurge
of reason in a world that is not of its making and to

prepare the substructure of living experience without

which reason and liberty are emptied of their content
and wither away." 130

The anarchist solution to the
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problems of freedom and difference
is simply to deny
that they really are genuine
problems of coexistence.
Hence they assume that coexistence
will be problem-free
- or at least that problems will
be reduced to a minimum if we just "let it be."
Yet there is no reason to
assume
that there would be much recognition
of otherness at
all

in a state of absolute anarchy.

We do not have to assume

Hobbesian "war of all against all" to
be suspicious
of the naive teleology in a theory
that posits such a
"natural" harmony.
Furthermore what "difference" would
there be to recognize in such a state of
absolute freedom?
a

As Merleau-Ponty has argued "[t]here is no
freedom in

submission to each shiver of opinion." 131

Such an

existence would most likely cancel its efforts from
one moment to the next; it would be more productive
of nothing, than difference.

The development of human

difference that shines forth as visible and demands
recognition, is not "natural," but the product of

careful elaboration of "styles" of individual and
social existence.

" Liberty

has to be made in a world

not predestined to it" 132 (my emphasis)

.

We might

say the same thing for the recognition of difference.
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Self as a Work of Art

Merleau-Ponty's self dwells in
the depths of an
ambiguous world that "ceaselessly
assails and beleaguers
subjectivity as waves wash round
a wreck on the shore. "133
Yet if at times we come across
some remarkable echoes of
Augustine in his conception of this
existence where humans
so often are "not a strength
but a weakness in the
field

of being,

»"4

his conception of nQW we might
understand

and craft our lives is nevertheless
very different from
Augustine's in some fundamental ways, when
Merleau-Ponty
turns away from the objectified world of
classical thought
and towards a fresh study of the embodied
self, he finds

no "source of intrinsic truth," no "inner
man." 135

Rather

he uncovers only a self inextricably
intertwined with

the world.
a society,

We find ourselves thrown into this world,
a

body with vulnerabilities and limits

- all

of which to a great extent we neither chose nor can
deny.

And there is no God to guide us, no nature in which we
find hints of a design or transparent purpose for which
to live.

Merleau-Ponty discovers depth, but it harbors

not even the muffled voice of a self-present God.

But

nor is this discovery that being is depth nihilistic
and empty.

To be sure, we do not discover a completely

articulated theory of ethical values and practices
through the ontological exploration of depth.

In fact,

the notion of a completed theory of ethics is antithetical
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to a philosophy of depth.

depth of being offers us

Yet an understanding of the
a

general ethical direction ; it

motions us towards an appreciation
of difference, dialogue
and style.

According to Merleau-Ponty

,

we are faced with living

our lives and transforming our
social world in ways which
articulate and meaningfully bring forth and in doing
so partially create - these general
values that he
finds rooted in our existence. And we
must do so in
the turbulent intercourse between the
self, others and
the world at large. We creatively bring
forth meaning
and value in our lives in "actively being
what we are
136
by chance,"
in plunging into communication with
this
historical world of nature and others which
penetrates
us to the cores of our being, and in attempting
to explore

and pursue the limits and possibilities it presents
as

well as strategies for change that enhance freedom and
the depth of being.
In an effort to further elaborate Merleau-Ponty '

understanding of this task and the ethical understanding
of our lives that emerges from his philosophy,

explore and develop

a

I

wish to

notion of the self as a work of art,

drawing extensively from Merleau-Ponty 's comments on style
and the nature of artistic expression.
As our body makes its way in the world it "gathers

itself together and begins to see, to understand, and
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to signify.- .137

Through our particular
inscription
the social and natural world,
through our successes and
failures in our attempts to
pick a path with our "fragile
body, in a language which has
already done so much
speaking, and in a reeling history "138
we each develop
a "style" of existence,
sedimented habitual ways of
perceiving, moving in and conceiving
of the

^

,

world.

it

is this style through which the
body interacts with the

world, unifies itself

- a

unity that is never total, not

that of an entity subsumed under a law,
and one which is
continually disrupted by new experiences
which challenge
it in different ways - and through
which others come to

recognize and communicate with us.

notion of style to Merleau-Ponty

'

s

So fundamental is the

understanding of the

body that he argues that the latter should be
compared
to a "work of art"139 not because our life ±s the
purely

self-conscious elaboration of an absolute subject, but
because each movement and perception is born in the wake
of and colored by the style (primarily preconscious) which

animates it.

Viewed from without, each manifestation of

one's style reveals "a way of inhabiting the world, of

handling it... in short, the emblem of a certain relationship to being." 140

We witness this style in another's

movement and perhaps even more profoundly in the paths
left by the painter's brush as she attempts to capture,
express, accentuate and bring to explicit life on a
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canvass, the world that appears
in her stylizing
perception.
From within, style does not
appear as
such, but orients and gives
form to the world one
perceives in arranging "certain gaps
or fissures,
figures and ground, a top and a
bottom, a norm and
a deviation in the inaccessible
plenum of things." 141

Style submits things to a "coherent
deformation"
which bends the diverse elements of
the world towards
a particular signification and
establishes in one's
movement and perception - one's work - a
certain "system
of equivalences," priorities and
privileged elements

with respect to which the world tends to
spring forth
before us. Our style should not be thought of
primarily
as something that is governed by our consciousness
but

rather as that which emerges at the point of contact

between the self and the world through the practices
and relationships into which the self enters.

in turn,

the world always appears to us through this style.

Style

at the most basic level is "preconceptual generality -

generality of the

axis ' which is preobjective and creates

the reality of the world." 142

consciousness

-

Intellectual and artistic

as we shall see in more detail below

-

emerges out of this preconceptual style, but the form is
not merely epiphenomenal

,

for as it attempts to bring the

preconceptual realm into explicit existence it actively
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transform this real*.

Hence they exist in a
relationship

of circularity.

Though most of Merleau-Ponty

'

s

discussions of style

are concerned primarily with
art and artists, and he
makes
little effort to develop an
ethic around the notion of
the self as a work of art, it
seems to me that when his
few comments on the embodied
self as art are thought in
relation to his more extensive
discussions of the artist
and style, some interesting insights
into the self and
ethics emerge.
If as he suggests, we should
think of the
embodied self as a work of art, the sense
of this thought
is not merely to indicate that the
living essence of the
body is style, for this understanding has
prescriptive

dimensions as well.

As embodied selves with sedimented

ways of being in the world we are all essentially
analogous to works of art, but we do not all live
artistically.
It is only when one makes this understanding of
the self
as art an integral part of one's existence, when
one

becomes self-conscious of one's being as art, and begins
to fashion a life and an ethic around this understanding,

that the self starts to become a work of art in the
fullest of senses.

The artistic self seeks not so much

to discover the truth of itself (since "truth" is always

revealed through one's style)

-

but to create meaning

and elaborate a style of existence in the nexus between
the self, others and the natural world.
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Yet the artistic self is by
no means fcQ be
of an absolute prescriptionless
freedom for whom all ways
of being are equally valid.
Merleau-Ponty s discussions
of the artist are not merely
descriptive, but contain what
is for him an exemplary
notion of the artist and
artistic
being more generally. They can
be read as thoughts about
an exemplary style in light of
which or by way of which
we might develop our various
different styles. This
notion of artistic being does not
give us meaning in
and of itself, but presents us with
broad contours around
which meaning ought to be artistically
brought forth.
<

Let us turn to his discussion of the
artist in order to
gain a better understanding of those
elaborations of style

with which Merleau-Ponty finds difficulty and
those he
holds in high esteem.
Thrown into the depths of the world, "caught up
in the push and shove of being," borne by a
time which

relentlessly carries me forth, "I take up
invent myself." 143

inventing?

a field and

But what is the nature of this

As his criticisms of Sartre illustrate,

it is not that of an originary subject - conceived as

nothingness
freedom.

-

who chooses his existence with an absolute

Rather this "inventing" is that of

a self

whose being is bound up with numerous accidents
familial, historical

-

-

bodily,

from which one cannot entirely

escape; accidents which color our opening upon the
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world.

»m

every life, one's birth
and one's past
define categories or basic
dimensions which do not
impose any particular act but
which can be found in
all.' .144
The task Qf
art st

^

.

^^^

f

^

^

work

of art is not to abstractly
project these givens
in order to attain some Archimedian
point of view that

would witness existence without
"distortion" and secure
a pure freedom.
Such a rebellion is an existential
impossibility and it is self-defeating
insofar as it
denies the particularities of oneself
and one's situation
through which the self opens out upon the
world.
in
contrast, the artist gathers the multiple
aspects of
his or her being together in an attempt to
explore and
express the possibilities they open. Of course,
this

"gathering" itself is not some abstract force, but

always already motivated and infused with that which
it gathers.

However, these "givens" do not impose upon

one's existence a determined static meaning but rather,
like the "accidents in Cezanne's life"

-

his nervous

weaknesses, his troubled eyes - which "present [ed]

themselves to him as what he had to live leaving how
to live it undetermined,

1,145

are the ambiguous text

one has to decipher and elaborate from.

Cezanne's fits

and depressions, his "schizoid temperament," instead of

existing only as something which wrenched him and those
around him, additionally acquires, when it speaks through
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his painting, a "metaphysical
*-ax sense
rmv of seeing the
^nse...aa way
j
world reduced to the totality
of frozen appearances,
with
all expressive values suspended.
Thus the illness ceases
to be an absurd fact and becomes
a general possibility
of human existence."
ent.e. 146
p
P7arin „ ^ temperament
Cezanne's
might have
incapacitated him, he might have said
nothing.
But his
artistic expression of the unusual
world that appeared
before his eyes, brought forth and
integrated this aspect
into his existence in a way that
enabled the peculiarities
of his life to contribute to and shape
a voice that
continues to significantly and interestingly
engage the
historical world in which it is situated.
Similarly

^

.

Merleau-Ponty writes:
The reason that Leonardo [da Vinci]
is something more than one of the
innumerable victims of an unhappy
childhood is not that he has one
foot in the great beyond but that
he succeeded in making a means
of interpreting the world out of
everything he lived. .he fashioned
his corporeal or life situation
into a language. 147
.

As embodied selves our existence of necessity must

confront the accidents which we find and which find us.
But as we noted, the artistic self does not allow itself
to be determined by these factors, either through obedi-

ence and simple acceptance or by a course of abstract
denial.

Instead it carefully elaborates a style in

a

continual effort at expression which "always goes beyond

280

brlnaingj^nt^o^^
meaning "^ (my empnasis)
Jn &
aU

what_it_ transform by

changes its

>

expression, even the most basic
perception, has this
latter quality. However, what
distinguishes the most
exemplary of artistic selves is
that they actively pursue
this creative effort in a manner
that recognizes the
nature of artistic expression itself the tensions and
inextricable relations between tradition
and change,

past,

present and future, one's accidental
characteristics and
what one longs to be, self and other and

seeks to create

within the tensions inherent to it. 149
Let us consider more carefully the nature
of this
artistic "elaboration of style." in the
relationship

between the self and its perceptual style we
discover
a circularity that is fundamental to
artistic work.

Merleau-Ponty's discussions of style often accent the
preconceptual level:

"perception already stylizes," 150

it fashions the world that appears before us, and it
is out of and with reference to this world, that our

intellectual and artistic consciousness develops.

Yet

is this to imply that all of the real work of existence
is already accomplished at the preconceptual level?

Are the artist's thoughts and works merely epiphenomena?
This would be strange given that his discussions seem
to indicate a conscious dimension of art that is important
in its own right and not identical to perceptual style.
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It is clear that in his
discussions of the "primacy

of perception," Merleau-Ponty
does not seek to "renounce
reflection. "151 As we illustrated
in an earlier section,

intellectual consciousness plays
an extremely important
role in his philosophy.
indeed, "without reflection
life would probably dissipate
into ignorance of itself
or in chaos. "152

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^.^

should be "ignorant of its origins,"
for its activity is
always vaguely portended - though
not determined - in the
perceptual field that emerges in the
intersection of the
body and the world.
"That convergence of visible and
intellectual vectors of the painting towards
the same

signification,

X,

perception. "153

is already sketched out in the
painter's

However, the sketches one finds at the

perceptual level harbor only broad motives

with indeterminate outcomes
tual expression.

-

-

beginnings

for artistic and intellec-

The stuff of artistic utterance does

not lie completed in the perceptual realm, needing
only
to be recovered like a pearl at the bottom of a deep

murky sea, but rather must be submitted to yet another

stylization

-

brought forth.

another giving of form

-

in order to be

This supplemental stylization at the

level of artistic expression is "the

x

coherent

deformation' by which [the artist] concentrates the
still scattered meaning of his perception and makes
it exist expressly. "I 54

Hence the artist interacts
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relatively with the world that
appears before her,
motivated by it, thrown by it, but
also

at the same

time bending, orienting and deforming
it in the attempt
to bring it into explicit existence
for herself and
others.
in order for the body to get a
perceptual
grip on the world, it must participate
in the "coherent
deformation- of the plenitude of its
surroundings, the

establishment of depth, priorities, figures
and grounds.
In order to get a grasp on this perceptual
world
itself

-

"making it manageable for the artist and accessible

to others" 155 - she must submit it to a similar
transfig-

uration.

Thus as the artist attempts to bring forth the

perceptual realm, she also re-creates it and contributes
to its making:

"there is no pure absolutely unexpressed

life in man; the unreflected [irreflechi] comes into

existence for us only through reflection." 156

The

artist develops within this ceaseless circularity.
As long as the artist remains an artist, for her,

her work is always in progress and never completed.

For

each expression of our encounter with the world brings
forth out of the depths which one can never overcome,

only a fragment of what there was to be said.

To be

sure, this is often an important fragment that really

"says something," but the silences which surround it,

the transgressed elements driven from or subordinated

within the work, speak of

a

tremendous plenitude of
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otherness which calls her to go
farther, to continue
the dialogue between the self
and the world that is the
life of the artist.
indeed, the world that
faces the
artist every day is not so much
that which has already
been caught in a phrase or on a
canvass, but rather a
"questioning" that wells out of the
depths which exceed
what she has thus far been able to
157
give voice
to.

This view of the artist stands in
marked contrast
to some other conceptions of the
artist's project.
In Renaissance and Classical theories
of painting for
example, the artist's task is excessively
reduced to
rendering the world present through the
exact techniques of perspective. Within this framework,
things
are submitted to a strict ordering which
denies "the

solicitation of the others" that are assigned to
the
background and, falsifies depth in totally silencing
the invisible of the visible

-

and its claim to exist." 158

Here reality is presented

"the demands of a horizon

"in the mode of the completed or of eternity," and rather

than "wild being," we experience a crystallized, tamed

world where "everything takes on an air of propriety and
discretion." 159

Yet this in itself is not the foremost

problem, for Merleau-Ponty does not deny that perspective

can sometimes be utilized to contribute to expressing

aspects of the world we experience (though he clearly
thinks painters like Cezanne and Van Gogh are far more
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interesting and successful in
portraying the lived world)
His main concern is that many
theoreticians of perspective
not only froze the world in
the picture, but attempted
to
freeze the historical world outside
as well, by claiming
that their "method" was the
absolute truth of
painting:

a truth which monopolizes the
historical foreground and

assigns all "others" to the obscurity
of the background
in a way which is strikingly in
accord with its artistic
activity.
Perhaps it is the thoroughness
of the denial

of contingency on the canvass that
motivates the attempt
to conclude history? At any rate,
Merleau-Ponty '

explicit statements are more cautious:

"These techniques

were false only insofar as they pretended
to bring an
end to painting's quest and history, to found
once and
for all an exact and infallible art of painting." 160
In contrast, Merleau-Ponty 's artist is never

finished.

And this openness to the future is inherent-

ly an openness to the past and others as well.

in an

effort to creatively express that which presents itself
so elusively and in such a scattered fashion, that

which has been washed over and hidden by the currents
of history,

in order to engage that question which shines

out of the things in the world before her, the artist is

thrown into a dialogue with the voices of the past and
others
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In searching "beneath
the imposed order of
humanity"^! in an attenpt

^

^

:ion

of appearances which is the
cradle of things, "162
Cezanne no more abstractly
denies tradition than he
does his troubled eyes or his
emotional makeup. Rather
he engages this tradition,
listening to and examining
its insights into the world
in an effort to bend it

towards new shapes and meanings
which better expres*>s
his existence and the appearance
of the world to h:
lim an existence and appearance
which themselves are formed
in part in the crucible of this
uneasy conversation
with tradition. When Cezanne is in
Paris, Merleau-Ponty
writes, he visits the Louvre every day.
But he goes
there as an artist, "in the joy of dialogue"
and
not

with a "spurious reverence." 1

"

He appropriates aspects

of geometry, geography, impressionism,
not in order to

mimic, but to bring forth a world which goes
far beyond
what any of these traditions recognized. The
exemplary

artist engages the efforts of those who have come
before
her as well as her contemporaries not as dead facts,
but
as voices and actions which live on in various ways in

one's own work and from which one cannot detach oneself;

voices and actions which throw the self towards certain

significations and away from others, voices with which
we must wrestle since we are nothing but particular

divergences in this historical conversation and struggle
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with others.

To actively develop a
style and actively
partake in the historical dialogue
requires a thorough
knowledge of the history which
penetrates us through
and through.
The past opens us to some
possibilities
for expression, but also
subjugates us and blinds us
to others, and it is in our
dialogue with it that we
attempt to further elaborate these
possibilities but
also to explore that which is
denied.
it is a quest on
of discerning which limits enhance
the depth of ourselve s
and the world and which act primarily
to flatten.

Our existence as art is in large part
the practice
of bringing into mutual confrontation
what has been
said and done by others and the particular
density of
our own being - our difference - which has
grown out of

this social milieu yet exceeds it.

"What we have to say"

both literally, in terms of immediate expression
and
figuratively, thinking of the self as a work of art

-

as

a statement - "is only the excess of what we
live over

what has already been said." 164

it is the things and

dimensions of things we are or can see and embrace

which seem important, empowering and have not been
seen, embraced or existed in the foreground before,

that our style attempts to express.

It is by rearranging

the elements of our milieu, changing figures and grounds,

placing things in "compositions which change their
meaning," utilizing aspects of our history in new
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ways, abandoning others,
juxtaposing terms that have
been kept apart, highlighting
tensions and contradicti,ions
that have been concealed, that
we transfigure the past so
that it may come to better
express elements of our being Pleasures, powers, relationships,
thoughts, desires - it
has previously not given
expression to. Hence the artist
"continues while going beyond,
conserves while destroying,

interprets through deviation." 165
Yet the transfiguring of this
engagement between
the self and its milieu is not so
one-sided, for the
self is transfigured in the process
as well.
in its

attempt to "say something" it comes to
understand and
create itself to an important extent in
light of the

other voices with which it is in dialogue.

it expresses

itself and takes form in a language - the terms
of a
tradition of understandings and practices - which

it

shares with others and the past, and in so doing
not
only bends this language towards new significations,
but also is "coherently deformed" itself.

which others speak and have spoken
strivings, their gestures

-

-

These words

their works, their

"do not limit themselves

to vibrating like chords the listeners' machinery of

acquired signification

Their flow must have the

power of throwing me in turn towards a signification
that neither [they] nor

I

possessed before." 166

Indeed,

the artist is so intertwined in and so constituted by
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this dialogue that he is
never able to say precisely
"what comes from him and what
comes from things, what
the new work adds to the
old ones, or what it has
taken
from others and what is its
own." 167
The history in which the artist
participates. .is the perpetual
conversation woven together by
all speech, all valid works
and
actions, each, according to its
place and circumstance, contesting
and confirming the other, each
one re-creating all the others. 168
.

We elaborate ourselves

-

our style - in this agonistic

interaction and hence this is where the
exemplary artist
explicitly seeks to dwell:
in continual dialogue with
that which precedes and surrounds her.
Yet let us be clear about this conversation
which
is the artist's being.

The artist's interest, concern

and engagement with others is not that of an
"I'm O.K.

you're O.K." "validation" of everything surrounding
her.
No,

it is much wilder, tougher,

fiestier than this.

The

artist listens carefully to, learns from and is thrown
by other voices.

Indeed, Merleau-Ponty writes of an

"obligation to understand situations other than my own
and to create a path between my life and that of others,
that is, to express myself." 169

But her response is that

of creative engagement, not flattery and polite accord.

The exemplary artist pulls together the world that appears

before her, the works and statements of others, in an
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effort to add a voice to the
world which sheds important
insights hitherto unrecognized
upon the world in which
we live - its depth and
mystery, its pleasures,
tragedies,
subjugations, sufferings. when
successful, her work
"throws our image of the world
out of focus, distends
it, draws it towards fuller
meaning. -"0 In tnis

Merleau-Ponty writes that the artistic
existence Moulds
others much more often than follows
them," is concerned
"with others become such that he
is able to
live with

them." 171

a society and politics constituted
around an
ethic of the self as a work of art
would see selves
in

relations of what we might call "respectful
tension" with
one another:
respectful in recognition that "the other
whom I respect gets his life from me as
I

get my life

from him"; 172 tension, because this life
we impart to
one another emerges when we intermingle,
"each from the

depths of its difference." 173

Merleau-Ponty is not elaborating a philosophy of
difference simply for the sake of difference, detached
from any sense of identity.

We do not become different

blindly and "for the hell of it."

Nor do we coherently

deform others' views of the world just to do so.

As

we saw above, we contest and confirm one another in
this dialogue that draws us beyond ourselves.

Where

we are in accord with what has been or is being said
by others, we affirm and elaborate this.
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Where we

sense what is missing or
subjugated in their statement
we encroach upon them in
an effort to push them
towardIs
what appears to us to be a
fuller expression of things.
There is a profound sense of
going beyond in his work,
but it is not a going beyond
grounded only
in itself.

Rather it is the depth of being
that calls for - among
other things - transfiguration.
it is the inexhaustible
reserve of otherness which continually
calls
the self

towards further engagement and equally
it is the hidden
undersides and unexpected dangers that
relentlessly haunt
our lives which demand that we "go
farther," that our
efforts continue. The interaction of
difference and the
effort to formulate new ways of thinking
and acting are
vital to Merleau-Ponty's understanding of
being as depth
and artistic existence, but they are
intimately bound
up with - though not subordinated to - an
affirmation of
the importance of identity.

As we have seen, it is only

through carefully elaborating

style that one is able

a

to engage the world in a most significant way.

Without

style, that is in part the product of conscious elaboration, our being scatters from one moment to the next.

One could say that pure difference is as flattening
and productive of nothing as is pure identity.

Merleau-

Ponty offers us a philosophy that affirms identity and

difference in their promiscuity

,

both necessary to bring

forth and engage the depth of the world.
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His own philosophy was
itself an effort well
aware
of its unfinished nature,
of the agonistic tensions
between the philosopher and
his milieu - but this
goes
equally for the interaction
among others more generally
he writes "we have yet
to learn the proper
uses of this
encroachment.- .174 It seems to
ffle
&

^

-

^^

this direction lies in this
discussion of the self as a
work of art. As we have seen,
the self as a work of art
in the exemplary sense is
self-conscious of its being
as art and is engaged in an
artistic relationship with
itself.
Yet this is not an artistic
relation guided only
by an abstract notion of
"creativity,., but rather one
whose creativity is guided by
Merleau-Ponty ' s insight
into the essentiality of different
others and the natural
world to both the self and artistic
activity.
It seems to me that some important
things follow

from this understanding.

Perhaps most basic, is that

this artistic relation to the self

-

f ar

the self-absorption so popular these days

different from
-

is always

significantly involved with others and the world.

As

Merleau-Ponty emphasizes at the end of the Phenomenol
og Y
of Perception people are but "a network of
relationships,
,

and these alone matter" to them. 175
is to attempt to fashion,

To craft the self

interrelate and separate, and

to some extent choose these relationships in a way that

creates the self into a provocative statement, not (to
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import Foucault's analytics)
a normalized being
that 1 ives
according to the truths
thrust upon it by
objectifying
and subjectifying discourses
and practices.
But given
her understanding of the
self, the self as a
work of art
must always exceed simply
having an artistic relation
to
the self and encompass an
artistic relation to the
world
as well.
indeed, the former without
the latter can be
little more than contentless
form - an utterly false
consciousness that denies its own
embodiment.

Another insight that follows from
this intertwining
of self, other and art, is
that alongside
the care for

the self that characterizes the
artistic existence is a
° are f ° r the other and the
natural world.
This is not
one last attempt to salvage a
thought that reduces the
value of the other to its beingfor-the-self - in this
case the artistic self which needs
different others
for its own development.
Such a conceptual collapse
is entirely at odds with Merleau-Ponty
' s
philosophy of

depth.

Rather the care of which we speak

depth which ultimately calls for it

-

-

like the

emerges from the

interworld, at the interstice of our differences,
in the
fact that we "get our lives from each other."

it seems

to me that while everything does not reduce itself to

this fact, it is no exaggeration to say that everything
is infused with it, and that a significant dimension of

artistic existence consists in exploring and seeking to
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enhance the vitality of others
Y
and *-u
this mterworld between
us
•

As we have seen, this
entails a respect for
others
but Merleau-Ponty understands
this in terms of an
often
encroaching engagement, not a
"spurious reverence."
If Merleau-Ponty speaks
of "moulding others,"
he does
not have in mind the
constitution of a simple
universal
identity or sameness. Such a
world of others is for the
artist a desert offering little
sustenance for creative
life.
The artist attempts to draw
people towards certain
ways of perceiving, thinking and
being, and away from
others; the politician seeks to
mould a national identity.
But central to these ways and
identities which Merleau'
Ponty S artist - Merleau-Ponty as
an artist - pushes
towards and embraces is a sense of an
artistic approach
to existence, a recognition of the
importance of different
others and a reawakening of our mysterious
bodily intertwining with the world - in other words,
identities that
bring forth and enhance the textures and
depth of our
activity in the world. Yet let us not underplay
the

importance of identity here, for this ethic only has

historical meaning to the extent that, as

a society,

we affirm and nurture it in our thoughts and practices.
It seems to me that society's identification with this

ethic is as crucial to bringing forth the depth of
the world and the artist's existence as are the
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differences that depth and
art entail.
it is this
very broad understanding
of identity and
difference
towards which the artist
attempts to move people.
(Again, the point is not
to reduce the artistic
project
to this effort, but to say
nevertheless that this is
an essential aspect of the
self as a work of art as
conceived of here.)
However, what is involved of
course is far more
than simply the realm of
understanding. Our lives are
directly shaped on the everyday
level by the institutions
and practices in which we
partake.
Hence the effort
towards a more artistic approach
to life demands a very
significant transformation of those
institutions which
objectify and subjectify around notions
of truth which
do far more to enhance an often
senseless endless,

disproportionately distributed productivity
and control,
than to enhance the quality of our lives.
These

priorities and practices as well as the larger
systemic
political and economic institutions with which
they

are interconnected must be changed if the self
as a

work of art is ever to be more than an idea in the
minds of a few philosophers.

"The problem is to find

institutions which implant this practice of freedom
in our customs." 176

With this problem in mind,

I

turn to Merleau-Ponty 's

political writings in order to sketch the beginnings of
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a

"Pontics of

aepth...

First

t

win

explore Merleau . ponty s
analysis flattening social
and political institutions
then explore his analysis
of democratic
politics in Ught
of the discussion thus
far.
,

Politi cs of n^p i-h
We have already seen that
Merleau-Ponty rejects
anarchism, arguing that it is
an untenable solution
because it simply ignores the
problems presented by
the human condition. An
equally superficial understanding
of the politics of depth
would be that capitalism, as
that system which supposedly
thrives on the competitive

struggle between "free" individuals
is the perfect social
mechanism for bringing forth the
difference and depth
of others and the world.
However Merleau-Ponty rejects
capitalism as well, for under the
guise of liberty,
law and individuality, he sees
hierarchy, exploitation,
unemployment, war and imperialism. Far
from simply
leading to a mutual recognition of both
the common

humanity and the otherness of others, people
approach
one another within the "free market" as
objects reduced
to use-value.

Class divisions do not give birth to an

affirmation of others' differences, but rather to an

obliteration of most people's difference, as society
takes forms that fashion people around the goal of
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enhancing an endless
productivity which is
dispropor .
tionately allocated and even
mo re disproportionately
controlled,
contrast to the Western
hu manis» of
capitalist societies, which
he believed

m

to be an

insidious ideological denial
of capitalists violence,
he advocated a

..humanism in *w- rri ~ nn which
acknowledges in every man a
power
more precious than his
productive
capacity, not in virtue of
being
an organism endowed with
such and
such a talent, but as a being
capable
?? self-determination and situating
himself 1n thP world.
(My emphasis
except for "humanism in extension.")
-j

Even in his later political
writing, in which he became
very critical of communist
revolutionary theory and
practice, he still emphasized that
"by this we in no
way imply acceptance of the eternal
laws of the capitalist
order or any respect for this order." 178
If not anarchy,
a number of years,

if not capitalism, then what?

For

particularly in the middle and late

1940 's, Merleau-Ponty thought that
Marxism offered not

only the best critique of bourgeois society,
but a tenable
alternative direction as well. He believed with Marx

that there was a possibility that the proletariat was
a "class of

men who, because they are expropriated in

present society from their country, their labor, and their

very life, are capable of recognizing one another aside
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from all differences
^ thus
rerences, and
founding humanity « 179
However, though it is clear
lear that uhe supported
socialist
production really
Y governed
hv the workers
g verned by
and a breakdown
of established hierarchies,
the modes of organization
that might best bring
this about are not
carefully
elaborated. While he attempted
to develop a reading
of events within the
Soviet Union which was
sensitive
to the way the contingency
of history made itself
felt
in a single revolutionary
country surrounded by
hostile
bourgeois states, he did not
see an embodiment of the
Marxian dream in Soviet reality.
it did not appear to
him that they were moving
toward a greater recognition
of humans by humans or
proletarian power, "0 though he
left open the question of their
future development.
Hence his affirmation of Marxism
does not take us
as far as we would like towards
a more developed understanding of the political and ethical
implications of
his philosophical formulations.
Nevertheless it is
.

worthwhile to emphasize that his Marxism
was not one
that was aimed at eliminating differences,

but rather

one that sought to create a world where
a greater

recognition of differences might exist.

When he writes

of the proletariat's "recognizing one
another aside

from all differences," this is of course, not at
all to
say that we should do away with all of our differences.

Capitalism on the whole levels people's differences
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(furthermore, the differences
it creates are
largely
flattening)
and paradoxically this
might facilitate
a recognition of
commonality. Yet it is
not
recognition of a common
homogeneous identity shared
by an, but rather a
recognition of a
human
capacity for "self-determination"
and the ability of
each to "situate himself
in the world" which
Merleau-Ponty
values.
short, to "recognize one
another aside from
all differences" is to
recognize that other's
differences
are not gua difference, the
negation of their humanity understood in terms of objectified
norms or productive
capacity - but rather expressions
of humanity as the
capacity for a degree of
self-determination. This is
at the same time a denial of
differences whose very
being is closed to otherness and
based on a fundamental
,

^

m

obliteration of other people's difference
(e.g., a
capitalist who recognizes workers
primarily as commodities
that enhance his wealth)
if the exploitation of the
.

proletariat was to foster a common recognition,
it was
most fundamentally a recognition that
no one is free

alone; that a greater level of self-determination
is

intrinsically intertwined with

a

greater mutual affirma-

tion of others' freedom, their otherness.

On Marxism

and difference Merleau-Ponty writes:
To be a Marxist is not to renounce
all differences to give up one's
identity as a Frenchman, a native
,
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of Tours or Paris,
or to
.into

the

for*™

worlQ^tiHirit

is indeed to

becol^aTt^f the
universal, but without
ceasing
to be what we are.
This
will
only happen through...
a meeting
at the crossroads of
actual
proletarians, such as they
exist
in the different
countries, and
not through an ascetic
internationalism wherein each of
them
.

.

for bein g a Msrvicf

.

™

However, Merleau-Ponty '
s belief that Marxism
might
lead to a greater recognition
of the capacity for selfdetermination and difference did
not last long.
As he
became aware in the early 19
50's of the Soviet camps,
the
persistence of extreme hierarchy,
authoritarianism in the
workplace and the persistent
unwillingness of the Soviet
communist party to allow a real
opposition, his comments
on the Soviet Union acquired an
increasingly critical
tone.
His changing evaluation of the
U.S.S.R. culminated
in a reassessment and rejection
of what he argued were
some of the theoretical foundations
of Marxism as well.

Merleau-Ponty 's critique of Marxism focused
on the
manner in which the latter squashed the space
within
which a significant opposition could exist.
He argued
that both its understanding of the relation between
the proletariat and the party, and its understanding
of the historical significance of this relation,
led
it to deny the importance and legitimacy of any
dialogical
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recognition of others who
externally
_
indeed, to view aU
external opposition as
a threat to the
development of truth in
history that must he
eliminated.
Merleau-Ponty maintains that
at the center of
Marxist theory is the idea
that the proietariat
is the
universal class which alone
ne reali^
realizes the universality
and seif-consciousness
that philosophers have
previously
only imagined. The
proletariat is to transcend
all
particularity, and Marx argued
that with its development
history has "finally put
world-historical, empirically
universal individuals in place
"182
of local

^

ones.

Finally history has produced
the universal subject.
Marx and Lenin were of course
well aware that this
universal subject is only a
"limit case," that in
fact the proletariat is divided
in a multiplicity of
factions, differing levels of
development and various
stages of self -consciousness,
"it is because

of this

that there is a need for a Party
which clarifies the
proletariat to itself, for a party of
iron, as Lenin
said." 18 3
attempting to express the historical
meaning of the proletariat, the party is
to take the
*

lead.

m

However, it is never to get more than
"one step

ahead," for the proletarians "bring the seal
of truth to
the politics of the Party" 184 and the party
must maintain

itself in a dialectical tension in which it
"establishes
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itself as the expression
of the working class
by making
itself accepted by the
working class. "185
Yet Merleau-Ponty
argues that this tension
is doomed
to collapse into
dictatorship largely due
to Marxisms

conceptualization of the
proletariat.
For Marxism as we
have noted, the proletariat
is the universal
in history.
Yet it is not a complete
realization of its universality
but rather a
universality-in-development which is
in a

continual process of self-criticism
and self-transcendence

(^taufhto)

Merleau-Ponty maintains that
Marxism
"concentrates all the negativity
and all the meaning
.

of

history^in an existing historical
formation, the working
class.' .186

m

so doingf

is totally self-critical,

in conceiving Qf a class

^

it lays the conceptual
ground

for denying the legitimacy of
all those who do not speak
and act as true representatives
of this exclusively
genuine negativity. As universal
negativity, the
working class "would no longer need
to be contested
from the outside. "187 Indeed, from
this standpoint
" all
that is other is an enemy nlBB merely
an attempt
to thwart the true universal.
This, of course, leads
to the exclusion of not only those who
make no claim to
,

speak exclusively for the working class, but
also those
members of the working class who understand their
present

conditions and desirable alternatives differently than
those in the Party who "truly" comprehend the "real"
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universality of this class.
working class as "universal

By conceiving of
the
in its truth"

(even if
it is not entirely
self-conscious of its
universality,
Marxism leaves no space for
the articulation of
a
multiplicity of divergent
perspectives, interests and

strategies within the working
class - differences which
it admits do in fact
exist and differences
which might
require endless tensions and
mediations. Rath er,
"universality" paves the way for
a reduction of this
Multiplicity to its singular
truth at any given moment
and since this reduction is
not accomplished "naturally"
within the working class itself
(history does not give
birth to a revolutionary
proletariat in the optimistic
fashion predicted by early Marx
and early
Lukacs)

,

it

is brought about and
"clarified" by a "party of iron."

Through the elimination of certain
tendencies and the
accentuation of others the proletariat
is led by the

party towards its true unified meaning,

while there

is supposed to be a continual
dialectical interchange

between the party and the proletariat,
Marxism's
conception of the latter is so singular
that

it cannot

tolerate the plurality of negativities which
is the
very essence of dialogue, and hence it abolishes
the

very space for the dialogical exchange that is
to be
the life blood and maximum guarantee of the
revolution's
legitimacy.

This leads to a very truncated dialectic
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or more accurately, a
dialectic that is terminated
in the
party which represents the
genuine negative and has
no
need for - nor can
n tolerah^
tolerate - an opposition.
The negative
is driven out of existence
as the party, in
gaining power
becomes a positive entity
which resists all criticism.
Perhaps at least at the
theoretical level, what
lies at the heart of
Merleau-Ponty s changed evaluation
of certain important aspects
of Marxism is the difference
between his interpretation and
what he finally believed to
be the Marxist interpretation
of the passage we discussed
above on the proletariat "recognizing
one another aside
from all differences and thus
founding humanity." For
Merleau-Ponty, this meant recognizing
the capacity of each
to situate him or herself in the
world; to not simply be
a thing determined by the world,
but, as a depth being,
.

.

'

to transcend determinations, to
proliferate the power of
the negative in one's being in the world.
The recognition

that Merleau-Ponty had in mind, was not
one that flattened
the depth and negativities of each into
a universal negativity, but rather one that sought to affirm
multiple loci
of negativity and to build a shared social
and political

movement through "a meeting at the crossroads" which
would
articulate common interests that might enhance rather
than erode the possibilities for different expressions
of being.

Such a notion was certainly not aimed at

eliminating contestation.

For some time he thought
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.

this idea was Marxist,
but his disillusion^
with the
historical develops of
co mm unis m and the
theoretical
reassessment this led to,
eventually brought ni m to
a
very different conclusion.
Inplicit in

^

his
is a critique of the
Marxist understanding of
"recognition
aside from all differences"
ao being
u«-s„
xrerences as
part of a theoretical

framework that concentrated
negativity into a class and the party that represented
it - while simultaneously
denying multiplicitous expressions
of its
existence,

in conceiving of recognition

aside^rom all differences,

Marxism fails to establish the
importance of difference at
the center of its understanding.
'

instead, at the center

were flattened notions of the
proletariat, negativity and
the party - all of which worked
towards the obliteration
of contestation among different
others, and indeed,

toward

the perception of "other as enemy."

Rather than a theory

which sought a greater affirmation of
depth, Merleau-Ponty
found significant elements of Marxism
to be conducive to a
situation where "t he open depths cln^ themse.l vp," 189
(my

emphasis)

A thorough evaluation of this criticism of
Marxism

would involve a theoretical and historical endeavor
that far exceeds the scope of the work at hand.

I

wish

to digress briefly in a partial defense of Merleau-Ponty

position only in order to show in the sketchiest of
ways that its value remains, in spite of some of the
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criticisms that have been
levied against it.
MerleauPonty has been criticized
for placing the
proletariatparty relation at the center
of Marxism in a manner
that misses the centrality
of many contemporary
Western
neo-Marxist attempts to shift
the primary level
of

analysis and focal point of
change from state power
to
the structuration of everyday
190
life.

It is said that
his criticism of Marxism
misses what is most important
about Marxism.
it seems to me that as a
defense of a

certain type of Marxism interpreted
along these lines,
there is some truth to these
criticisms.
However,

Merleau-Ponty's critique of Marxism
was not intended
as a wholesale dismissal of
Marxism, and certainly it
was not meant as a rejection of
all Marxism of everyday
life.
Rather it was a critique of the
philosophical and
political theoretical foundations of the
historically most
important communist developments of the
twentieth century
- foundations which Merleau-Ponty
thought were rooted
in

Marx himself.

At this level,

I

think, Adventure* of th.

Dialectic remains a work of extremely valuable
insight.
Furthermore, insofar as any viable movement for
change

must confront the political realm as part of its
strategy
-

we cannot wish this away

-

it is an important work for

Marxism of everyday life as well.

it has been argued that

Advent ures of the Dialectic is insufficiently historical;
that the collapse Merleau- Ponty describes which occurs
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when "the open depths close
themselves," cannot be
accounted for at such an
abstract level. "1 clearly
a textured historical
account would have greatly
enhanced
his project.
But again, this criticism
largely misses
the point. His discussion
is not so much an
effort to
show what "caused" the
particular development of
twentieth
century communism, but more
an attempt to illustrate
the

theoretical underpinnings and
problems that contributed
to this development.
Of course, the dialectic
between
texts and interpretations is
very important to this task
and this dialectic must be
explored in an historical
context in order to better show why
certain readings of
texts flourish and others do not
at particular historical
moments - a greater historical
dimension would
have

profoundly enriched Merleau-Ponty

'

s work.

Yet Merleau-

Ponty argues quite persuasively that
there is much in
the texts of Marx, Lukacs and Lenin
that contributed
to the theoretical and practical
developments of Soviet
communism. At this level his work remains
very important
- even if an historical account of other
circumstances

contributing to these developments would have made
it
more so.
But where does all of this leave us concerning our

inquiry into the ethical and political understandings
and practices which might lead to a greater mutual

recognition of depth and difference?
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Merleau-Ponty'

germ cell formulation of
an ali-Pm.f
alternative in Adventure
of the Dialectic only
goes so tar
i yueb
f ar in
in answering
thi.s
question.
Indeed, reriectmg
reflecting on
o„ his
ua
proposal he writes:
"This is not *a solution'
and we know it full
well. "192
He is right about this,
yet if considered closely
and
in conjunction with
other elements of his
philosophy
it gestures further than
many have realized ,

including,

perhaps, Merleau-Ponty himself.
Of utmost importance in
his defense against the
closure he saw occurring in the
communist left was
his support of democratic
parliamentary action, "for
Parliament is the only known
institution that guarantees
a minimum of opposition and
truth." "3
(This argument

applies specifically to parliament,
which is based on
proportional representation with a
minimal percentage of
the overall vote enabling a party
to gain representation.
It applies to a far lesser extent if at
all

to our

congressional system in which the "winner
takes all."
This latter system operates to exclude
minority voices
and to minimize their chances for efficacious

expression.

It severely limits - one might say cripples,
judging

from this country - political discourse.)

in contrast

to a communist politics which focused all negation
into
a single class - ultimately comprehended as a
unity -

Merleau-Ponty argued that:
We expect progress only from
a conscious action which will
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confront itself with the
judgment of an opposition.
Like
Weber's heroic liberalism,
it
lets even what contests
it enter
its universe, and is
in its own eyes only justified
when
understands its opposition.it 94
The foundation of any attempt
to improve things must
be
a recognition that no
one has a monopoly on the
negative
that
there are different others
with whom we must be
dialogically and critically engaged.
Parliament goes
further in holding open this
recognition than a "vanguard
party."
(m the most extreme situations (e.g.,
"starvation") Merleau-Ponty admits that
the latter may be the
best available alternative.)
Yet Merleau-Ponty 's support of
parliament is not
naively optimistic nor does it overlook
the ambiguities
and undersides of parliamentary
action.
in an essay
published nearly a decade earlier, Merleau-Ponty

underscored the problems with this institution.
"[W]e
know full well the means which the powerful
have at

their disposal

-

precisely under the aegis of freedom

of the press - to stir up currents of opinion
and

manifestations which paralyze a parliamentary majority"
assuming it is possible to obtain one. 195

He also warned

against
...comparing political democracy, in
which everyone is called upon to give
his opinion on abstract problems and,
above all, where a whole series of
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influences... come between
and legislative decisions, the voter
with actual
al
workers control on a
daily ?evel?^

Furthermore, he was extremely
skeptical about the possibility that an institution
dominated by the hegemonic
economic interests could bring
about significant change
At the time of this early
essay, Merleau-Ponty
maintained
that a greater hope lay in
a leadership like the
one
described by Lenin which
"presupposes a dialogue and
exchange" with the people. «7
As we have seerif
he

later argued that this position
is based on conceptions
which work to undermine its best
intentions.
However,
in affirming the importance
of parliament he did not

forget nor retract his earlier
criticisms of this
institution but rather urged the
non-communist left
to work against these practices
which undermined its
proper functioning. He thought that they
could do a
lot to counter "parliamentary mystification,"
which
consists in avoiding real problems or posing
them too
late or in ways which obfuscate far more
than clarify.

Beyond the problems which result from abuses
which might
be remedied however, Merleau-Ponty further
recognized
"the limitations of parliamentary and democratic
action

...which result from the institution." 198

Though he

does not specify these limitations in Adventures of
the Dialectic, he was probably in part referring to

his earlier observations on the inherent distance

310

parliamentary government puts
between people and many
of the decisions which
affect their lives, the
fact
that it is not a "daily.
forn of political activity
»ost people, the way in
which it opens the
possibility
of eloquent deceit.
These problems might be
reduced
but never eliminated as
long as national
parliamentary
politics plays a significant
role in political

^

life.

Nevertheless, he urges us to
accept them as the necessary
underside of a political institution
that on the whole
holds open the possibility for
both effective governing
by large groups of people
according to a majority and
recognizing different others, ambiguity
and contestation
more than any other of which we
know - an institution that
might contribute to maintaining
and enhancing the depth of
our coexistence.

Hence we see the manner in which
parliament is, for
Merleau-Ponty, what we might call an
"apparatus" which,
with its arrangements that help guarantee
the possibility
of contestation from day to day, might
help keep history
open and demand a greater recognition among
people.
As

an "apparatus," parliament holds open a door
through which

people can enter and partake in the heated dialogical

struggles over real life which actively contribute to
our

present and future and, as contestational acts, literally
hold the social world open.
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All this is of the utmost
importance.
Yet I suggest
that in addition to
parliament being an
"apparatus" that
helps ensure the possibility
of agonistic activity
whi ch
contributes to bringing forth
the world in depth,
Merl eauPonty's thought provides us
with another way in which
to
understand the institution of
parliament that is quite
valuable as well; and it opens
up fertile possibilities
for thinking about human
institutions and practices
more generally. Here we must
go beyond his explicit
discussions of parliament in order
to bring to the
foreground some of the theoretical
insights which
probably shaped his view of it and at any rate
shape the argument that follows.

At about the same time Merleau-Ponty
was writing
Adventures of the DialPctir he also
taught a course on
"Institution in Personal and Public History"
at College
de France, in which he explored the
notion of "institution" as a way of avoiding the problems
which arise
when philosophies of consciousness take the
constituting
subject and its object, the world, as the starting
point
of their investigations.
Of particular interest to our
,

current discussion of parliament is his conception of
"institution."

Most succinctly:

What we understand by the concept
of institution are those events
in experience which endow it with
durable dimensions in relation
to which a whole series of other
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or a history - or again
events which sediment in those
me a
meaning, not just as
survivals
or residues, but as the
invitation
to a sequel, the necessity
of a
future. 199
(My emphasis.)

This passage receives little
further illumination
that is helpful for us in
the sketchy summary
published
in Themes from the
Lectures.
However if we recall his
discussion of dimensionality in
The

Visihi.^^

invisible, it begins to acquire a
greater degree of
conceptual texture. There he argued
that all things
are not simply objects within
a perceptual field,
but also dimensions

:

meaning that they participate

in clearing the perceptual
field - in opening us to
it and therefore presenting it as well as appearing
in the clearing.

Yet while there is a dimensionality

to all facts, not all facts are equally
dimensional.
Some facts or events may participate in
the opening of
the perceptual field only for an instant
and then be

swallowed up by a movement of the world in which
they
become utterly insignificant. Other things
however,

things referred to above as institutions and elsewhere
as emblems - acquire such a significance that the

disclosure of Being may take place through them
throughout an entire lifetime.

Merleau-Ponty

describes this situation in a working note where
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he pursues an ontological
re interpretation of
Freu d
in which he argues that
"any entity [e.g., feces]
can
be accentuated as an
emblem of Being. "200
In other
words this entity or event
can become "representative
of Being" - a being that
is fixated in such
a way that
the "investment of the
openness to Being. .henceforth
takes place ^romhtti^Er^.^oi
In such a manner
an event, say of intense
subordination or abandonment
by someone deeply loved, may
disclose all of our
.

experiences henceforth in the light,
or "atmosphere,"
of an inferiority complex or
an inability
202
to love.

In these instances the investment
of the openness
of Being in a thing is understood
by

Merleau-Ponty in

negative manner as a fixed opening
which closes us to
the multiplicity of the world by
collapsing experience
a

towards a single dimension which ceaselessly
reactivates
itself.
Similarly in the case of social institutions
such as racism, sexism, authoritarian
structures of power,
sexual norms, etc., our field of perception
is fixed in

ways which flatten it.

The depth of beings withers in

these cases and the dialogue between the self and
the

world is narrowly constituted or effectively terminated.
Yet not all emblems are predominantly negative.

Indeed,

Merleau-Ponty elaborates his notion of the institution
in a far more neutral manner.

Institutions are events

which establish relatively stable dimensions that create
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an atmosphere and
illumination within which
future event
acquire meaning. Some
institutions can fortify
and enhance the depth and openness
of the world by being
embl ems
which illuminate precisely
these ontological qualities.
It is in this sense of
"institution" - in addition
to
the sense of apparatus
discussed above - that
parliament

acquires a particular meaning
within the context of
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy.
Parliament, as a central
institution in society
which is connected to all
citizens, can be an emblem
which - at least in the best
cases, elaborated more
fully below - endows experience
with a meaning which
is not so much that of a
particular being-event, but
rather more that of the depth,
openness and resistance
of the world; an emblem which
is representative
of

Being not in collapsing it to a single
dimension but
by investing the clearing in a way
that accentuates
our experience of the most fundamental
character of
the clearing itself:
depth.
Said again in a slightly
different way, parliament is an institution
which
in part discloses the openness and resistance
of the

"there" or "worldness" in the senses we discussed
in

the last chapter.

In this case the meaning which attains

durability and stability as it becomes

a

dimension is

precisely that of the depth of people and the world,
the incredible texturedness and transcendence of things
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fully present.

As an emblem

,

parliament contributes

to a disclosure of the
world that generates
a consensus
around this ontological
character of the world
and the
importance of recognizing
different others. This
is no
small deed, for Merleau-Ponty
<s worK - as well
as that
of others - has shown
us the multiplicity
of institutions
ethics, thoughts and
practices whose effect is
to flatten
radically reduce and close
being.
In the best

instances/

the institution of parliament
can be an emblem which
counters these institutions of
closure.

insofar as the institution of
parliament insists
that we confront oppositions,
it affirms that the world
is depth and always exceeds
the definitions given it by
one person or group.
This is not to say that the
best
understandings and courses of action
are necessarily

compromises between several different
positions, that
is, moderate positions.
many instances this is

m

not

the case and at any rate there is
no reason to assume it
is.
And parliament makes no such assumption;
it simply
asserts that because the world transcends
us, each must

maintain an openness to the world and different
others
who may reveal dimensions of the world that
we might
never have seen nor imagined alone.
In asserting
the

transcendence of the world and demanding that we face
oppositions, parliament also signifies the fundamental

error of those who refuse dialogue in favor of
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a

world

that is completely
contained within the
hounds of the
self's perceptions and
conceptions.
addition to
revealing that the being
of the world is
~~t also reveals the circularly
related importance of
the interaction among
different others in bringing
forth
the depth and fullness
of the world into the
clearing.

m

^

It is through this
interaction that we are
continually

confronted with aspects of the
world, events, and
proposals which remind us and
enhance our awareness
of the surplus of being that
escapes our knowing.
It is through these relations
that some aspects of

things are enhanced, multiplied,
given greater texture,
while others are crossed out and
still others held in
uncertain tensions - all of this
rending and rendering
the world "there" in an open
fullness which is quite
antithetical to the frozen figures of
objectifying
normalizing practices.
Of course, none of this is unproblematic.

We might

view all genuine contestation, primarily
as a feature
of "transitional ages" to be transcended
for the most
part when we reach a consensus on all
important

issues

in some unspecified future. 203

m

this case, rather

than revealing the depth of the world, parliamentary

contestation would merely reveal the deficiencies of
our age. Or, we might understand parliament only in
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pragmatic terms as the best
overall means of arriving
at reasonable legislation
to guide a nation.

Merleau-Ponty obviously rejects
the former posit:ion
for reasons that should be
clear
from the first chapter.

While he is sympathetic to
the pragmatic argument,
it i.s
not exhaustive of his position,
in which parliament i
-S
important as an institution
emblematic of depth as well.
Of course, the extent to
which it is emblematic of
depth
depends, in part, upon the
interpretations it receives.
Hence the argument we are presenting
is not simply a
description of things, but part of
an effort to bolster
an interpretation which enhances
the extent to which
parliament really is emblematic of
openness
and depth.

In this sense the interpretation
positively contributes
to the realization of what it
describes.

However, if the understanding of
parliament-as-emblem
is to move distinctly beyond being
a mystification and

legitimization of the present, if it is to
contribute
to the deepening and opening of the world,
it is necessary
that it not only accentuate certain hopeful
dimensions
of our present, but that it alert us to circumstances
in our world which threaten its further realization
as

well.

If parliament is to function as an institution

of depth in a manner that goes beyond mere reification

and abstraction, then it must also be operative and

meaningful as an apparatus, and this depends not simply
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upon parliament, but upon
other social historical
factors
as well.
If parliament is to be
an authentic emblem
of
depth, it must be an
institution that
facilitates
the expression of multiple
voices.
To the extent that
it claims to do this
while doing something
quite different, it in part becomes
a bad myth and takes
its place
in a regime of "truth"
and power that is linked
more to
subjugation than freedom.
Parliament cannot

i*^

live up to
its ideal of ensuring the
possibility of fair contestatio
as long as it is situated
within a society where wealth

and many forms of power are
extremely inequitably
distributed and yet play a very
important role in what
issues are addressed, the limits
of debate, who speaks
and who does not, who has access
to certain information
and who does not, the way the mass
media covers issues
that help generate opinions, etc.
it cannot live up
to its ideal of being a meaningful
forum as long as the
executive branch controls major foreign policy
issues

behind its back; as long as most of the really
important
economic decisions which affect hundreds of millions
of

lives in far-reaching ways are made behind the closed

doors of multi-national corporation boardrooms.

It

ceases to be meaningful when, as Lowi has described,

decision-making becomes entirely fragmented inside
"iron triangles" made up of people on congressional

committees, bureaucrats and powerful interest groups
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with little concern
ncern for
fnr the consequences
~
of their actions
beyond their narrowly
calculated balance

sheet.
it cea ses
to be meaningful when as with the U.S.
"winner take all
system of elections - minority
voices are utterly shut
out of congress.
it ceases to be meaningful
when - for
all these reasons and many
more - most people stop
voting
and far fewer still are
actively engaged in political
activity.
our current state of mass
disaffection and

m

political disempowerment in the
U.S., it is not clear how
much an emblem of depth parliament
really is or can be.
But the parliamentary emblem is
not non-existent,
nor is it simply ideological.
it also already functions
as a lever of criticism and
bolsters demands for change
towards a better world. The existing
democratic ethos
should not be underestimated.
it stands as an
ideal

worthy of support, one that involves far
reaching
reforms and major transformations in

important areas

of our society.

The realization of parliamentary

ideals goes hand in hand with other changes
that open

our social world to participation by and empowerment
of people over events which shape their lives;
so too
it involves creating greater space for different
voices

and ways of being to develop - as an emblem, parliament

enhances the durability of the depth which emerges in
this process.
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in one of his last
directly political essays

Merleau-Ponty alerts us to
another issue concerning
parliament which serves as
an important caveat to
the
discussion thus far.
In reflecting on
parliamentary
politics in France in the
late 1950's, his criticism
concerns not so much a lack
of openness, but the

lack

of anything much at all.

He writes sarcastically:

But what do checks and
balances
mean when there is no longer
action to check and balance?.,any
today it is necessary, in
continuing the criticism, to
reorganize
power.
Many stupid things are
said against "personal power"
or
•strong power":
it is a genuine
strength and personality which
those in power during the Fourth
Republic lacked. 205
It seems to me that this
passage provides us with

both a political and an ontological
clarification that
is extremely important.
While the world as depth is open
to different renderings, it does
not equal - it cannot
be reduced to - "openness."

Openness is not what is

"there," rather what is "there" has a
depth and is open.
Like checks and balances without any action,
openness

alone is nothing.

it is simply a recent form of that

persistent dream harbored in Western metaphysics of
being present - open - to the world everywhere and
at once.

It is the latest form of nihilism.

all

Furthermore,

the effort to define the world as openness alone is yet
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another .tte.pt to posit

a

world totally open to
Qur

attests to transfigure ana
possess

it:

totally without

resistanoe.

If Merleau-Ponty has
taught us anything,
it is that on the
contrary, we always open
onto the

«orld through the speoificity,
difference and limits
of our historical bodily
being, and likewise that
others and things are "there"
in a specificity which
in addition to being
open, resists - is not
open to many renderings, and demands
that we encounter them.
Our openness to difference is
not enhanced through
annihilating the specificity and
difference of our own
embodiment in order to simply
"be open to difference."
Rather it is by cultivating
ourselves in a dialogue with
the world and others that
acknowledges and affirms
the

specificity, particularity and
difference of our own
being that we open towards other.
Our openness to the
polyphony and cacophony of the world
is enhanced as we
become something "th^re" with distinction a distinction
which both invites and is capable of
participating
in,

profoundly dialogical existence with other
distinct
beings.
a

Hence parliament is not simply an emblem of
openness, but of the depth of the world through
which things

are both there and

r>p P n

y e t it

can be this only to

the extent that actions, initiatives and programs are

developed through this forum

- to
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the extent that

something is there.

To the
ne e
vt P nf
exte
nt that no programs
could be formulated in
this arena, it would
signify
™ore a lack of any =o MO
„ world than a world
of depth
Merleau-Ponty had in mind a
vigorous politics, one
which
would strive in a powerful
way to lead towards
greater
freedom and justice. The
new "heroic liberalise
he
advocated in his later works
was not a variation of
the self-effacing,
fence-sitting-by-nature, hear-all4.

sides-in-absence-of-any-position liberalism
that we are
all too familiar with. Rather
it was to be an "initiative
which gathers support. .. organizes
its own pedagogy, and

demonstrates

as it develops. "205

It was

fcQ

^

shape the political world according
to a vision of the
common good while remaining in
agonistic tension and
dialogue with those who contest
this vision.
Both
there and open, it was to hear other
voices - even be
"thrown" by them.
But its openness was to facilitate
its development as a dynamic "living
political power," 206
forcefully shaping itself and the political
world in
dialogue, rather than using openness and
dialogue as
an excuse not to be present with distinction
(more often
than not, forfeiting power to hegemonic
elements and

structural tendencies of the status guo)
an emblem of depth and to be

.

Both to be

an apparatus not only

for ensuring the possibility of contestation, but also

for creating social, economic and political conditions
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more conducive to
o cne
the bsinn
being „<=
of and creative
interaction
among different others,
it is necessary that
parliament
actually draw enough
differences together to
generate
action.
contestation is an extremely
important part
of Merleau-Ponty's
understanding of parliament,
but its
importance stems from its
place within the context
of
his philosophy of depth
being.
Contestation

for the saxe
of contestation alone, could
destroy mutual recognition,
communication and, in stifling all
initiatives, could
bring about the failure of
parliament as an emblem of
depth and its failure as an
institution capable of

generating a politics of freedom.

Contestation is an

important element in bringing forth
the social world
that affirms depth, but the latter
is the ultimate value
for Merleau-Ponty and it is not
reducible to contestation
alone.

Merleau-Ponty thought that for

a

short period of time

the Mendez-France government was able
to approximate some
of these ideas.
However, he realized that the effort to
bring about a significant and sustained
improvement in our
political culture would involve much more than
politics
alone.

society.

it would require important changes throughout

"The problem is to find institutions which

implant this practice of freedom into our customs." 207

Clearly he was thinking here of institutions in their

capacity to elicit and organize certain dialogical
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forms of activity, and
in their emblematic
aspect as
well, though he does net
specify what sorts of
institutions might enhance the
freedom of which he speaks.
Almost everything in
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy
gestures towards changes in
the institutions and
practices
of everyday life which
would enhance people's
capacity to
effectively shape their existences,
widespread worker's

control of production is clearly
indicated. 208
dees not develop a theory that
emphasizes

Though he

the importance

of local and regional control
of major dimensions of
economic, social and political
life, such decentralization

seems essential to "implanting
the practice of freedom."
Colossal institutions inhibit
active participation because
their sheer scale makes one's
efforts seem overwhelmingly
insignificant.
Vet our current local institutions
are

often too irrelevant to solicit
significant popular
involvement. Significantly empowered
local democratic
institutions would likely go a long way
towards confronting this problem.
Yet institutions alone are insufficient.

If we led

into this section on the politics of depth
by stressing
the importance of developing institutions that
would

enhance the possibilities of the artistic ethos,
it is

equally important in closing to stress the circularity
of this relationship.

The politics of depth requires that

those inhabiting parliament - and democratic institutions
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-re

generally

-

guide themselves ±n

ethos.

^

Qf

^

That is, decisions should
he aimed at creating the
preconditions and space for
human heings to creatively
and
analogically shape their
existences.
In absence of this
ethos, democratic politics
easily becomes a more
insidious
pretext for a flattening
politics.
We do not need to imagine
the latter, for it shadows
much of our contemporary world.
We are driven in modernity by an ethos that identifies
the "better life" with
an endlessly increasing
productivity.
Growth, calculated
in material terms, is seen
as the solution for nearly
everything.
Yet, as we learn from Foucault,
endlessly
increasing productivity demands that
more and more of
the self be drawn into the productive
apparatus - that
the goal of productivity proliferate
throughout more and
more of the social world - and even
if this can be done
in ways that are not as normalizing
per unit of output
as those methods currently hegemonic,
the pressures to

increase will demand further absorption of
the self,
further normalization and an eclipse of the
space

necessary to lead a creative existence.

As long as

we are governed by this god, it is very difficult
to

conceive of a flourishing politics of depth, even in
a democratic

(broadly conceived) society.

Hence it

is clear that we must tame the growth imperative and
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.

»ove in the direction of
a relatively steady
state of
economics
Yet this transformation
requires a new ethos which
both opposes mindless growth
and provides an alternative
sense of what is valuable.
i believe the self
as a work
of art is precisely such
an ethos and that Merleau-Ponty

had this ethos in mind when
he wrote of » a h^anis _i
JL n
extension, which acknowledges in
every man a power more
precious than his productive
capacity... a being capable
of self-determination and of
situating himself in the
world." 209 as we develop and inhabit
democratic institutions we ought to make decisions
in light of this
ethos,

for it beacons us towards an
affirmation of difference
and dialogue that is most appropriate
to the world as

depth.

Just as democratic institutions are

a

precondition

for the widespread proliferation of the
artistic ethos,
a lively and open democratic politics
requires the sense
of openness and distinction contained
in the artistic
ethos,

for without it debate flattens to the question

of productivity - and the depth of being flattens
in the

productive apparatus.

Instead of open forums we will

continue to have forums that are narrowly constituted
forums at war with that which does not fit

-

forums that

will be in great danger if their discourse exceeds that

required by the goal of productivity.
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Together, the democratic
ethcs and the self as a
„or k
f art set the stage
for a grand human
style, one which
embraces indivisibly all
the order and all the
disorder
f the world." 210
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Possibi

l

it-jps and

Dang egg

Whoever does not want to fear,
let
him probe his inmost self,
do not
11 th
surfa ^; go down
vourJ?^
yourself; reach into the farthestinto
corner of your heart. Examine
it
then with care:
see there, whether
a poisoned vein of wasting
love
of the world still does not
whether you are not moved by pulse
some'
physical desires, and are not
cauqht
in some law of the senses;
whether
you are never elated with empty
boasting, never depressed by some
vain anxiety: then only can you
dare to announce that you are
pure
and crystal clear, when you have
sifted everything in the deepest
recesses of your inner being. 1

\

have argued that Augustine's turn
towards an
inward seeking hermeneutical deep self
should be situated
in the context of his understanding
of the Roman Pagan
self.
Inhabiting the center of a conceited ontology
I

the pagan self, in Augustine's view, was
an imperialist,

driven at every level to flatten others and the
world
to their being-for-the-self.

In so doing the space for

that which was not the self collapsed in a conflagration

kindled and kept ablaze by the flaming gaze of vanity.
By directing the self towards its depths in confession

Augustine sought to deflate this vanity and reinflate
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^

exist free of the self
as unique signif
ications Qf
Vet it is too simple to
view the confessing-self
and the self of ontological
conceit as two types which
Augustine sees merely in
external opposition, while
this
latter dimension is extremely
important and indicates
what
is at stake for Augustine,
we must not lose sight
of the
fact - Augustine did not
lose sight of the fact that
the struggle between the
two selves is also one
which is
continually waged within the
Christian self.
indeed the
confessing-self is in large degree
defined^ its inward
struggle with its "other." The
confessing-self is not so
much defined by Truth and Goodness
in and of themselves,
but by the way in which one
struggles on the side of these
qualities to overcome the conceit,
evil, impurity within.
For Augustine, our fallen bodies
and souls contain an
endless multiplicity of lusts which
harbor ontological
conceits that continually threaten to
collapse the space
in which others can appear in their
glory as truly other
- as God signifying.
On earth, this struggle that is

confession can never end.
This is of no small importance, for this active

struggle defines the qualitative aspect of depth.
Perhaps we should call the confessing-self a being
of deepening

in order to draw attention to depth as

activity - in order to draw attention to the effects
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of depth which we must
consider more carefully a s
we
attempt to think about
Augustine in the context of
Foucault's work.

For Augustine of course,
the self that turns its
gaze inward strives to
discover, examine and decipher
itself in light of God's
truths, weeding out flattening
conceits, purifying itself in short molding
movements of its soul to God's
will.
As we have seen,
the confessing-self relentlessly
unifies itself around
this task and God's truths.
Augustine's faith in God
and scripture is unflinching
and hence questions about
the Christian morality to which
one conforms never arise.
To erase conceit is to discover
God within and become
receptive to the unique voices with
which surrounding
beings cry out:
"He made us." To convert to an existence that siqnifies God and to see in
all things His
Word, is not to sacrifice one's being or
the being
,

^

of things to God, but to actively affirm
that which

imparts being to all things.

And this affirmation of

the transcendental signified does not, in Augustine's
view, entail a flattening or levelling of selves or

things, for God's light on earth is polyphonous, each

being manifesting it in

a

different way.

Of course,

living according to God's light entails that the soul

adhere to his injunctions and prohibitions, but these
pull us precisely away from a flattened world and toward
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.

a

truer experience.

celebration of Hi*.

It is creation as .
multiplicitous
In God's li ght| the
effects of

confession can appear only as
beneficial.
However, in an age where
Christian metaphysics (and
metaphysics in general) is losing
its privileged position
as the universal Truth in an age where for

many, God
is dead, Augustine's conf
essing-self now appears in a
different light. The effects of
confession as a mode

of being must open themselves
to questions that were
concealed as long as being itself
was thought to be
designed by God.

For those who reject metaphysics,
there is a
distinctly monological quality to the
conf essing-self

Augustine's polyphony becomes, for Nietzsche,
monotony.
In an important sense, from a
post-metaphysical perspective there is only one significant voice
in Augustine's
relentless self-examination, and when he writes,
"Help

me so that

I

may see the truth about myself," his wish

is ultimately to hear one voice in that cacophonous

interior he calls the "great deep."

From this vantage

point, the quest for depth is a quest to rout out the

last traces of other voices in his experience of the
world, to surround them and penetrate them through

and through to their deepest depths until they cease
to speak, until they cease to be, until "you are pure

and crystal clear."

Of course this purity was an
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unattainable endpoint on
earth (Augustine died
.-cryi,
.ng
constantly and deeply" as
he read penance, but
as the
confessing-self deepened, it
approached ever closer
to m onological being:
a being no longer
distracted by
Pleasures, desires, thoughts
or sensations which did
not harbor the voice of
the one True God.
This Nietzschean reading of
early Christianity
overstates the extent of the
latter's reduction and

elimination of otnerness.
other-ne^e:
reasons

+T
n
it
underplays

(for strategic

am not concerned with at the
moment) the
space which Christianity opens
for appreciating others
as diverse expressions of God.
Nevertheless, it contains
an important insight that survives
its own exaggeration.
The space for being which is created
by Christianity is
- regardless of its merits relative
to decadent Rome thoroughly constituted by the one True
Voice, and this
voice seems in many respects both wrong
and narrowly
I

defined, in light of post-metaphysical
perspectives.
If there are many manifestations of the
voice of

Augustine's God, they all fall within

a

tightly

limited range, characterized by harmonious concord
and the unchallengeability of Christian morality and

scripture.

eradicated.

Discord indicates error and error is to be
In this sense it seems to me that there

is a great deal of truth in the claim that Augustine's

mode of subjectivity is largely monological.
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Augustine's

,

conf essinq-self
dprinhov^
g seit deciphers,
re-members and unifies itself
according to God's truth
in an effort to
extirpate ail
voices that might be
discordant with His voice,
within
the self God's voice meets
the voice of the other
as it
confronts impure desires and
pleasures.
But that this
meeting bears little resemblance
to dialogue is indicated
by the "nothing" to which
all that ls
is not in
in agreement
a
with God is assigned. The
conf essing-self is more
accurately characterized as a
site of inner confrontation
than one of inner conversation
(albeit often discordant)
for the encounter in depth
between God's light and that
which is_not, is marked by the
aim of absolute hegemony
of God's voice.
Within the multiple manifestations
of

God's light, there is a dialogue
in which the various
dimensions of God co-mingle to give
birth to deeper
truth.
Yet with respect to that which lies
beyond His
Word, there is only a monological
polemic - a ceaseless
attempt to silence the Other, and no
possibility
of a

dialogue in which God is illuminated in the
critical
light of his Other. The absurd ring to this
last

statement is indicative of the depth of its truth.
At the heart of the conf essing-self one can discern
an ontological conceit of a different kind than the
one

Augustine so perceptively criticized.

In this conceit,

human selves are not the implicit ground of Being, rather
God is the ground that establishes and secures the Truth,
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Good and Being of all b
eings.

Yet we are the highest

elements of his creation
and He made us capable
of experiencing and knowing Truth
and Goodness to a very
high
degree - even if there is
an incredible extent
to which
-ch of Truth renins concealed
and must be continually
deciphered.
indeed, God has made us
beings such that
we harbor His truth *ithi^
and He is
enough
for our fate so that we can
find truth and save
ourselves
if we truly will to do so.
"Return within yourself,"
Augustine writes, "m the inward
man dwells truth."
insofar as we should "obey the
voice of unchangeable
truth speaking silently within
the soul"2 one perhaps
can detect a certain humility,
but it is a humility
based upon a conceited ontology
that maintains there
is such a voice within us to
obey.
And it is precisely
the centrality of this voice and
this obedience that
gives birth to the monological character
of the

confessing-self.

in short the humility of obedience

wells out of a conceited ontology and
returns to
conceit when it repudiates even the possibility

of

that which is utterly other than His voice within
(in the sense that the latter, no matter how
demanding,
is "nothingness")

Augustine's confessing-self is an ambiguous
phenomena.
I

For he argues quite convincingly that what

have identified as its specific conceit and monologue
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- its

relentless inward journey provides . space
for appreciating others
and things that was
rapidly
disappearing for the pagan
self in late antiquity
Within what Foucault calls
the modern episteme
however
the conceit which lingers
on from two thousand
years
of Christianity is
implicated in a rapidly
narrowing
closure.
Foucault makes the case that
we are still
thoroughly attached to the
belief in a Truth which can
be discovered and obeyed.
yet with the recession of
God
from our world, man himself
becomes the uncertain ground
°f this truth - uncertain for
he inhabits a world, drained
of its telos, which continually
threatens to cut him off
from truth.
Driven by both his desire for
truth
and the

centrality of his uncertainty, man
in modernity endlessly
seeks to objectify and normalize
the social and natural

world around him

- to

make the other the Same.

(At a

more concrete level, this is driven
by socio-economic
and political imperatives for profit
and productivity.)
One could argue that there is

a sense in

which

modernity unites two ontological conceits
which bear
an interesting resemblance to those that
emerge from
our discussion of Augustine's work

-

both the belief

in a largely discoverable universal truth and the
belief

that man is the ground of the truth of things.

This

combination - and the fact that "man" cannot in fact

discover a truth that is able to sustain claims to
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universality for very long provides the
the "norm,., with a
mutability that allows it
to
shift as it is employed
in various power
strategies.
(Sex - that which must
be carefully
regulated,

psychoanalytically deciphered and
that which must
be freed - in advertisements
all across the nation.)
Put somewhat differently
the combination relativizes
truth to the latest demands
of man's productive
apparatuses and circumstances.
Yet this restless proliferation
of norms and the
instability of truth is only one
outcome of the interplay

between the two conceits.

Another frequent consequence

of this uneasy marriage of
modernity which Foucault is
less concerned with, is separation
and the destruction
of one of the members, namely
universal truth.
Sometimes
the atomistic self is unable to
tolerate even the claims
to universality which help establish
his hegemony,
what
is left then is man as his own
ground - or rather men, in

the absence of universals which united
them.

This leads

to atomistic struggles, and the most severe
reduction of
those who cohabit the social world to beings-f
or-the-self

Augustine described this process with remarkable acuity
in
general terms. Hegel and Marx are two who have analyzed
this dynamic extensively in its particular modern form.
Thus far, humans without metaphysical truths have most

often been self -aggrandizing humans, unlimited by past
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morals.

-,~4Their
lueii: qnriai
social action
•

iarn nn all
^ii
lacking
grounds

-

- has
in the worst cases
been "justified" by the
senseless and
horrifying £ on»s of fasoistio
aesthetic decisionis m which

Habermas, Richard Wolin and

ra

any others are rightfully

haunted by.
Both of these outcomes

-

the restless searches

for truth and various forms
of nihilism
among the defining features
of our age.

-

egoism

-

are

And both play

an important role in the
regular functioning of power.
As the former surveys,
regulates and coerces people
around norms that enhance
productivity, the latter

frequently deflects criticism and
thwarts

a sense of

responsibility for and commitment to
anything which
lies beyond the self.
The former obliterates
and

codifies differences while the latter
fosters an
oblivious indifference. Foucault, it

can be argued,

has not paid enough attention to the
salience and
dangers of the latter in his critical writing.
That
"man" may be "erased like a face drawn in sand

at the

edge of the sea" is dangerous and frightening
as well
as potentially attractive and provocative.

Augustine, writing in an extremely different age, had
a profound sense of the dangers of the ontological
conceit

that recognizes nothing beyond the self, and we would do
well to listen to his warnings carefully

-

even if his

alternative contains its own problems and is untenable

338

for us.

as we stand near the
edge of a world without
universal truths, we cannot
wish away or take lightly
the problems that tormented
him.
Beyond metaphysics
there are a variety of paths.
if we dance too Ughtly
over the edge we may again
discover the horrific, instead
of the possibility of our
freedom. Some recent theoretical
trends seem insufficiently aware
of this (e.g., this often
seems to be the case with
Deleuze and Lyotard. 3
)

Yet is it possible to provide
both an awareness
of those dangers and an
alternative to them without
Augustine's metaphysics? Can we
separate Augustine's
critical insight from his morality?
Better
still,

is

there a position from which we can
both recognize the
importance of Augustine's critique of
ontological conceit
and recognize the limits and
insufficiencies of Augustine
as well? A position from which we
can take and fortify
what is best in Augustine's morality - a
concern with
flattening and a move towards a greater appreciation
of

difference than the decadent version of Roman Paganism
while avoiding the monological character and arbitrary
limitations of this morality?
I

have argued that Foucault's work contains an

ethical alternative to the search for metaphysical

truths which avoids nihilism, egoism and indifference
(in spite of the fact that he rarely focuses upon these

problems in his critical writing)
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His artistic ethos

-

should be distinguished
from the decisionism
with which
some would like to
associate him.
Because Foucault's
understanding of artistic
activity is inextricably
connected to a great
appreciation of dialogical
encounters with others who
are different, his
artistic ethos is closely
linked to creating the
self, social, economic
and political practices
in
forms which would allow and
indeed engender such
experiences. This involves
fashioning the self
and social world in ways which
increase the space
for different others and affirm
the value of our
differences.
Far from leaving Foucault
without
any positive directions, his
position provides
a most important voice in
the discussion of what
values should govern personal and
societal
change.

Foucault 's ontology and ethics work
counter to both
conceits and provide us with a particular
humility which
is not that of humble obedience
to metaphysical
truths,

but instead, respectful regard for the
importance of the
dialogical situation with those who are different
and

differences within the self in the creation of ourselves.
He offers us the outlines of a notion of the self
as a

work of art which would not generate

a monological process

within the self aimed at establishing the One Truth in
depth, but rather fashion the self in part through a

careful internal conversation which would consider many
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dimensions of the spif
self and its
multiplicitous experiences.
And lff as we noted above<
August ne s hum uty
weii8
out of a certain conceit,
„. might say that
Foucault s
ethic is characterized by
a peculiar audacity
rooted in
an ontological humility.
Not being th>
•

x.

.

,

.

,

^ ^
^

truth, nor being self
sufficient, Poucault suggests
that
we dwell at the edge o,
our being, carefully
questioning
who we are in an historical
social ontology of ourselves
aimed in part at determining
where a transgressive
crafting of our existences might
enhance the possibilities
of our freedom and better
our lives, within Poucault
<s

ethos distinction is both
appropriate to the self (there
is no ontological providence
which predisposes us to
the "norm") and important if we
are to be valuable
interlocutors for others in their own
attempts to
artistically shape their lives and the
shared social
milieu.
This dimension of Foucault's thought
has been
missed by most of his interpreters, and it
seems that
there are a few important reasons for this.
Foucault
made little effort to make his ethics explicit
until
his later writings and even there he is quite
subtle

about the matter.

For strategic reasons, he carefully

avoided writing from a position that could be construed
to rest on another "truth claim."

In his "final inter-

view" in Raritan. he again made clear that he opposed
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the idea of a single
morality to be applicable
to
everyone.* He was not
terribly
who wished to dismiss
him as a nihiUst and
hence
not guard against passing
phrases which could fae
thusly.
Yet Foucault was „ ot
a nih

^^

.

ust

ethicai
stance which was central
to his work is precisely
an
attempt to stake out an
existential strategy between
universal morality and nihilism.
It is not a strategy
that has been well received
in a world where many
are

still yearning to discover
metaphysical solutions to
our problems. And it is a
strategy whose merits are
barely audible in a world where
dialogue and difference
are rigorously marginalized.

The differences between Foucault
and Augustine
are quite easy to discern. Those
between my readings
of Foucault and Merleau-Ponty
on the other hand are more
difficult to grasp. Indeed, I draw them
closer together
than would probably make either of them
very comfortable.
The Merleau-Ponty I describe bears little
similarity

with the philosopher-yearning for an originary
subject 6
or trying to reduce the world of difference
with a
phenomenological body 7

- to

makes cryptic references,
respects

- far from

which Foucault occasionally
in fact,

I

think in many

being at odds with each other

-

notions of an artistic ethos which can be discerned
in each thinker actually provide an interesting
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and textured theory
when they are brought
together
Nevertheless there are
differences between the
two
thinkers and they are
important and illuminating.
I will explore these
differences as they are
manifest
in three areas:
first, through a brief
analysis of
the rhetoric of "depth"
in Merleau-Ponty and
Foucault's
frequent attacks on this
word; second, through
a

discussion of the differences
which remain at the
ontological level between the

two thinkers; and finally,

by exploring loose affiliations
which might be drawn
between the former differences
and differences in
the political tendencies of
the two philosophers.
Foucault, as we have seen,
consistently avoids the
rhetoric of "depth." He is extremely
conscious of its
deployment within Christian metaphysics
and within the
numerous attempts in our age to
resuscitate a metaphysical

understanding of the world.

To touch the word is for

him, to risk triggering all sorts
of resonations which

might insidiously reinscribe his discourse
back into
those which he opposes as sham: confession,
Truth,

teleological unities which cohere naturally around
the depths of their singular centers, codif
ied-normalized
subjects, discoverable essences
of God.

-

the secret whispers

Depth is too inextricably tied in with this

constellation of things to be of any use in either
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criticizing this constellation
or worUn, towards
different discourses and
practices.

Of course, Merleau-Ponty
also aims his philosophy
in part against notions
that there are
pre-existing
truths that we need only
reflect or discover and
prefabricated unities that are
predestined to co me
into existence.
But for him, "depth" is
both
an

important term and a vital
metaphor,
large part>
Merleau-Ponty employs "depth"
in a manner that is
not concerned with whatever
echoes "depth" may import
from its use within Christian
metaphysics. He employs
it for its spatial significance,
in order, as I have
recounted, to return us to dense
living space, space
wildly intertwined with time.
Depth is the dimension
that pushes us most forcefully
towards a reconsideration
of our being in the world, a
re-consideration of the
birth of our experience of space itself
("originality
of depth"), while utilizing the
spatial connotations
of "depth" he simultaneously and
guite consistently

m

attempts to coherently transform the word,
reinscribing
it as a central figure in a philosophy
which reverberates

with words like "polymorphism," "latency," "transgress,"
"wild," "invisible."

At some point along the way spatial

depth comes to signify a living thickness
and sensing
a

-

-

both sensible

"overlapping" and "transgressing" itself,

dimension born simultaneously in our intercorporeal
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mi n gling with others

,

. dimension

^

which

distinct and other as
opposed to the di m ension
in which
things are objectively
eiy contained,
*
contain displayed
and possessed
in entirety.
,

Yet Merleau-Ponty does
more with the word than
utilize and coherently deform
its spatial intimations.
He engages certain resonances
"depth" has acquired in
Christianity as well. Echoing
Augustine, Merleau-Ponty
writes that "depth is the
dimension of the hidden."
Reawakening our sense of the
hidden, of the invisible
that lines and is an integral
aspect of the sensible
world, is a central theme for
Merleau-Ponty and "depth"
plays a vital role in the unraveling
of this theme.
Of course, what is hidden is not
"deep Truth"; rather
it is "hidden-ness" itself that
Merleau-Ponty wishes
to bring before us in an effort to
reveal an ontology

which recognizes the "obstacles" and
"resistance" that
belong to things - a protean world with
ineliminable
pregnant reserves. Beyond mere hidden-ness
however,

"depth" colors the hidden as wondrous and it
motions
us in the direction of a particular attitude
toward

the hidden - that of "wonder."

wonder is a certain reverence
for Being and flesh.

profound.)

And accompanying this
- a

profound awed respect

("Profound" means depth and also

Albeit this reverence is not for "His voice,"

Merleau-Ponty employs a word steeped in two thousand
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years of Christianity,
a word saturated
with reverence
as he calls us toward
different relations with
the world.
in spite of his important
departures from metaphysics
the broad sense in which
it is commonly employed
today, not the sense in
which he sometimes worked
with
it 8 - Merleau-Ponty
employs the rhetoric of
depth, in
part to salvage a sense of
mystery and awe that Christianity contained far more of
than we typically

m

find in
the secular regions of the
modern world.
For MerleauPonty - with Weber, "depoeticization"
and "disenchantment.,
is central to the problems
of modernity,
a new and better
ontology and ethics would have to
in part evoke poetic even reverent - attitudes. Foucault
on the other hand is
more suspicious. He conscientiously
avoids such things
in his writing - even as he
describes for us as well as
anyone ever has, the methods which
depoeticize our bodies
and disrespect our differences. Reverence
seems in his
view to have been too dangerous, too likely
to rekindle

teleological conceptions, universal truths, secret
strategies for subjugation, sugary disguises for
violence.
In his later work on Kant and enlightenment there
are

traces in his rhetoric of something like reverence
find words like "belonging" and "respect"
he is sparing.

-

-

we

but even here

Indeed, perhaps my development of these

themes in his thought pushes Foucault "further than he

wished to go himself."

346

This rhetorical difference
between these two
theorists is, I think, entwined
with differences at
the ontological level.
In an effort to highlight
differences, let us carefully
consider the following
passages.

^

The first passage, by Foucault,
is inescapably selfexplicit:
...we must not imagine that the
turns towards us a legible face world
we would have only to decipher; which
world is not the accomplice of the
our
knowledge; there is no prediscursive
providence which disposes the world
in our favour.
We must conceive
discourse as a violence which we
do to things, or in any case as a
practice which we impose upon them. 9

The second passage, by Merleau-Ponty
is more
difficult:
The phenomenological world is not
the bringing to explicit expression
of a pre-existing being, but the
laying down of being. Philosophy
is not the reflection of a preexisting truth, but, like art,
the act of bringing truth into
being.
One may well ask how
this creation is possible and
if it does not recapture in things
a pre-existing Reason.
The answer
is that the only pre-existent Logos
is the world itself, and that the
philosophy which brings it into
visible existence does not begin
by being possible it is actual
or real like the world of which
it is a part, and no explanatory
hypothesis is clearer than the act
whereby we take up this unfinished
,

;
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f ° rt to
conceit ??.f&

Wt.

and

We must read carefully
here, for if we do not
we may
come to the mistaken
conclusion that on the very
fundamental issue of "the world,"
Foucault and Merleau-Ponty
stand as complete antagonists:
The former denies that
the world is Logos, let
alone legible, while the
latter
discovers in the world a
"pre-existent Logos." Those
in search of transcendental
breath are allured
to

these words.

A comforting rhetoric that
settles us
back into our chairs after all
that blather about
violence, illegibility,
indecipherability imposition
and lack of favours.
So comforting in fact that
"pre-existent Logos" may be the only
words one
remembers or thinks about on this
entire page.
,

Yet this would be unfortunate, for
Merleau-Ponty 's

line of thought runs in a very different
direction than
that which is indicated by this phrase
when isolated.

Consider first the "world" which is this
pre-existent
logos.

He refers, of course, to the "phenomenological

world," the perceptual field or clearing, which we
always
inhabit, which, as he writes in the first sentence
of

the quoted passage, is itself not an "expression of
a pre-existing being,

that emerges

-

but the laying down of being"

in his later terminology - through the

intertwining of our flesh and that of things.
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So this

world does not pre-exist
our existence.

^

but is laid down

(And let us not forget
as

noted earlier
that for Merleau-Ponty,
"perception is a violent act.")
The phenomenological world
is only pre-existent
with
respect to philosophy and
philosophical activity does
not mirror the Logos of
this world - the correlations,
I

discrepancies, consistencies,
continuities, distinctions
which are revealed at the
intersections of my various
experiences and those between myself
and others - but
"brings it into being" as philosophy
attempts to complete
an unfinished world.
Philosophers
...do not rediscover an already
given rationality, they "establish
themselves" and establish it, by
an act of initiative which has
no
guarantee in being, its justification
resting entirely on the effective
power it centers on us of taking
our history upon ourselves. 11

As with perception, the philosophical
reflection which

further gives form to the world does not simply
express

possibilities of this world, it also transgresses others,
and as Merleau-Ponty writes in the closing sentence
of

this paragraph:

it "is a violent act which is validated

by being performed." 12

We should think of the "unfinished

world" as a very incomplete sculpture which requires that
we chisel, grind, sand and polish away some potentialities
in order to accomplish others.

And finally, nothing

begins by being "possible," but through the perceptual,
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s

conceptual or practical
activity „ hich transcends
the
given and lets -possibility"
appear in its wake.
Yet the rhetoric remains.
Just as Foucault
banishes "depth" from his
discourse, one cannot
imagine him touching
"pre-existent Logos" - even
in a somewhat defensive
paragraph like Merleau-Ponty
- with a ten foot pen.
There simply is no space
within
Foucault <s ontology for this
type of trope.
For
'

the
latter, discourse is a violence
we do to things.
it
is of course violent for
Merleau-Ponty also, but it
is not simply, violence.
Central to Merleau-Ponty's

understanding of our embodied
perceptual and conceptual
relation to ourselves and the world
is the notion that

in the best cases, things that
were "unfinished" and

"incomplete" can be "brought into being"
and "expressed"
in our intercourse with them,
spite of (he would
say because of his awareness of
"encroachment,"

m

)

"transgression," "concealment," he can still
write
that the best speech "frees the meaning
captive
in

a thing.

He can write of the "miracle of related

experiences." 14 There is a certain complicity between
our body and the world for Merleau-Ponty.

in the

overlapping of flesh upon flesh the world solicits
our gaze and our gaze responds.

Solicitation and

response are fraught with an ineliminable dimension
of discord and violence, but there is the possibility,
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and so.eti.es the
occurrence, of a certain
circumscribed
justice here as well.
Merleau-Ponty 's rhet oric and
the ontology which
reciprocally calls this
rhetoric
forth and is illuminated
by it . instills an
of the turbulence in
our existence, but
simultaneously
it never allows us to
forget the experience of
miracles
profundity and poetry.
It is a view which l ike
the most
fragile object of perception a soap bubble, or a
wave or li ke the most simple
dialogue, embraces indivisibly
all the order and disorder
of the world." 15

m^

..

The profundity of our experience
is not the expression of a "deep truth" which
would be our guarantee,
justification and measure.
it is brought into being
in a dialogue between human
lives and an inchoate

surrounding world, in which we do
not discover a
reason we could obey - even as we
experience miracles
but rather "become responsible for
our history."

-

It seems to me that Merleau-Ponty
's rhetoric and

ontology in which expression and transgression
are
intertwined is existentially and experientially
much
more appropriate than Foucault's nearly
exclusive emphasis
on violence and obstacle. One cannot read a
book like
Barry Lopez's Arctic Dreams, with its sensitive
portrayal
of the people, animals and plants of the arctic, the
ice, the sun,

and not be struck by the fact that in

this discourse there is a certain justice, an expression
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of things in which truths
and poetry intermingle.
It
is a text that calls
attention to the limits
and potential
violence of its own and
various other perspectives but
it is not a perspective
it makes any sense to
summarize
as a "violence done to
things." And there is
the civil
rights movement, the anti-war
movement, the socialist

movement linked with Eugene
Debs.

None of these can be

summarized adequately as violence
and I doubt Foucault
would disagree. However, I
still have difficulty
imagining how I could "prove" the
superiority of MerleauPonty's approach or even what a
"proof" might look
like

at this level given their
philosophies.

The status of their philosophical
agreements
points of overlap - seems a bit easier
to
define.

-

their
Both

agree that there is an ineliminable
degree of otherness,
difference, recalcitrance, pregnancy to
all things we
experience. Everything that we sense,
conceptualize
and act upon harbors a surplus beyond that
which we

acknowledge
to,

- a

surplus that is continually given birth

spills beyond and is transgressed by the identities

we formulate in an effort to capture things in their
entirety.

The sense of this view does not rest on some

sort of "correspondence" between it and some thing in
the world that it signifies which would guarantee its
truth.

Rather, its sense rests upon our sense of the

perpetual failure of concepts, categories, significations,
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norms to totally grasp
things.

Two tactics which Foucauit
repeatedly utiles for
provoking this sense of
bankruptcy
is to call our attention
to that which is
obliterated
or mutilated by our
categories and practices
(those
who do not work fast enough,
those who do not obey,
hermaphrodites, those who
masturbate, etc.) and to
expose the way in which they
actively and forcefully
impose themselves upon the
world.
of course, this does
not prove the (at least
partial) inadequacy of totalizing
concepts and norms per se, but
only that of those norms
and concepts which he debunks
(or those related)
By
showing us repeated efforts and
repeated failures however,
Foucauit seeks to prod us into
questioning the sense
of this history of Truth-without-excess
more generally.
Still, his counter to this history the notion that
.

otherness and at least a degree of violence
are inescapable aspects of existence which we
must dialogically
confront in our choices - can claim to be no
more than
a working assumption.

Merleau-Ponty also proceeds in part by bringing to
our attention that which is unacknowledged in
hegemonic

conceptions (e.g., in his criticisms of liberalism and
Marxism)

.

However, because he also addresses questions

of perception and ontology in ways that are more rigorous,

sustained and, in some senses, more basic, it seems to me
that he more successfully "secures" the points upon which
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he and Foucault agree.

„ e focuses much Qf

upon the inadequacies of
o bj ectivis t/ iden t i
fy i

ng thought

fierce, showing persuasively
that it cannot account
for
our most basic perceptual
experiences - or .ore si.ply,
experience itself. „ e has
convincingly demonstrated
that some notions or
of pvrpcc
excess - k^t,
background, depth, the
invisible - are necessary if
we are to begin to formulate
an understanding of our
existence in which experience
is at all possible.
He has shown us - at a far
more
general level than Foucault - that
every revealing
implies concealment, every expression,
transgression.
But that perception, discourse
and action are
"violent acts"? Here their footing
is more difficult
and any attempt to summarily
characterize the relation
of the visible to the invisible,
the spoken to that
which remains unsaid seems highly
questionable.
For
it is possible to think of perceptions,
conceptions and

practices where that which is eclipsed is so
relatively
insignificant or the eclipse so temporary that
"violence"
hardly seems to capture what is going on. Indeed
as

have argued to use "violence" in some cases

conjure our favorite examples

-

-

I

we can each

seems to begin to drain

an important word of much of its significance.

Hence,

it seems to me that if we wish to stick to what we can

know about the underside of what happens whenever anything
appears we must be satisfied with
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a

word like "eclipse

1

which may take the form
of an utter disgrace,
or on the
of sunlight for a few
minutes.

But

do not think that either
Foucault or MerleauPonty chose their metaphors
simply in an attempt to
shed
literal light on perception
or ontology.
Beyond what they
both know about "eclipsing,.,
their rhetorical choices
are
tightly bound up with questions
of ethics and politics.
Through his employment of
certain metaphors to describe
our fundamental relation to
the world (in the broadest
sense:
self, others, things) each
theorist attempts to
draw us towards what he perceives
to be most important
yet most lacking in modernity.
For Foucault, who had one
of the most acute eyes for
subjugation in this century,
this entails a sense that "everything
is dangerous."
Succinctly:
"l think that the ethico-political
choice
we have to make every day is to
determine which is the
main danger." 16 The rhetoric of discord
which colors his
I

ontology is aimed at instilling this lesson
so we never
forget it.

Merleau-Ponty also thinks that objectif ication
and the "terror" associated with it

insidious

-

-

both overt and

defines the modern age to a great extent.

In an age where denial is a chief mechanism by which

violence is rendered less visible and perpetuated, he
employs ontological metaphors which summon us to recognize
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the degree of violence in
every perception.
in an age
where violence is disguised,
with Foucault, he gestures
us towards a hyper-sensitivity
to the encroachment
intrinsic in existence. Yet
this insight shares the
stage with another.
For this age of objectif
ication
which denies its violence is
at the same time one
of "depoeticization and
disenchantment," a time in
which both our categories and our
experiences of their
failure are draining away our sense
of the openness
of the future and the possibility
of creating a world
with more justice and grandeur.
Merleau-Ponty worries
about a " bad existentialism, which
exhausts itself
in the description of the collision
between reason
and the contradictions of experience
and terminates
in a consciousness of defeat." 17

His perceptual and

ontological metaphors of "depth," "expression,"
"miracle,"
"overlapping," are attempts to repoeticize our
experience
at a most basic level - attempts to color
our existence

with the profundity of possibility.

Viewed at this level,

I

think that Merleau-Ponty

'

rhetoric and ontology are more suited than Foucault 's
to the dialogical artistic ethos which

I

believe they

both share at a general level.

A sense of danger and

discord alone is not sufficient

-

most times
deeds.

- to

for most people at

provoke and call forth great creative

Great acts usually require a sense of positive
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possibility as well.

Insofar as tne WQrld Merleau .
ponty

evokes is one which is a
"pregnancy of possibles-" not simply transgression,
"possibles" which allow and
call for better expressions
of existence, it elicits
our creative engagement
in a way that Foucault's
world
does not.
it calls us to the task
of constructing
as

well as deconstructing.

of course, Foucault himself

calls us to create our existences,
but the world he
describes at the ontological level
harbors little of
the inspiration of possibility
which would help sustain
this ethos - an ethos that requires
an enormous degree
of fortitude.
short, I think the tenability
of this
ethos rests on a sense of the
possibility of a certain
degree of comp licit y in our relations
with others and
the natural world, while recognizing
that this complicity
always involves an element of transgression.

m

There are important political implications
in the
present distinction as well. The centrality
of discord
and danger in Foucault's perception of the world
is

entwined with a focus on "local" strategies designed
to thwart the exercise of power at specific sites.

This is partly due to the fact that this perception
has given rise to a heightened understanding of the

importance of these sites in the subjugation of selves.
Yet it is also because this perception has given rise
to a skepticism that leads one to shy away from attempts
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to construct plausible
alternatives.

In absence of such

alternatives, resistance tends
to be consumed in local
struggles against current
modes of power.

That Foucault's rhetoric
and ontology largely
discourage the attempt to
formulate alternatives is
extremely significant, for
such alternatives would
involve an articulation of
different social
values,

visions and concrete directions
which might catalyze
significant coalition building with
other people
struggling against other sites of
power.

m

addition,

the formulation of alternative
practices would tend to
raise more "global" issues as well,
as people attempted
to consider the broader circumstances
which would be
required in order to realize their goals.
These global
issues could provide an additional
focus for creating
solidarity.

None of this is necessarily excluded by the
ethic

which governs Foucault's work.

In fact,

I

think these

things are called for at the level of his ethics
as
I

developed them in Chapter Four.

But his ontology

and rhetoric tend to inhibit their development.

While

his ethics provides an extremely valuable position from

which to begin to formulate positive alternatives to
the contemporary practices he has criticized, Foucault

very rarely actually took these steps.

One will say that

this was a strategic choice, that Foucault was simply more
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concerned with pl aying the „
fool „ and problemat ,
ng „
than with offering us
concrete solutions.
In part this
is true - he has said
so himself" - and he
was able fcQ
raise important questions
from this
i_ms position
ms i«™ in ways that
others had not done.
Yet we should not endow
Foucault
with an agency that he and
others have persuasively
debunked.
Foucault partly chose his
rhetoric and
ontological formulations, but at
.

,.

.

<

the same time his

language and fundamental
experiences of the world
guided and limited his choices.
They dissuaded him
from formulating concrete
alternatives even as an
ethos emerged in his writings
which provides an original
and fascinating perspective from
which to begin this
task.

if we are to grasp and creatively
develop the

most profound dimensions of Foucault's
thought in the
direction of a more adequate political
theory it seems
to me that we would do well to shift
towards ontological
formulations and rhetorical configurations
that are closer
to those of Merleau-Ponty as I have
developed his thought
in this text.
(Having said this is not to deny that there
is no society imaginable that would not
benefit from the

presence of "fools."

it is simply to assert that this

benefit hinges in part on those who take up their insights
in ways that are not "fool-ish.")

Merleau-Ponty

-

as inadequate and unoriginal as his

thoughts on politics often are
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continually calls us to

foliate

alternatives to the iven
g
visions and practices
of violence and subjugation.
His vision of a "third
way was aimed not only at
criticizing and avoiding the
hegemony of the two super-powers,
but also at working out
a path towards a more
dialogical and just
world.

if we
are able to inform this
impulse (and the ontology
that
supports it) with Foucault's
insights into the workings
and dangers of power in
modernity, and develop it in
light of the dialogical artistic
ethos which emerges
in the writings of both there are great possibilities.

A Brief GlancP at Two Fignros in
the Surrounding
Landscape of Politi c al and Social Thpnry
The dialogical artistic ethos which
has been
developed here through the works of
Foucault and
Merleau-Ponty provides a vantage point from
which to
criticize certain contemporary practices and
formulate

alternatives which avoid two dangerous tendencies
in
contemporary theory. The first, as exemplified by

the

world of Habermas, consists in attempting to ground
critique in quasi-transcendentals derived from an

analysis of an "ideal speech situation" which would
ensure the possibility of a non-coercively arrived at
rational consensus.

Leaving aside the questions of

interpretation which arise in the Habermas-Godamer
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debate and elsewhere, the
central problem with
respect
to the argument I have
been developing here is
that
in Habermas' scheme
differences are only
recognized
as legitimate if they
fall within the limits
defined
by the preconditions
deemed necessary for achieving
a

"rational consensus."

Differences are only acknowledged

to the extent that they can
be formulated in a manner
that would guarantee the
possibility of an eventual
identity.
Yet this a priori privileging
of identity,
unity, consensus and Reason
above all else is precisely
one of the issues which Foucault
contests.
light of
this crucial discrepancy, Dreyfus
and Rabinow are probably
justified in asserting that Habermas'
position precludes
any real dialogue with Foucault. 20
Habermas' stance seems
to foreclose the possibility of
problematizing dimensions
of our modernity which we have
good reason to question.
Furthermore, in the context of the achievement

m

of a

transparent rationality there appears to be
no space
for "non-rational" differences let alone
a positive

valuation of differences.

As we have seen, such a

stance is extremely problematic in light of the

philosophies of Foucault and Merleau-Ponty
With this in mind Foucault writes, "perhaps one

must not be for consensuality
nonconsensuality." 21

,

but one must be against

The principle of nonconsensual ity

here implies a coercive non-dialogical form of power
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that approaches the other
through force or discipline.
It is unacceptable for
Foucault, because it implies
that we "throw away" the
possibility of understand!,mg
our differences or reaching
agreements dialogically
Yet there is no genuine
dialogical engagement between
different others when their
voices are limited
at

the start within the confines
of a regulative reason
which would a priori guarantee
consensus.
Hence while
rejecting nonconsensual ity Foucault
simultaneously opposed
consensus as a regulative principle,
and in fact finds
the most fecund situations to be
those where significant
differences intermingle.

There are important limits (which must
be empirically
defined) to difference within the
artistic ethos. Those

differences that are inherently nonconsensual
and nondialogical, those whose primary effect is
to obliterate
the difference of the world around them,
are not
acceptable where they have a significant social
impact.
Yet these limits well out of a dialogical
appreciation
of and respect for others' differences

(a

respect and

appreciation which does not preclude extremely discordant
conversations)

,

rather than the preconditions for possible

homogenization.
At the same time that the artistic ethos avoids
the Habermasian quagmire however, it is equally distant

from the "post-modern" alternative we find developed

362

in the work of Jean-Francois
Lyotard.

Reacting against
the dangerous implications
of totalizing thought,
Lyotard
suggests that we abandon
"legitimating metanarratives"
and affirm the heterogeneity
of diverse language
games.
For Lyotard, this implies
that these games will be
(in

Sam Weber's words)

"non-communicating and incommeasurable";22 multiplicitous
discourses and practices will
flourish without regard to the
"totalitarian" demands
for some sort of exterior
accountability or concern.
Of course, Lyotard is not
entirely blind to the fact
that as embodied in the same
social world our discursive
practices encroach upon one another.
But his position,
which is one of indifference and
non-sense towards that
which lies beyond each particular
"game," and in the
inter-world between "games" is unable to
address this
problem. Hence Hobbes rumbles in the
final passage
of Just Gaming as Lyotard backs into
a corner where
he finds lurking "the great prescriber himself." 23
In contrast to this very dangerous morass whose

worship of incommeasurability and non-communicating
indifference towards that which is Other
a different "game")

sovereign

-

(or,

in

leads us back to the absolute

the artistic ethos developed here fosters

a communication between games,

selves, practices which

transcends the limits of each and calls for the diverse

developments of each to acknowledge and respect the
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aialogical inter-world of
differences to which they
belong. The question of
the possible forms that
this
acknowledgement and respect
might take ultiMately brings
us back to the issue of
establishing limits. what
clear within this ethos is
that these limits will
have
to be determined through
an ongoing discussion
which
seeks to elaborate an "ontology
of the present." only
through such an ontology - the
type initiated by Kant
and continued in Hegel, Marx,
Nietzsche, Weber, Adorno,

u

Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, Heidegger
and others - can we
genuinely attempt to discern and
weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of our practices and
hence make decisions
that are as thoughtful as possible.
And only through
social, economic and political
structures that affirm
multiple and diverse voices can
such an ontology attain
a maximum guarantee against
dogmatism.
If this text has thus far quite
persistently remained

at the level of ontology and ethics,
if

I

have avoided

throwing out many anchors which might
"ground" and "bring
down to earth" what is admittedly an abstract
journey,

this is in no way to avoid either the necessity
or the

desirability of working out the implications of what
has
been said for our everyday practices. Yet while theory
and practice, ethics and politics, exist in a relationship

of circularity which partially constitutes the nature of
each,

I

am extremely wary of those who demand that the
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circle be drawn too tightly.

The circumscription implied

too often leads to both
bad theory and bad practice.
If
I have exploited for
the moment a margin of
autonomy for
theory, it has been to allow
the latter the possibility
of developing in a manner
that might shed a different
light upon the practices and
commitments out of which
it sprang.
But there is another issue as
well.

if theory

runs the danger of being excessively
constrained when
it is tied too tightly,
frequently, or carelessly into
the everyday, the latter suffers
as well.
The way we
live is too textured and important
to be shaped and
governed by quick leaps out of theory,
too complicated
for there to be much justice in glib
theoretical

references affirming this practice, denying
that one.
As Foucault illustrated and articulated
on numerous
occasions, the task of creating our lives
is an activity

requiring profoundly historical analysis.

Discerning

the practical implications of theory requires
the same.

Leaping over historical analysis blunts the possible

contributions of theory making it of little value to
the world, and stifles the possibility that the world

might speak to and transform theory.

The very possibility

of a dialogue between theory and practice requires more

care than

I

am capable of in passing remarks and examples.

What is required at this point

365

- in

addition to further

^

^

wor* on the ethic at an
abstract
.
proceeds with the values
and insights which surface
in
the ethos begun by
Merleau-Ponty

^

and Foucault.
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